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Welcome to the Journal of Business 
Models
The research field of business models has gained a 
vast amount of momentum in the recent decade – a 
momentum that only looks to continue in strength in 
the coming years. Hence, the mission of this journal is 
to support the growing interest of researchers in the 
business model phenomenon and provide a rigorous 
platform for which researchers can develop and dis-
seminate their research-based insights to the world 
of business scholars and executive managers. Up un-
til now, business model research has found its home 
in numerous special issues in journals such as Long 
Range Planning, Journal of Management and a forth-
coming issue of Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 
just to name a few. However, with the Journal of Busi-
ness Models we now have a dedicated journal that can 
serve as a multidisciplinary platform for researchers 
interested in the business model phenomenon from all 
possible academic perspectives and disciplines.
The aim of the Journal of Business Models is to dis-
seminate the newest research-based insight on busi-
ness models globally. The Journal of Business Models 
will constitute a cross-disciplinary platform conveying 
multiple-type papers, i.e. both conceptual and em-
pirical and also encouraging methodological pluralism. 
We plan to invite contributors in order to cover a wide 
array of the most popular perspectives on business 
models, like e.g. innovation, commercialization, en-
trepreneurship, internationalization, strategy, organi-
zation, accounting, performance measurement and 
finance. However, we also intend to provide space for 
less mainstream and alternative perspectives that may 
challenge existing practices of thought.
The key audiences of this journal are academics and 
dedicated consultants. As this journal aims at push-
ing the knowledge of the field to a higher theoretical 
level, and to becoming a core discipline in due course, 
the rigorousness of the review process and the qual-
ity of the published papers naturally lend themselves 
to an expert audience. However, policy-makers, politi-
cians, entrepreneurs and students with high academic 
aspirations will also benefit substantially from the mix 
of articles in this journal.
The Journal of Business Models does not have a pre-
planned publication schedule. This is one of the 
strengths of not being a part of a large publication 
corporation. Our aim is to publish at least two issues a 
year and a maximum of five issues. Rather than forcing 
papers through the submission process or leaving up to 
date knowledge sitting on the shelf waiting for critical 
mass, this journal can publish when the timing is best.
Therefore it is a good idea to register as a reader to this 
journal (http://journals.aau.dk/index.php/JOBM/user/
register) while at the same time being a registered 
member of the Business Model Community (see www.
businessmodelcommunity.com) in order to receive 
timely information on new publications.
The scope of the Journal 
In this first issue, as well as the issues forthcoming in 
2014, the papers are expected to cover a majority of 
the existing perspectives on business models and also 
to include a large number of major contributors to the 
field. The editorial panel is working hard to ensure that 
the literature provided and discussed covers varying 
perceptions of the field and how to progress the field of 
business models forward from this point. The various 
major disciplines or schools addressing business mod-
els, including strategy, management, organization, in-
novation, entrepreneurship, technology, internationali-
zation, finance and communication, will all be covered 
during the first year and make lead way for a series of 
special issues digging deeper into such perspectives 
from a multi-method and interdisciplinary angle.
The array of perspectives present in the literature 
on business models leads to the identification of a 
number of themes on which the Journal of Business 
Models naturally will be focused. Some of the subjects 
expected (but not limited to) in the journal are:
• Definitions and concepts of business models; in-
cluding archetypes, typologies, key components 
and building blocks  
• Defining what business models are about: The 
epistemological and conceptual roots of business 
models and their differences with strategy, strate-
gic management, organization and business plan-
ning
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• Business Model Design: designing, rejuvenating, 
innovating and facilitating business models includ-
ing the role of design thinking contra the business 
case
• Implementing business models and the execution 
process
• Commercialization and exploitation of ideas 
through business models: challenging entrepre-
neurial processes
• Seeking the true benefits of a globalized world: 
how internationalization of activities affects busi-
ness models
• The strategic partnerships of business models: 
Roles and relationships within and among busi-
ness models
• Business models and high-tech ventures
• The performance of business models: Dilemmas 
and paradoxes of performance measurement con-
sequences
• Tools and techniques for analysing, designing, 
testing and implementing business models
The business model of the Journal 
of Business Models
This journal is an Open Access journal that follows the 
Creative Commons Attribution License version
     
   
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)
By this license authors retain the copyrights to their 
work and grant the journal the right of first publication 
with the work. 
At the same time, we believe in academic rigour and the 
value-added of a double-blind review process. The Jour-
nal of Business Models runs on an Open Journal System 
platform that ensures the exact same work flow such 
as provided for example by the ScholarOne setup of 
Manuscript Central. There are well-established control 
mechanisms for ensuring anonymity of manuscripts as 
well as reviewers, and there is also a rating system on 
reviewers and their efforts.
Question: “So what is it precisely we are missing out on 
by not being part of a large publication house?” 
Answer: “Apart from using academic colleagues as free 
resources for profit-making purposes we don’t really 
know!”
While it is clear that large publishing houses may be 
able to offer some professional services in relation to 
marketing a journal like ours, when it comes to services 
for authors, these are typically not for free anyhow. 
Our hypothesis is that in this era of Google-optimiza-
tion it is possible to beat the existing marketing mod-
els of established publishing houses. We call this in-
telligent marketing. The following section analyses the 
potential business model of a journal doing just this. 
At the present the customers of a standard journal are 
the universities themselves through their affiliated li-
braries. So in effect university employees are working 
for free to publish in journals the very same university 
pays for access to. Now that is a neat business model 
– at least if you are a publisher. With an open access 
journal, libraries are not charged. However, these open 
access journals typically do not have any marketing ac-
tivities. Therefore, we need you – the readers, authors 
and reviewers – to go to your library directors and rec-
ommend them putting this journal on their resource 
list. 
Despite the Journal of Business Models not having to 
send profit back to a publisher, there are still costs of 
running the business. Most of these costs are associ-
ated with the activities of the submission system and 
the publishing process (even if we do count entirely on 
your marketing effort). Our submission system is run 
by our strategic partner Open Journal Systems, and the 
website is sponsored by Aalborg University Library. 
Despite this, our business case estimates the costs of 
running the Journal of Business Models at €25.000-
30.000 a year.  We intend to launch an international 
case competition for the best business model for the 
Journal of Business Models in the beginning of 2014. 
We hope you and your students will join in.  The above 
illustrates that a journal like this is short of a strong 
marketing partner.  Let us take a look at how this could 
be solved.
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Let’s get a group on
Let’s get a group on – Let’s get a Groupon. This is a play 
with words for two reasons. Firstly, it stipulates that 
there is a need to activate the group of scholars inter-
ested in the field of business models and to work with 
creating and sending enough value back to them to 
ensure that they will keep on sending manuscripts to 
the journal and help out reviewing the papers of their 
peers. The Business Model Community can add value 
to the journal by submitting their best papers through 
the Journal of Business Models, which in turn will lever-
age the impact factor of the journal for their own good.
Secondly, leaning on Groupon as a metaphor of doing 
business, i.e. a business model, what we can learn from 
the above is that we have to be extremely intelligent in 
the way we take in strategic partners and utilize them 
in the value creation process of the journal. 
Groupon’s business model is unique not only in the 
way that the company “creates markets” by becom-
ing a platform for building consumer buying power. 
Groupon’s business model is also unique because the 
potential buyers become the most important strate-
gic marketing partners to the company. Let us try to 
describe the Journal of Business Models (JOBM) in the 
light of this business model metaphor:
• The central company, Groupon, is the JOBM edito-
rial board and reviewers
• The shops in the Groupon concept are the univer-
sity libraries and universities themselves as well as 
independent researchers in the JOBM case
• The customers are the authors and readers of 
JOBM, including academics, corporate managers, 
policy-makers and students
• We need to persuade the customers to perform 
the marketing for JOBM
• JOBM then needs to set up a structure to do this 
(facebook button, LinkedIn button, Twitter button, 
and direct mail to the library director)
However, now comes the key question of how the JOBM 
can make enough money to sustain its operations. We 
expect to require revenues of €25.000-30.000 a year to 
reach break-even for a journal with this level of activity. 
A number of revenue streams make themselves avail-
able, for example, a few large sponsors, a crowd-fund-
ing approach, adds, an annual conference, book promo-
tions and paid book reviews from publishing houses, or 
print on demand services for libraries world-wide. 
The key question is therefore: Which mix of these is 
the best combination with the value proposition and 
strategy of this journal? 
In reality, what we really need to facilitate is a strong 
academic and professional community around this 
journal. To do this, the Journal of Business Models 
needs to obtain a strong impact factor and a good 
ranking. Did we say Chicken-and-egg problem? We go 
about this by insisting on a rigorous and constructive 
peer review process. The next step will no doubt be left 
in the hands of the audience, who needs to cite the 
published work and send in papers that develop earlier 
work. The audience also needs to discuss the papers 
at conferences, in blogs etc.  In other words, we just 
gave you, the readers, the authors and the reviewers, 
full responsibility!
Don’t worry. We are confident in you. The Journal of 
Business Models already has a vast potential audience 
and a strong community. At the Business Model Com-
munity website there are close to 300 registered mem-
bers at the present. The same goes for practitioners 
around the world and can be seen from the quantity of 
practitioner conferences and summits available. 
The Editorial Team
In this initial phase of starting up the journal a big 
thank you goes out to the Editorial Advisory Board and 
the Editorial Review Board which have constituted the 
major part of the hard working reviewers on the pa-
pers that are either in the editing process or submis-
sion process at the present. The Editors-in-Chief also 
wish to thank the team at the Editorial office and at 
Aalborg University Library for their commitment to the 
project, their professionalism as well as patience with 
a team of newly designated reviewers and editors get-
ting used to the submission system.  The organization 
of the journal is as follows: 
6
Journal of Business Models (2013), Vol. 1, No. 1
Editors-in-Chief
• Christian Nielsen, Aalborg University, Denmark
• Colin Haslam, Queen Mary University of London, 
United Kingdom
• Romeo V. Turcan, Aalborg University, Denmark
Editorial Advisory Board
• Marco Montemari, Università Politecnica delle 
Marche, Italy
• Robin Roslender, University of Dundee, United 
Kingdom
• Poul Kyvsgaard Hansen, Aalborg University, Den-
mark
• Xavier Lecocq, IAE Lille and IESEG School of Man-
agement, France
• Jonas Hedman, Copenhagen Business School, 
Denmark
• Ales Novak, University of Maribor, Slovenia
• Stefano Zambon, University of Ferrara, Italy
• Petri Ahokangas, Oulu Business School, Finland
Editorial Review Board
• Hanno Roberts, Norwegian Business School, 
Norway
• Ivan Butler, Aalborg University, Denmark
• Gunnar Rimmel, Jonkjöping Business School, 
Sweden 
• Risto Rajala, Aalto University, Finland
• Anders Drejer, Aalborg University, Denmark
• Norman Fraser, Henley Business School, United 
Kingdom
• Yariv Taran, Aalborg University, Denmark
• Margit Malmmose, Aarhus University, Denmark
• Lars Krull, Aalborg University, Denmark
• Rainer Lueg, Aarhus University, Denmark
• Susan Christine Lambert, University of South 
Australia, Australia
• Kristina Jonäll, University of Gothenburg, Sweden
• Langdon Morris, Innovationlabs, USA
• Peter Seddon, The University of Melbourne,  
Australia
• Geoffrey Lewis, Melbourne Business School,  
Australia
• Michael Rappa, North Carolina State University, 
USA
• Taman Powell, Cardiff Business School, UK
Editorial Office
• Vibeke Jørgensen, Aalborg University, Denmark
• Anja Birch Nielsen, Aalborg University, Denmark
• Jesper Chrautwald Sort, Aalborg University,  
Denmark
• Morten Lund, Aalborg University, Denmark 
• Janni Preisler Vilstrup , Aalborg University,  
Denmark
• Maria Abildgaard Haladyn, Aalborg University 
Library, Denmark
The inaugural edition
In this inaugural issue we start to address the core 
themes that form the scope of the journal. However, 
we are humble towards the fact that it is difficult to 
come around all core themes in just one issue, also 
realizing that getting manuscripts that would fit into 
such a jigsaw puzzle would be difficult. Therefore, we 
do not claim to cover all key topics in this issue. How-
ever, we urge those of you who feel “left out” to get in 
touch as soon as possible. 
Furthermore, we urge you as readers and potential au-
thors to consider the merits of forming some of these 
core themes into special issues that you would wish 
to be the guest editor(s) of. Besides the already an-
nounced special issue from the NFF conference in Ice-
land, we have two other special issues in the pipeline at 
the present. One relates to the internationalization of 
business models, and the other to the financialization 
of business models. 
This issue will be divided into four sections as described 
below: 
Section 1: Definitions, concepts, schools and 
theory
A natural place to begin is by addressing issues of de-
fining the concept of business models. In the literature 
there are to our awareness more than 70 definitions of 
what a business model is. Some of the most cited defi-
nitions include Porter’s 2001 take that: 
“The definition of a business model is murky at best”,
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and Magretta’s 2002 neat and simplistic definition: 
“A business model is a story that explains how the en-
terprise works”
Bell and Solomon (2002, xi) put a profit angle on the 
concept in stating that a business model is:
 
“[A] simplified representation of the network of causes 
and effects that determine the extent to which the en-
tity creates value and earns profits”,
while other authors such as Chesbrough and Rosen-
bloom (2002) provided more comprehensible, albeit 
complex, definitions, here in the form of their six nec-
essary steps that constitute the description of a busi-
ness model: 
1. Articulate the value proposition, that is, the value 
created for users by the offering based on the tech-
nology
2. Identify a market segment, that is, the users to 
whom the technology is useful and for what purpose
3. Define the structure of the value chain within the 
firm required to create and distribute the offering
4. Estimate the cost structure and profit potential of 
producing the offering, given the value proposition 
and value chain structure chosen
5. Describe the position of the firm within the value 
network linking suppliers and customers, including 
identification of potential complementors and com-
petitors
6. Formulate the competitive strategy by which the 
innovating firm will gain and hold advantage over 
rivals
In the middle of the last decade, it was almost as if 
every researcher needed to prove his/her right to con-
tribute to the field by having his/her own definition of 
what a business model was. As such, one of the au-
thors of this editorial also managed to jump onto that 
specific bandwagon stating that:
“A business model describes the coherence in the stra-
tegic choices which facilitates the handling of the proc-
esses and relations which create value on both the oper-
ational, tactical and strategic levels in the organization. 
The business model is therefore the platform which con-
nects resources, processes and the supply of a service 
which results in the fact that the company is profitable 
in the long term” (2006, reprinted in Nielsen 2011).
In recent years the definition by Osterwalder and 
Pigneur (2009) seems to encapsulate in a neat manner 
the focus of the field as it stands today: 
“A business model is the rationale of how an organiza-
tion creates, delivers and captures value”
In this issue the paper by Bille discusses the develop-
ments of business model definitions. This recap leads 
us to question the necessity of having a clear definition 
of what a business model is, i.e. to define or not, and 
the value added of discussing details of definition.
In much the same manner, in the last 10-15 years we 
have seen the development of numerous conceptuali-
zations of business models, including frameworks for 
defining archetypes, typologies, key components and 
building blocks. Morris contributes with a seminal ac-
count of how the business model becomes a competi-
tive advantage in this rejuvenated 2013 version. 
With their Business Model Canvas, Osterwalder and 
Pigneur provided a relatively fresh surge to the field 
in 2009. Hence we are now seeing the same tenden-
cies as with the definition game above that a lot of re-
searchers and consultants are constructing their own 
canvasses. In this issue the paper by Fielt takes the 
temperature on the concepts, models, canvasses and 
archetypes discussion.  
Many of the definitions and concepts that constitute 
the discussions above illustrate how the field of busi-
ness models is grounded in a variety of different aca-
demic perspectives and backgrounds. It can be argued 
that there are several different Schools of Thought in 
this field and these are described and discussed in the 
paper by Ahokangas et al. Here the temperature on the 
dispersion of the field is taken, and the diffusion of the 
concept from the early roots of strategy in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s over the e-business assimilation of the turn 
of the millennium towards the design school move-
ment of the last few years is depicted.   
In a natural development from definitions, over con-
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cepts to schools, the next step is to address the move 
towards theorization of business models. The paper by 
Lueg et al. hypothesizes that the choice of business 
model may be more dependent upon the specific chal-
lenges a company is facing and the lifecycle phase it is 
in, and not so much the industry segment within which 
it competes. 
Lueg et al. develop the notion of analysing the role of 
business models across the four phases of the business 
lifecycle in order to generate coherent business model 
theory and thereby the ability to provide prescriptive 
theories of action, design, and implementation. High-
er-level theories like this may provide a quantum leap 
for companies looking to optimize their business con-
figurations and profit models.
Section 2: The influence of technology
The creation of wealth and new industries is often seen 
as a combination of technological, organisational and 
societal factors, and much the same can be said for 
the advent of business models where new technolo-
gies and new knowledge make possible the deliver-
ance of new and novel value propositions. However, 
the preparedness of customer segments to take on 
board such value propositions is also a necessity for 
success. This was evident in the dot.com bubble that 
also boosted research into business models. Because 
e-business technologies were relatively young and cus-
tomers not used to using the Internet as a retail chan-
nel, many companies ended up with unprofitable busi-
ness models.  
Together with the prospects of business models as ac-
tivity systems and cost/revenue architectures, Zott et 
al. (2011) argue that e-business still is one out of three 
key issues in relation to business models that needs to 
be addressed. From a customer perspective the notion 
of e-business might merely be seen as a choice of dis-
tribution or communication channel, and therefore this 
research would need to explain the effects of e-busi-
ness in relation to both value creation, value capture 
and value delivery. These aspects are covered by Rappa 
in his revision of his very influential paper from 2001. 
The paper by Chae and Hedman articulates the inter-
play between the role of technology and a business 
model exemplified by the mobile payment ecosystem 
and illustrates how the lack of sustainable business 
models has led to slow market penetration.  This pa-
per offers a framework that allows practitioners and 
academics to study current and future mobile payment 
approaches and thus a platform from which to address 
business model innovation. 
Relative to other types of innovations, Taran and Boer 
argue that little is known about business model inno-
vation, let alone the process of managing the risks in-
volved in that process. Using the emerging enterprise 
risk management literature, they propose an approach 
through which risk management can be embedded in 
the business model innovation process and illustrate 
this through a case study. The results warrant contin-
uation of the development of such a model and give 
rise to furthering the links between innovation models 
and models of doing business. This is taken one step 
further in Lecocq and Demil’s paper which introduces a 
tool to design and innovate business models. 
Section 3: Creating businesses and value
While it is possible to imagine a company without in-
novation, leadership and explicit strategy, it may be ar-
gued that no company exists without a business mod-
el, some form of organisation and a business idea as a 
starting point. The field of business models is there-
fore intricately connected with creating new companies 
as well as with the understanding of value creation. 
From the perspective of entrepreneurship, Verstraete 
and Jouison-Lafitte’s paper posits the role of business 
models and the application of business model design 
tools on start-up companies. Commercialization and 
exploitation of ideas through business models and the 
challenging of entrepreneurial processes through this 
perspective receive a lot of interest in the natural and 
technical sciences and also from policy-makers seeking 
methods for increasing the probability that funding of 
the sciences leads to value creation. 
The notion of organisation and the role of strategic 
management to business models, the final paper in 
this section, by Andersson et al., illustrates through 
the case of Real Estate Investment Trusts how busi-
ness models are affected by financialization. The paper 
discusses the evolution of the case business model and 
the extent to which it is dependent upon favourable le-
gal and accounting regulations. Hence it raises aware-
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ness of the intricacies of understanding profit models 
in more complex forms than previously suggested in 
the literature as merely being a term of cost/revenue 
models.  Further steps may entail theorization relat-
ing to the performance of business models, including 
analyses of the dilemmas and paradoxes of measuring 
their performance.
Section 4: Strategy, and creating business 
model patterns around customer needs
In this fourth section we expect a series of papers that 
address the interface between business models and 
strategy and how business model patterns emerge 
around the need of customers and other strategic part-
ners such as suppliers. The first of these is Seddon and 
Lewis’ reprise of their seminal paper from 2004. This 
section will furthermore constitute a foresight section 
on the design of business models including aspects of 
designing, rejuvenating, innovating, testing and facili-
tating business models and business model execution. 
We expect to see some contributions that will en-
lighten the dichotomous roles of design-thinking con-
tra business-case thinking evident at the present and 
thus discuss the epistemological and conceptual roots 
of business models and their differences with strat-
egy, strategic management, organization and business 
planning. Lastly, this section will address how compa-
nies, even SME’s, could and should be seeking the true 
benefits of a globalized world through international 
partnering and micro-multinational structures through 
unique business model configurations. 
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Business Model Warfare
The Strategy of Business Breakthroughs
Langdon Morris1
Abstract
There’s a story behind every business success and every business fail-
ure, sometimes the story of a great idea; sometimes one that failed. 
Sometimes it’s a story of insightful management, or management that 
failed.  But almost always it’s a story about change.  Change in the mar-
ket; change in the economy; change in a particular product or service that 
transformed a failure into a success, or vice versa.  Hidden behind many of 
these changes, or sometimes as a result of them, there is change in what 
customers experience, and as a result, a change in their perceptions and 
attitudes, and then in their buying habits.  Companies soar, or collapse, 
as a consequence.  While we study the stories to learn about the specific 
changes, events, insights, and breakdowns in each case, we also look for 
broader and deeper explanations that show how change applies across 
industries and the whole of the economy. The broader patterns are often 
Business Model Innovations, the subject of this white paper.  Here we pro-
pose a specific model explaining how large companies create and sustain 
market leadership in today’s market, or the traps that they fall into that 
prevent them from doing so.
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Introduction
The average lifespan of a major corporation isn’t very 
long.  The rate of change throughout the economy 
is such that a surprising number of new companies 
are being born and then growing to be quite large 
very quickly.  At the same time, many older and well 
established firms are falling by the wayside just as 
fast, or faster.  Hence, just because a company is listed 
in the S&P 500 or the Fortune 500, or any other of the 
biggest and most powerful and influential firms does 
not mean that it can look forward to a long and happy 
life ahead, as the mortality rate is high, and increasing. 
Many companies that we today consider to be leaders 
will be gone by tomorrow, or the day after, while 
companies that we haven’t yet heard of, and indeed 
which may not even exist today, may will in many cases 
become next week’s industry giants.1  
This problem of accelerating change is one of the most 
challenging issues facing business and government 
leaders today, not only in the developed world, but 
everywhere.
In these turbulent markets where companies that were 
once dominant are struggling to survive, managers are 
constantly probing to understand what makes the 
difference between success and failure.  
Looking at the recent past, for example, we might 
ask what happened to Nokia, or Blackberry, or Kodak, 
or Sony, Sears, Xerox, Blockbuster, Pontiac, Lehman 
Brothers, and so many other great brand names.  Why 
was GM’s Saturn subsidiary a breakthrough in the 1990s 
and 100% dead in 2008?  At the same time, how did 
Google, Facebook, Amazon, Fedex, Charles Schwab, and 
Home Depot become so big so fast, so widely admired? 
There’s a story behind every business success and every 
business failure, sometimes the story of a great idea; 
sometimes one that failed.  Sometimes it’s a story of 
insightful management, or management that failed. 
But almost always it’s a story about change.  Change 
in the market; change in the economy; change in a 
particular product or service that transformed a failure 
into a success, or vice versa.  Hidden behind many 
of these changes, or sometimes as a result of them, 
there is change in what customers experience, and as 
a result, a change in their perceptions and attitudes, 
and then in their buying habits.  Companies soar, or 
collapse, as a consequence.
While we study the stories to learn about the specific 
changes, events, insights, and breakdowns in each 
case, we also look for broader and deeper explanations 
that show how change applies across industries and 
the whole of the economy.
The broader patterns are the subject of this white 
paper.  Here we propose a specific model explaining how 
large companies create and sustain market leadership 
in today’s market, or the traps that they fall into that 
prevent them from doing so. 
Part I:  The Mortality of Companies
The capacity of organizations to adapt to rapid and 
unexpected change is frequently discussed, but 
managing for adaptability is a little understood 
and poorly practiced art even as the pace of change 
continues to accelerate.  In reality more big companies 
are going out of business faster than ever before.
In searching for hard data about company mortality we 
found three sources:  The Fortune 500 list, The Forbes 
100 list, and The S&P 500 list.
From the first year the Fortune 500 was created, 
1955, and continuing through 2001 we identified the 
companies that were on the list one year but not the 
subsequent year as living examples of what we might 
call the relentless progression of competition.  Over 
this span of 46 years, an average of 30 companies per 
year left the list.2
In some years there were more departures, in some 
years fewer, but the overall trend showed consistent 
turnover of about 6% each year. 
If the impact of decay was random among companies, 
then over a period of only about 17 years the entire list 
would turn over and an entirely new set of companies 
would be listed.  But of course it doesn’t happen that 
way.  Instead, some companies are ephemeral visitors 
to the Fortune 500, while others endure for decades.  A 
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study by planners at Shell found that by 1983, one-third 
of the companies listed among the 500 in 1970 had not 
only fallen from the list, but had gone out of business 
altogether.3  That’s an average mortality rate of 12 very 
large companies per year, or one per month.  They also 
found that a multi-national corporation comparable in 
size to a Fortune 500 company could only be expected 
to survive for between 40 and 50 years. 
In 1917, Forbes magazine created its own list of the 
largest 100 US companies, and over the seventy-
year span an average of about one company per year 
disappeared.  Of the remaining 39 original companies, 
18 were still large enough to remain on the list in 1987. 
However, of the 18 companies, only two had managed 
to perform better than the overall stock market during 
the seventy-year period.  While the combined annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of US public companies from 
1917 to 1987 was 7.5%, the 18 surviving companies 
managed a combined average of only 5.3%.  In other 
words, an investor in market index funds would have 
done substantially better than an investor in these 18 
companies.  (This assumes, of course, that any investor 
would have had the incredible foresight to pick the 18 
surviving big companies from the original list of 100.) 
The S&P 500 list provides a third reference point.  The 
mortality rate S&P 500 companies has been steadily 
increasing, and the average life span has steadily decreased 
from more than 50 years to fewer than 25 today.4   
The three slices of history convey a clear pattern, and 
projecting the pattern forward suggests that about 
a third of today’s major corporations will survive as 
significant businesses for the next twenty-five years. 
Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan comment that, “Most 
will die or be bought out and absorbed because they 
are too slow to keep pace with change in the market.”5
That’s the key issue – keeping page with change in the 
market; and of course it’s very difficult to do.  Where, 
then, to focus?
Part II:  It’s the Business Model 
The context of business strategy is the marketplace in 
which it is played out, so discussions of strategy must 
begin with reference to market dynamics.  Today, the 
most external critical factors are accelerating change, 
increasing competition, new technology, and increasing 
complexity, while the two major internal drivers are 
innovation and corporate decision making.  
While each of the external ones presents its own 
particular problems, the impact of all four acting 
together significantly compounds the problem, 
composing a “change conspiracy” that increases the 
danger exponentially.  The results are a drastically 
compressed planning horizon for every company, the 
need for faster responses throughout the organization, 
and the accelerating rate of corporate failure as leaders 
simply fail to master these dynamics.
Indeed, these conditions are taking a heavy toll on 
companies, industries, and entire nations, and bringing 
severe stress to the business leaders who grapple with 
these issues day after day.  On the news you’ll hear 
a long list of struggling enterprises, notable not only 
for the steep slide that many have recently endured, 
but also because it was not so long ago that they were 
held in high esteem.  Among them are, as mentioned, 
Nokia, Sony, Kodak, Sears, Xerox, and many others.  
While these companies struggle to right themselves, 
even entire nations struggle to keep their economies 
viable in the new and demanding framework of global 
markets.  A decade ago Argentina, Brazil, and their 
South American neighbors were caught in a deep 
decline; currently Greece, Spain, and Ireland are notable 
for their struggles, while Japan struggles with an 
economic restructuring that has already lasted nearly 
two decades.
The parade of failures makes for dramatic stories that 
are illustrated by the sad losses suffered by individuals 
and families struggling to survive the economic and 
emotional strains, but as more and more companies 
fail, it is becoming clear that these are no longer 
unusual events.  
In spite of the attempts by governments, central banks, 
and multilateral organizations such as the IMF, WTO, 
and the World Bank to reduce the impacts of change, 
it’s evident that the forces of change are far stronger 
than ever before.  Turbulence continues to increase, 
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which means that business failures will continue to be 
common occurrences going forward.  And managers 
wonder obsessively deep into the night, What should 
I be doing differently?
Creative Destruction
While the sense of crisis and the time compression 
caused by the change conspiracy is certainly real, the 
underlying dynamics of the competitive marketplace 
are not new.  In the 1940s the brilliant economist 
Joseph Schumpeter described the overall capitalist 
process as “creative destruction,” and he pointed out 
that the natural behavior of capitalist systems brings 
revolution not as the result of vague external factors, 
but from within.  Change, Schumpeter observed, is 
the common condition of capitalism, not stability. 
And in an utterly prescient comment about prevalent 
management practices at the time (and still today), 
he wrote, “The problem that is usually being visualized 
is how capitalism administers existing structures, 
whereas the relevant problem is how it creates and 
destroys them.”6
The significance of this comment is nearly impossible 
to overstate.  While so many observers and leaders 
focus their attention on how businesses perform in 
today’s markets, Schumpeter points out that it is in 
the very nature of market evolution to weaken some 
companies while creating enticing opportunities 
for others.  Therefore, just as important as today’s 
market structures, or today’s technologies, or today’s 
competitive advantage, is how the forces of change 
will affect a firm tomorrow and the day after.
But unfortunately, the instinctive habit of management 
is to look forward at a 90 day sales forecast and the 
next quarterly report, or backwards to the past, to guide 
a course into the future.  Neither approach is adequate 
to the challenge that is the focus of this paper.
We call this short-term mentality the “logic of 
operations,” and it is characterized by a pattern of 
behavior whose goal is to create a stable, scalable 
enterprise that returns strong, steady profits to its 
stakeholders.  The qualities that are important from 
this perspective include predictability, the capacity to 
forecast future growth, revenues, and profits, and as a 
result tremendous emphasis is placed on management 
of today’s business.  Standardization, policy, procedure, 
organization structure, and short-term decision making 
are tuned and fine tuned.  
The problem, of course, is that the obsession with 
predictable scalability ignores the realities of external 
change, and in an era characterized by the nasty change 
conspiracy, the obsession with the short term cannot 
and does not succeed.  
To take Nokia as a poignant example, it does no good 
to be far and away the globe’s leading cell phone 
maker, the firm with 9 of the top 10 selling phones 
worldwide, as Nokia was in 2007, when the iPhone 
comes along.  Since the introduction of the iPhone, 
Nokia’s market capitalization has dropped from a nice 
high of $150 billion in 2007, to a rather sad $27 billion 
today (February 2014).  That’s $123 billion erased as its 
prospects transformed from bright to dismal.  With 
top management looking backward instead of into 
the future, Nokia did not have a ready response to the 
iPhone.  It quickly became a sad story for a lot of people.
Nokia’s 2007 Annual Report is written in glowing 
language that is highly optimistic.  Military leaders 
are familiar with this problem, which they refer to as 
“preparing to fight the last war.”  Such preparations, 
even fully implemented with rigor and discipline, 
consistently fail if the style of warfare has in the 
interim changed.  Whether it’s armored knights 
slaughtered by the long bow, France’s Maginot Line, 
the 20th century’s iconic monument to backward 
thinking, the Polish horse cavalry that rode out to face 
Hitler’s blitzkrieg, the American army confounded by 
Viet Cong guerrilla fighters, civilian aircraft hijacked 
and turned into guided terrorist missiles, or a new 
class of weapon based on the cell phone, the “IED,” 
“improvised explosive device,” the history of warfare is 
the history of innovations that render past strategies 
ineffective.  This is also the history of business.  
Hence, the relevant question is, What is your strategy 
for dealing with accelerating change?
Part of the challenge with this type of thinking is that 
the misplaced focus is usually evident only in hindsight, 
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when wars, market share, jobs, or stock value have 
already been lost.  You have to find a different way of 
thinking, and a different way of working.
When things are moving so fast, in fact it’s a new kind of 
radar that you need, along with a different approach to 
making decisions.  For business leaders as for generals, 
hindsight does not provide sufficient preparation, and 
it is therefore essential to have an effective way not 
only to look toward the future, but even better, to 
create it.  It is on this imperative of innovation that this 
report will now concentrate.
Innovation
The term “creative destruction” gives us a warning, 
a name, and a general explanation for the waves of 
change that move continually through the marketplace, 
and “fighting the last war” warns us as well that we 
have do it differently if we’re going to survive.  Both 
help us direct our attention toward understanding the 
forces of change rather than supporting the illusion 
of stability, and also remind us that the waves of 
change are themselves created, either intentionally 
or unintentionally, not by mysterious forces, but as 
a result of purposeful innovation in the competitive 
arena of the market.  That’s right … your rivals in the 
marketplace or the battlefield are targeting you.  There 
is a business, or more than one, whose innovative 
thinkers are working right now to take away your share 
of the market, for innovation is indeed the weapon of 
choice.
What is your best response?
Innovations of your own.  
In fact, innovation may be your only possible valid 
response.
However, innovation is a term that means different 
things to different people.  Since it’s a critically 
important concept to this report and to your business, 
we’ll pause here to define it carefully.  
We note, first of all, that the word “innovation” refers 
to an attribute, a process, and a result.  Innovation is a 
process that happens somewhere in your company, or 
perhaps in someone’s mind.  The result, in each case, 
can be an insight, a new idea, a product, a strategy, 
a new or improve business process, or perhaps a 
new business model (we’ll get to defining “business 
model” shortly).  It may be a question, a theory, or just 
a fear.  But whatever it is, one of the qualities that 
will distinguish the new thing is its “innovativeness.” 
This innovativeness refers to its distinctiveness, 
its originality, perhaps its usefulness, and most 
importantly its value.7 
The label “innovation” also refers specifically to 
that new thing itself that the innovation process has 
produced.  To be considered an innovation in business, 
the result must be increased value in the form of 
new or improved functionality, reduced cost, a price 
increase (good for the seller), a price decrease (good 
for the buyer), better margin for the seller, or some 
combination of these.
According to this definition not every new or different 
idea qualifies as an innovation.  In fact only a small 
percentage qualify.  Innovative ideas, by definition, 
create value for their users and valuable competitive 
advantage for their owners, as well as economic 
rewards.
However, even innovations that have only minor 
impact on the market can be significant and critically 
important, especially if they help a company to provide 
its customers with a superior experience.  In this 
context innovation can be used to defend, to block 
competitors from gaining our share even as it can also 
be used to attack.8
Hence, the approach that Peter Drucker labeled as 
“fast-follower” is a useful defensive strategy employed 
by companies to block the growing effectiveness 
of a competitor’s offering.  For example, Netscape 
Navigator had a strong head start in the browser 
market, but Microsoft’s Internet Explorer became a 
fast follower and quickly overtook Netscape, forcing 
it to seek refuge as a subsidiary of AOL.  (AOL grew 
dominant for a short time, acquired Time-Warner, and 
then itself collapsed into near-irrelevance before being 
reinvented.)
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In high tech and particularly software markets, a variant 
on this strategy is known derisively as “vaporware.” 
Here the defense consists of product announcements, 
not actual products.  In the early days of the database 
market, vaporware announcements were prolific, while 
actual new products came trotting along sometimes 
years later.  In the course of one of these transitions 
Borland died a quick death long before its promised 
software reached the market.
While these aspects of innovation and the innovation 
process occur in the life cycles of individual companies, 
innovation is also a significant factor in macroeconomics 
at the level of nations and the economy as a whole. 
Economists know that it is only through effective 
innovation that real economic growth occurs, because 
the underlying economic impact of innovation is to 
make resources more productive, which literally creates 
wealth for society.  Hence, innovation is crucial to the 
economic viability of nations. 
But when discussing innovation the focus must remain 
on individuals and individual companies because it is 
their work that drives the economy forward.  Thus, just 
as innovators drive microeconomic change in specific 
markets and macroeconomic change in economies, 
it is innovators who trigger creative destruction in 
their search for commercial success and competitive 
advantage.  Among the companies widely admired 
today - and we have so far mentioned Google, Amazon, 
Facebook, Charles Schwab, Home Depot, and Fedex - 
most have attained success precisely because they have 
innovated.  Through their innovations they brought 
structural change to their markets; their motivation 
was to gain advantage within the capitalist process 
precisely as Schumpeter described, and they succeeded 
in doing so.
But the innovator’s role is only half of the equation. 
Customers are the ones who determine the value of 
innovations, because they are the ones who pay for 
them.  Market behavior is an aggregate reflection of 
each consumer’s drive to find the most attractive 
offers, and to maximize value received for cost incurred. 
As innovation is the process of creating higher value 
offerings, buyers naturally gravitate to innovative 
products.  
But perhaps “gravitate” is the wrong word.  It is 
more accurate to say that capitalist markets devour 
innovations, hungrily consuming them the way a very 
hungry lion consumes a fresh kill.  The capitalist system 
depends for its dynamism on the market’s appetite 
for innovation, which has shown itself to be generally 
insatiable.
Inherent in the dynamics of market demand is the 
process that drives competition through innovation. 
The waves of change launched by innovators are 
countered by competitors who innovate in order to 
defend their existing positions, or to attack with 
ambitions of their own.  
It’s an endless cycles that serves only to drive the 
process of change still that much faster and more 
widely throughout the economy.  Accelerating change 
and the convergence in the marketplace of many 
competing innovators results in greater complexity 
for all, a landscape of acute danger and astonishing 
challenge.  
Any enterprise that intends to survive must somehow 
innovate, because innovation itself is the only defense 
against innovation.  Through innovation you may catch 
up if you are behind, or even take the lead.
Thus, we see clearly that the future of each and every 
firm is determined largely as a function of its ability 
to innovate effectively.  Innovation is therefore a 
mandate, an absolute requirement for survival.  
And it is a problem.  An enormous, thorny problem for 
enterprises, because managing the innovation process 
is one of the most challenging issues facing any of 
them.  It is extraordinarily difficult to do well, in part 
because, as with top management, R&D organizations 
are often focused on the wrong objectives, as we will 
discuss below.
The Many Dimensions of 
Innovation
Creative destruction is fascinating from a macroeconomic 
perspective, and it raises tough microeconomic 
questions about change and change management in 
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individual firms.  In particular, it brings focus to how 
leaders and managers handle change, and it highlights 
the necessity of constant regeneration of the business 
from within through the R&D process and other creative 
and innovation-seeking endeavors, that is, on activities 
that are directly intentionally at creating innovations.
While leaders of successful companies show a knack for 
reinventing their organizations in clever ways, among 
the failures we see repeatedly the consequences of not 
understanding or following Schumpeter’s advice.  Too 
many managers assume that change is the aberration, 
and they behave as if the market is stable.  Perhaps 
the business school curriculum is partly at fault, for the 
very notion of a Masters in Business Administration 
assumes that the critical competence is administration, 
implying that continuing and well-controlled operation 
under managerial control is the focus, intent, and 
purpose of management.  
For most managers, however, the ability to create is far 
more important to their companies than skills related 
to administrating and controlling.  Furthermore, as 
Russ Ackoff points out, a serious flaw in the traditional 
MBA curriculum is that in the real world managers are 
not presented with tidy and objective “cases” to solve9 
- they must first figure out what the problem is, which 
can itself require a great deal of insight and creativity. 
And for the most part, textbooks don’t help.
In today’s markets change is the norm and stability 
is an aberration.  Leaders grapple with the disruptive 
forces of change and they figure out for themselves 
what lessons and challenges present in the current 
situation, and what responses will be most effective 
in harnessing change so that their organizations can 
survive.  Somewhere in the competitive environment 
it’s likely that a new innovation is about to appear that 
will dramatically impact on the current structures that 
your business depends on.
And yet the relentless day to day demands on every 
manager’s time immerses them in a flood of pressing 
issues, and many simply fail to recognize important 
underlying factors that portend significant disruption. 
Consequently, they tend not to account adequately 
for systemic change, and they are surprised and 
unprepared when they should not be.
Did personal computers and networked workstations 
surprise the computer industry?  Absolutely.  Did the 
high performance sport shoe surprise the staid sneaker 
marketplace when Nike invented the category?  Did 
efficient and high quality Japanese cars surprise the 
Detroit automakers?  Did the cellular telephone shock 
the entrenched telcos? And did the smart phone 
radically disrupt the cell phone makers?  The answer 
to all of these questions, of course, is “Yes.”  This 
can happen only because leaders are looking in the 
rear view mirror, gazing backwards at what they have 
accomplished, instead of forward at what must be 
accomplished.
Occasionally we even see a company whose leaders, 
judging by the evidence of their behavior, prefer 
to go out of business rather than do the work of 
adapting to change.  It can be intellectually as well as 
psychologically difficult to shift the focus from the 
operations mentality and actually confront the need to 
do things in a very different way.
During his tenure as CEO of IBM, during which he turned 
the company from a disastrous decline, Lou Gerstner 
commented that,  “Many successful companies that 
fall on hard times – IBM, Sears, GM, Kodak, Xerox – 
saw clearly the changes in the environment.  But they 
were unable to change highly structured organizational 
cultures that had been born in a different world.”10
Even today, the local Sears store appears to be caught 
in a time warp, its merchandising showing all the 
leading edge ideas of 1975.  Have their merchandising 
directors never seen an Ikea store, much less an Apple 
store?  I don’t have much confidence that Sears will be 
around much longer.  What, one wonders, could they 
possibly be thinking?  But they’re not alone, for as we 
noted at the very beginning of this paper, companies 
are dying every day, even big ones that you’d think 
would know better.
And as Mr. Gerstner points out, a primary reason seems 
to be that some leaders actually make the choice for 
their enterprise to fail, to die, rather than confronting 
the need to change and adapt, that is, to innovate.
And while it is imperative for organizations to be 
continually engaged in the process of innovation, an 
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important question concerns where those efforts to 
innovate should be focused.  Because there are, it turns 
out, a great many possibilities.
To examine this we devised an imaginary and archetypal 
large organization with products and services in many 
different markets, extensive operations in numerous 
locations, and a predominantly internal support 
structure.  We suggest that in such an organization 
there are at least 38 distinctive opportunities for 
innovation.
38 Possible Innovation Targets
The first thing that jumps out from this list is that the 
vast majority of these opportunities do not involve new 
technologies embedded in existing or new products.  In 
spite of the widely-held assumption to the contrary, 
“innovation” is by no means limited to “technology.” 
One of the lessons is that technology innovation by 
itself has rarely been sufficient to ensure the future, 
and it is certainly not today.  Nokia, to go back to that 
sad story, has mountains of great new technology.  In 
its halcyon days, it was one of the world’s greatest 
technology innovators, and its massive R&D budgets 
were the envy of companies worldwide.
But in fact, Nokia’s collapse was one of the most 
effective messengers of an important lesson, which 
is that it’s not a question of how much you spend on 
innovation, but rather the process you use to manage 
that effort.  Booz & Co. has shown us through some 
great research that spending a lot on R&D is surely no 
guarantee of future business success:
Table 1: Possible Innovation Targets
business structure
 alliances
 capital formation
administration
 information flow
 automation
 insourcing / outsourcing services
organization
 structure type
 facilities infrastructure
                  IT infrastructure
 employee / contractor mix
                  employee experience
 decision making processes
 facilities effectiveness
 process to improve processes
customer experience
 communication process
 crm
 brand / image
                  advertising
                 feedback
    
customer service
 service process 
 communication
supply chain
 distribution system
 manufacturing
 communication
               automation
product
 product offering
 product availability    
                  technology (hidden)
 technology (evident)            
 manufacturing
 R&D
 user interface
 packaging
 functionality
 life cycle model
 sales model
                  sustainability
 after-sale service
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“Yearly R&D spending among the world’s 1,000 largest 
public corporate R&D spenders has hit a record high 
of US$638 billion, according to global management 
consulting firm Booz & Company in its ninth annual 
Global Innovation 1000 study.  However, despite the 
sustained overall increase in R&D budgets over the last 
decade, this year’s findings show once again that higher 
spending doesn’t guarantee bigger payoffs.  Indeed, 
the 10 most innovative companies our study identified 
this year financially outperformed the world’s top 10 
spenders, despite actually spending significantly less 
on R&D.”11
Interestingly, this is the case even when innovative 
technology is at the core of the offering.  A good example 
is Xerox.  Chester Carlson’s technological innovation 
was a stunning breakthrough, and a testimony to 
his insight and persistence.  The Xerox story is also 
testimony to the difficulties of forecasting the market 
for genuinely new products.  Many industrial giants of 
the day, including IBM, Kodak, and GE each rejected the 
opportunity to acquire Carlson’s technology at bargain 
prices.
When he finally did find a partner, it was tiny Haloid 
Company that stepped up, and together they found 
that getting the technology to market entailed far 
more than simply building new machines.  The success 
of Haloid-become-Xerox in its early years was largely 
due to its innovative approach to distribution - leasing 
the machines on a per-use basis, instead of selling 
them outright.  This brilliant insight propelled Xerox 
into the top echelon of American business, where it 
remained, however, only for a few decades.  Today 
Xerox is a company in difficulty, threatened by far 
more creative competitors whose own innovations in 
distribution and technology have largely surpassed 
Xerox’s.  Again and again we see the inexorable power 
of creative destruction.  
Did Xerox top management believe that the market 
was stable, and that their incumbent competitive 
advantages would persist?  If so, they were clearly 
mistaken, and now another generation of top managers 
has the task of rebuilding the company.12
But the problem was not that Xerox failed to recognize 
the importance of innovation.  In fact, they generously 
funded technical R&D that surpassed the efforts of 
most other companies, creating the legendary Palo 
Alto Research Center, PARC, from which sprang an 
amazing string of enormous breakthroughs in many 
dimensions of technology.  It was at PARC, in fact, 
that the personal computer as we know it today was 
invented.  Not only was the investment substantial, 
but so were the results.
And even as the company entered its period of decline, 
it was still producing astonishing technological 
breakthroughs.  It’s Docutech system, for example, a 
self-contained digital printing plant and bindery, did 
what no copier had done before.  But within a relatively 
short period of time, Xerox competitors had machines 
that matched or surpassed the Docutech.
This illustrates one of the most vexing problems 
associated with technological innovation:  In today’s 
environment, technology is one thing that a determined 
and adequately-financed competitor may readily 
replicate or bypass.  Patents offer limited protection, 
but sometimes they simply provide stimulus and 
insight for others determined to be still more inventive. 
Thus, a focus on technology breakthroughs to the 
exclusion of other aspects of innovation is misplaced. 
Given the complexity inherent in today’s technologies, 
you simply can’t count on being able to out-R&D the 
market on a consistent enough basis to sustain a 
competitive advantage.  Sooner or later, and probably 
sooner, every technology meets its match or its 
superior, and it’s probably coming from a competitor.
But for the brief interval while a particular technology 
is superior, it can be the basis upon which to build 
something of truly critical importance:  strong 
relationships with customers.  Innovation efforts must 
therefore include the creation of new approaches that 
help strengthen the bonds with customers, and they 
should draw from each of the 38 dimensions that might 
provide differentiation.  Strong customer relationships 
help companies survive the inevitable periods when 
their technology will not be the best.
The experience IBM underscores the significance of 
innovation that is not just technological.  Over the 
years, many of IBM’s successes have come not as a 
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result of technological leadership, but because of its 
close relationships with its customers.  IBM was not 
actually a technology leader in many of its product 
areas, but for the decades of the 1970s, ‘80s, and 
‘90s, IT managers struggled with the choice between 
leading edge technology offered by IBM’s competitors, 
and IBM’s own systems, which were often just slightly 
above average.  Because even though its technology 
may not have been the best, IBM made sure that it was 
a “safe choice” for customers because the company 
made consistent and unsurpassed efforts to provide 
exemplary service.  The adage among IT executives was 
that, “Nobody ever got fired for choosing IBM.”
Over the years an increasing proportion of IBM’s 
revenues and profits have come from its services 
organization, and the major transformation led by 
Louis Gerstner was a massive shift from product-based 
revenues to services.  By 2002, services accounted for 
more than 50% of revenues.  So is IBM a computer 
company?  Well, yes.  Its high profile research efforts 
in areas such as super high-density magnetic storage 
drives and the Deep Blue chess-playing supercomputer 
are well publicized initiatives that keep this idea in the 
public’s mind.
But the IBM services organization is far more significant 
today because the relationships that are created and 
sustained through services are the real key to the 
company’s future.  
Ford provides another clear example.  The original 
Ford cars of the early 1900s were certainly innovative 
for automotive engineering, but equally important to 
the company’s success was the innovative production 
process (the first vertically integrated assembly line), 
the distribution system (the dealer network), and the 
company’s pricing model that ensured affordability. 
All of these innovations enabled Ford to create an 
enduring relationship with American car-buyers and 
build a significant share of the market.
By the 1920s, however, GM had copied and largely caught 
up with Ford’s innovations, and began introducing 
some of its own.  A minor GM innovation with major 
impact was the availability of cars in colors other than 
black.13  Ford suffered steady decline thereafter, and 
was rescued from what might have been fatal demise 
only by the enormous demand for military vehicles 
caused by World War II.  After the war, the company 
soon staggered again, and was nearly bankrupt by the 
late 1950s.
The Ford story illustrates two important aspects of 
competition in nearly every market.  First, each industry 
has its own rhythm of technical innovation, driven 
largely by advances in materials and methods.  These 
advances often lead to cycles of changing market 
dominance.  In the auto industry, Ford was supplanted 
by GM, and more recently GM by Toyota and Honda. 
Today, we wonder if Tesla will be a future industrial 
giant.  And what new car company that we haven’t 
heard of yet will be the leader in 2025, or 2035?
The second aspect, however, is what seriously 
complicates the focus on technology.  Ford’s choice of 
black paint was an economic one, part of a relentless 
strategy of minimizing costs.  From 1903 through 
World War I, this strategy was a significant contributor 
to the company’s growth.  But in the 1920s, the nature 
of the market itself was changing, and Ford’s success 
as a cost-cutting pioneer did not serve so well when 
market dynamics began to favor factors related to 
comfort and style.  
The point is that within the framework of any given 
market cycle, a company can grasp and sustain 
leadership.  But the greater challenge is managing 
what happens when a new cycle begins.  As it turns 
out, very few companies sustain leadership positions 
beyond a single cycle because they don’t grasp the 
significance of change.  And this is what makes the 
work of Gerstner so significant at IBM.  In the face of 
a major shift in the market, the company faced the 
choice to reinvent itself or collapse, and Gerstner in fact 
led the process of reinvention with great success.
Many of the negative examples already mentioned 
confirm how extraordinary this was. 
Xerox led the copier market, but has nearly collapsed in 
the age of the PDF.
Kodak was the world’s number one manufacturer of 
film, but collapsed when digital cameras displaced film 
cameras.
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Nokia led the cell phone market, but was not prepared 
for the smart phone market.
Sears led American retail for decades, but lost out 
to Wal-Mart when discounting and supply chain 
management became the key differentiators.
Between 1995 and 2004, Coca-Cola dropped 50% of its 
share price when customers switched their preference 
to healthier beverages (and much as IBM did, it has 
since recovered).
There were many happy and charming bookstores all 
over America until Amazon.com undercut their prices 
by 20 or 30%, and now there are almost none.
So the point is clear – just because the current 
structure of the market favors your solution absolutely 
today, does not mean that the structure of the market 
tomorrow will also favor you.  While one set of products 
and services may be exceptionally well-suited to the 
market at a particular point in time, it’s surprisingly 
rare for a company to successfully adapt its products 
and services to changing market conditions quickly 
enough to sustain its leadership position. 
Chances are they have positioned their defenses in 
a way that leaves them vulnerable, and indeed it is 
common for companies to cede market dominance 
when clever competitors attack them in areas where 
they are not prepared to defend themselves.  
Sears, for example, allowed Wal-Mart to establish 
itself in smaller rural markets that Sears had thought 
unfeasible.  Wal-Mart then applied innovation 
processes throughout its growing supply chain to 
significantly lower its overall operating costs, at which 
point it went after Sears and K-Mart in their urban 
markets.  Sears became a second-tier player almost 
before it realized what had happened, while K-Mart 
soon found itself in bankruptcy.  (And then, strangely, 
CEO Edward Lampert decided that a merger of the two 
failed companies was the best solution for both.  So far 
the results have not been so good.)
Similarly, by focusing on annual style changes in their 
competition with one another, the Detroit automakers 
largely ignored the importance of underlying quality 
improvements.  When quality suddenly became an 
important attribute for American buyers in the 1970s, 
the Japanese manufacturers began taking market 
share.  Before 1980, GM didn’t take the Japanese 
seriously as competitors at all, and it didn’t take the 
issue of quality seriously either.  Today GM is still 
struggling to catch up to Japanese quality standards, 
and as a result GM’s share of the American car market 
declined from 50% to less than 35% between 1980 and 
2000, to 18 % today.
During his unsuccessful 10 years as CEO of GM between 
1998 and 2008, Rick Wagoner saw the company’s 
market valuation drop by 90%, and losses totaled 
more than $80 billion.  This, together with the story 
of Nokia, shows just how bad things can get when a 
company loses its fit with the market, and competitor 
innovations take hold in the market.
It takes exceptional discipline and clarity of vision to 
defend a competitive advantage and carry it through 
to a next generation of offerings, and not to be cruel to 
Mr. Wagoner, but in hindsight he just wasn’t the right 
guy for the job.  
The challenge, particularly for a board of directors, is 
to know who is the right guy, or woman, for the job, 
because the CEO must look after both the current 
business and also the future, and these two facets 
require quite different expertise and viewpoints.
With success comes growth, and as a company 
increases in size and scope, the nature of management’s 
challenges change considerably.  Managing Xerox at 
the start-up stage was an entirely different problem 
than steering the global copier colossus.  
When a company is small, top managers are often 
in direct contact with customers as a natural part of 
their role in the company.  But as they deal with the 
complexities of larger enterprises and multiplying 
layers of organization, they often become further and 
further removed from direct experience of the market. 
Without direct contact they are intuitively forced to 
rely on past experiences, and they have a progressively 
more difficult time hearing the voice a changing market 
that was different than the one they remember.  
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In addition, the need for extensive administration 
ultimately distracts management from the business 
of innovation.  At the same time, dysfunctional and 
bureaucratic behaviors grow endemic inside of large 
organizations, and result in huge distortions to the 
flow of critical information about the changing external 
market.  Corporate politics gets more and more 
attention, and emphasis shifts to internal events, 
while key external factors become obscured from view. 
Meanwhile, change waits for no organization, and 
innovations from competitors are introduced without 
sufficient response.
Hence, it’s one thing to be an innovator in a small 
market, and quite a different matter to bring creative 
drive to a large operation.  As a company grows and 
the stakes become higher, the risks that the small 
company has taken as a matter of course are now 
subjected to a lot more scrutiny, and reaction times 
slow.  Sometimes they slow disastrously.  More levels 
of management have a stake in major decisions; time 
lags in decision making are longer.  In extreme cases, 
“analysis paralysis” sets in.
Smaller, more nimble competitors have less to 
lose, fewer people to convince, and often a sense 
of desperation that sharpens top management’s 
perception of market needs.  In fact, the well-tuned 
senses of entrepreneurial top managers become 
magnets for capital – small, new companies are 
founded specifically to attack new market niches that 
only their entrepreneurs and the capitalists that back 
them even recognize.
The result of this complex process is a pattern that 
repeats with astonishing regularity.  As innovative 
companies grow, they tend to become followers rather 
than leaders.  Nevertheless, their sheer size, combined 
with control of distribution channels, makes them 
formidable competitors even when their subsequent 
innovations are really copies.
Another factor heavily influencing market evolution 
is that at any given time in any given market, only a 
few critical value dimensions yield the key combination 
that proves most attractive to customers.  Whichever 
company happens to have just the right mix available 
gains a temporary advantage, but the emphasis 
remains on “temporary” because the market’s need 
change and very few companies sustain leadership 
over a long period of time.
We find countless examples of companies that have 
distinguished themselves by focusing on one or 
another of the many dimensions of innovation, but 
then faded into obscurity when the dimension in which 
they were particularly strong became a secondary or 
tertiary concern, or a non-concern, of customers.
From a manager’s perspective, however, 38 dimensions 
of innovation presents a daunting challenge.  For old 
school giants such as GE, GM, or IBM and new school 
leaders such as Apple, Google, or Cisco, 38 arenas for 
innovation are clearly too many to address at once, 
which brings us to a critical dilemma that confronts 
managers every day: How to choose?  In what aspects 
of a business should efforts at innovation be focused? 
Should a company apply itself to innovation in its 
products and services, or its brand, or its organization, 
its leadership team, its technology, its capital structure, 
or any of the others among the possible targets.
Or should it choose any of them?
Individual factors may explain the success achieved 
by this or that company in this or that market, but it’s 
obvious that while any of the 38 areas may be important, 
no one of them consistently explains emerging success 
and failure.  Wouldn’t it be far more useful to have a 
robust explanation of the emergent successes as well 
as the astonishing failures, and thereby a better way to 
both examine the competition and to direct innovation 
efforts?  Of course.
In search of such an explanation we could ask, What 
makes Apple, Apple?  What makes Fedex, Fedex?  Or, 
What makes Schwab, Schwab?  Or, What makes Home 
Depot, Southwest Airlines, or any flourishing company 
successful?  Is there a way to accurately describe 
success and to explain how success emerges?  
If we take this question seriously, what we’re really 
looking for is more than innovation localized to a 
particular dimension, but rather a comprehensive 
innovation framework.  
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The Business Model
When you look at our list of 38 possible innovation 
targets you see interesting potentials, but you also see 
a fragmented world.  Viewed as a list of possibilities, 
each target stands separately, interesting perhaps, 
but alone.  This may be useful for analytical purposes, 
but it’s also fundamentally distorted, because by 
looking at an inventory parts you’ll surely not get a real 
appreciation for the whole.  
But what if you could look at the problem of innovation 
as a whole, as one process?  What would you see?  
You might see this:  Yesterday a whole range of tough 
competitors were creating new products, services, 
distribution systems, brands, and infrastructures that 
are bringing change to the market today.  Recognizing 
the imminence of the creative destruction that will 
result from this, we accept the absolute imperative of 
innovation.  
And now we are confronted with the following question: 
How do we innovate with a clear focus not on the parts 
of the system, but the system as a whole?  
To accomplish this we would first have to understand 
what the “whole system” is.  It’s not a particular 
department, a product, a service, or a brand.  It is the 
entire organization together as one thing, working 
together to deliver value.   For this new integrated 
whole to be a useful managerial concept we need to 
give it a name, and design a process through which it 
can help us manage the enterprise more effectively. 
This whole is the “business model,” a comprehensive 
description of business as an integrated system 
functioning in an intimate relationship with the broader 
market.  In this concept, the individual components of 
an organization do not matter as much as the way they 
work together to enable the organization to create 
value and deliver it to customers.  
A business model is therefore a description of a 
whole system, a combination of products and services 
delivered to the market in a particular way, or ways, 
supported by an organization, positioned according to 
a particular branding that, most importantly, provides 
experiences to customers that yield a particular set of 
strong relationships with them.  Further, a business 
model describes how the experiences of creating and 
delivering experiences and value may evolve along with 
the changing needs and preferences of customers.  
To make this approach useful we will need to understand 
some critical characteristics of the whole.  In particular, 
we need to know how this whole is different from the 
parts that comprise it.  
A key insight is that the distinguishing characteristic of 
any system is that its outputs emerge not as a result of 
any single part. but as a result of the way the parts are 
connected together.
An excellent example of such connectedness is an 
airplane.  Each of an airplane’s component parts, 
and even its major sub-assemblies, has the absolute 
tendency to fall towards the ground.  Take them up 
to 35,000 feet and let go, and they invariably tumble 
straight down.  It is only – only, only, only –  when all 
the parts are assembled just so, and working together 
properly, that the system we call the airplane manifests 
“airplaneness,” and actually flies.14
Similarly, a system we call “a company” consists of 
many different parts.  It participates in other systems 
we call “markets,” which in turn are part of a still larger 
system we call “the economy.”  
If you take a part of a company – say the accounting 
department – and put it into a market by itself, what 
you have is approximately … nothing (unless you 
want to run an accounting services company).  The 
accounting department has no relevance outside of the 
larger company because accounting is only meaningful 
when there are transactions that have to be accounted 
for.  
Similarly, manufacturing requires a sales force, 
distribution, and customers.  Marketing has no purpose 
independent of a company’s identity, its products and 
services, and the perceptions of outsiders.
This tells us that the success of a company is not 
attributable just to one or another part, even as the 
reality of flight is most assuredly not an attribute of 
any single part of the airplane.
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There’s another aspect of the airplane analogy that’s 
also important, one that has to do with the process of 
optimization.  Let’s say we have a nicely functioning 
airplane and we want to improve it.  We might want 
to make the engines more powerful so the plane can 
go faster.  But that might put too much stress on 
the airframe, or the wings, or it might change the 
control properties of the plane, and make it unflyable. 
Hence, the ability of the system to function is entirely 
dependent on the mutual fitness of the parts.  No part 
can possibly be optimized except in the context of all 
the rest.  Instead, we must direct our efforts toward 
optimizing the system as a whole. 
The product that cannot reach the customer provides 
no value; the service that cannot be delivered 
provides no value; distribution systems lacking 
effective products provide no value.  Indeed, Coca Cola 
discovered this a decade age, when the world’s most 
proficient marketing machine lost half of its market 
valuation because … the market for Coca Cola stopped 
growing.  This misfit between product and market was 
devastating to stock price, partly because mired in its 
past, the company’s leadership failed to notice what 
was happening.  This oversight enabled Pepsi to shoot 
ahead in terms of market capitalization; it also cost the 
CEO of Coke his job.
Certainly the optimal approach to marketing depends on 
the actual products that you’re manufacturing and the 
customers for whom they’re intended.  Product design, 
manufacturing, marketing, and sales have to fit together, 
and the definition of this fitness is the business model.
Consider another example of what happens when the 
parts don’t fit together well.  Imagine a company with 
an amazing breakthrough technology, but a sales force 
that is incapable of selling it and a senior management 
that is largely indifferent to prospective buyers. 
Actually, that’s not so difficult to imagine;  Xerox had 
this experience.  
After all, Xerox is the company that literally invented 
the personal computer at PARC back in the early 1970s. 
Naturally, Xerox wanted to make money from this profound 
invention, but because Xerox management didn’t actually 
understand who would use the product, or what for, they 
tried to push it through an entirely unsuited distribution 
channel, to a market that was neither prepared for it nor 
able to understand it.  It went nowhere.  
Well, it went nowhere for Xerox that is.  But a few other 
companies did make excellent use of Xerox technology, 
and in subsequent years they have made billions – 
yes, billions – by applying Xerox inventions to their 
own products and services.  In particular, Apple and 
Microsoft were big beneficiaries.  
Now imagine a company with a brilliant sales force 
that is also adept at bringing back news from the 
marketplace, but the company ignores the warnings? 
This happened to IBM, when it overlooked the emerging 
computer workstation market, a device occupying a 
market niche between the PC and the mainframe, and 
allowed Sun to become the market leader when IBM 
failed to even make an attempt to address the new 
client-server IT paradigm.  (Sun, it should be noted, 
also subsequently faltered, and became part of Oracle.)
Or let’s look at cars.  GM has a vast dealer network 
that is deeply embedded in the commercial fabric 
throughout North America (and in fact the entire 
world), but the company somehow couldn’t manage 
to produce an Oldsmobile-branded car that enough 
people actually want to buy.  Although its headquarters 
was packed with thousands of very bright minds, GM 
was compelled by a persistent lack of innovation and a 
chronically worsening shortage of capital to shut down 
the Olds line.  And then it did the same with Saturn, 
Pontiac, and Hummer; the death of these brands was 
another aspect of Rick Wagoner’s unsuccessful legacy.
To repeat, then, a “business model” is a description 
of the entire marketplace and the relationship of the 
company to that commercial environment.  It is a 
precise definition of who customers are, and how the 
company intends to satisfy their needs, both today and 
tomorrow.  A business model also provides a specific 
assessment of today’s competitors, and tomorrow’s, 
and the technologies that are and will be embedded in 
various competing versions of products and services.  
If Xerox had been thinking about its personal computer 
technology in terms of a business model, perhaps 
the results would have been different.  If IBM had 
understood that workstation computing was a new and 
important business model, perhaps Sun would never 
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have attained prominence.  If GM had considered the 
business model underlying its Oldsmobile line, perhaps 
it would still be viable.  In each of these examples it 
is impossible to know the root causes of the problem 
without knowing the actual people involved, but the 
results strongly suggest that top management was 
probably not asking the right questions, and they were 
probably not having the right kind of conversations 
about the future and how to adapt to it.
The realization is that for the company it is the business 
model that matters, and which must drive any new 
approach the competitive marketplace as well as how 
it should organize itself to compete.  This gives us a 
new way to think about adapting to change, or how to 
create it.  Today and going forward what we’re talking 
about is not just competition between companies, but 
competition between business models.  
Or, in other words, Business Model Warfare.  
Business model warfare characterizes the process 
of winning and losing that marks the creatively 
destructive marketplace, and enables us to define a 
set of principles and skills that will allow managers to 
be effective at this game.  Not that it’s a new game, 
however.  This is the way business has always been; 
and for just as long, managers have been falling into 
the trap of focusing too much on today and not enough 
on tomorrow.   
Winning and Losing at Business 
Model Warfare
As we have noted, in addition to erroneous assumptions 
about stability, managers also fall into the trap of 
focusing too much of their attention inside their own 
organizations.  This is a particular danger with middle 
managers who are under pressure from upper levels 
in the hierarchy of organizational authority.  Their 
instinctive and entirely logical sense of self-protection 
forces them to pay great attention to the behavior and 
desires of senior management, but sadly less attention 
is often paid to customers.
To engage in business model warfare, managers 
cannot be internally focused on products, services, 
or administration to the exclusion of the critical 
relationships between these elements, and the even 
more crucial interactions between a company and its 
customers.  Remember the metaphor of the airplane, 
and the critical role of the connections in its capacity to 
fly.  Thinking about innovation in the business model 
as a matter of the overall relationship between the 
company and its customers, rather than innovation 
isolated in this or that aspect, may therefore yield 
greater insight and better management performance: 
it’s not a coincidence that the winners in business 
model warfare are usually those who manage their 
customer relationships in the most effective ways 
possible, by creating compelling experiences across 
many different dimensions.
Some examples:
Japanese auto manufacturers are the source of many 
business model innovations, and when they applied 
their increasing expertise in manufacturing quality to 
create new, affordable high-end product lines, and now 
Lexus, Acura, and Infiniti, they created products among 
the most admired cars worldwide, and enormously 
profitable segments of their businesses.  
They continue to steadily increase their share of the 
American auto market.  Further, Toyota’s innovations 
in alternative fuels with they hybrid Prius line, far in 
advance of American manufacturers, won it added 
market share as buyers develop a preference for fuels 
other than oil.  The Prius was the best selling car in 
California in 2013.
Looking to Europe, retailing giants Auchan and 
Carrefour redefined the French grocery business in 
the 1960s by applying new cash register technology to 
create the hypermarket, and at about the same time 
Novotel introduced a new kind of hotel.
In the 1970s, Nike redefined the nature of competition 
in the sports shoe and sports apparel business by 
transforming star athletes into marketing icons, first 
with runner Steve Prefontaine and later with Michael 
Jordan.  In so doing, Nike created new markets for its 
shoes and clothing, and surpassed Adidas to become 
the global leader in a ruptured market.  Nike’s core 
business model innovation was turning its own brand 
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into a key element in the self-identity of its customers, 
which comes pretty close to the ideal when we’re talking 
about the company-customer relationship.  Nike, in 
fact, elevated brand management to unprecedented 
heights, and has demonstrated how central the concept 
of brand management is in today’s market.
American Express once dominated the credit card 
industry, and carefully cultivated an image of prestige 
and exclusivity.  Visa entered into competition by 
creating a global network that was far more fluid, 
flexible, and low cost, and has far surpassed American 
Express.  Visa charges lower rates to merchants, 
making its services more attractive, and built its brand 
on ubiquity – Visa cards are available and accepted 
everywhere.  Visa’s first forty years prior to its recent 
IPO were built on an organizational innovation of the 
first caliber, developed by Dee Hock and now articulated 
by him as an example of the “chaordic” organization, 
one that effectively balances chaos and order in service 
to continuous innovation and adaptation.
Dell created a commercial powerhouse by completely 
re-inventing the manufacturing and distribution 
process and building machines to order, rather than to 
inventory, thereby introducing an entirely new business 
model to the personal computer industry.  Mass 
customization at a competitive price defined a new 
kind of customer relationship in the PC industry.  But in 
an impressive display of changing market structures, 
the company’s unique business model lost its charm, 
and founder Michael Dell took the company private in 
2013 in his attempt to recreate the magic of its past.
Southwest Airlines developed an approach to the 
airline business unlike any of the airlines that were 
established when the company was founded, and 
has sustained its unique business model to become 
the most financially successful company in a highly 
troubled industry for the decades leading up to the 
systemic crisis in airline industry that resulted from the 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001.  
One of the most interesting things about Southwest 
is that there isn’t much technology evident in the 
business.  What is apparent is that the leaders of 
Southwest thought through the air travel business in a 
comprehensive way, and avoided falling into traps that 
hurt others.  The company is not burdened by restrictive 
labor agreements that now weigh so heavily on its 
competitors; by design, the company did not operate 
out of airports that charged high fees; and it still does 
not participate in centralized reservations systems. 
The company has not attempted to be something that 
it is not, a mighty global airline, but has instead focused 
on understanding its niche and serving it profitably. 
Exemplars
As we examine industry after industry, we see that 
wherever there is an exemplar, a company that stands 
head and shoulders above others, that company is 
almost always a business model innovator, and is 
applying creativity across many dimensions of customer 
experience to become that market leader.  This does not, 
however, mean that every business model innovator is 
also a market leader, for innovation is a risky enterprise. 
Many new business models fail, just as old ones do.
Like Southwest, Fedex is most notable not so much for the 
pioneering idea of overnight delivery, nor for its innovative 
use of information technology to track packages, nor its 
positioning as a reliable, courteous, and service-oriented 
alternative to the post office.  No, it is all of these factors, 
and more, integrated together, as a coherent system.  The 
fusion of these elements into an effective organization 
is precisely what we mean by the business model.  And 
when we compare the Fedex model with the US Post 
Office model, we see consistent innovativeness on one 
side and astonishing stagnation on the other.  Fedex has 
a history of change and development that the post office 
lacks.  Certainly the post office is hampered by its own 
history as a government agency, its rigid labor relations, 
and even by its extremely broad mission.  Just as certainly 
we see a business model that is failing, one that is losing 
market share and buckets of money, and facing a host of 
competitors as it becomes marginalized on the fringe of 
economic viability.
It’s interesting to see how the post office did attempt 
to defend itself from Fedex.  In the mid-1990s the post 
office introduced a guaranteed 2-day delivery service in 
a package very similar to Fedex’s, and available at just 
25% of the cost.  After a while, however, it became 
apparent that 2-day service wasn’t actually a guarantee, 
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just an intention.  While for many customers this may 
have been acceptable, it shows how little the post office 
management understood that Fedex’s reputation for 
reliable execution was as important as the fact of its 
timely deliveries.  Aside from its questionable notion of 
what constitutes acceptable delivery, it’s probably a moot 
point until the post office realizes that another element 
of its business model is obsolete, namely the requirement 
that customers must wait in long lines to get service.  If 
the post office ever wises up and solves either or both 
of these two problems, Fedex will have someone besides 
the brown trucks of UPS to worry about.
Home Depot also exemplifies the successful integration 
of numerous factors to create a business that is 
so appealing to customers and so devastating to 
competitors.  Impressive scale on two dimensions – 
gigantic stores and a huge number of them – leads to 
high sales volume that enables the company to pay and 
charge the lowest prices.  The local hardware store or 
lumber yard can’t compete unless it, too, undertakes its 
own business model innovation and positions itself as 
something that Home Depot cannot be.   Which would be 
highly personalized service, fast transactions, proximity, 
better selection, different products ….  Ace has recognized 
this as its niche, in which it is doing quite well, positioned 
as the anti-Home Depot, and also demonstrating how the 
evolution of business models creates new opportunities.
So what we see consistently across all of these examples, 
and with widespread consistency across the entire history 
of business, is the following:
It’s rarely, if ever, a single innovation that propels a 
business to success.  It is, instead, a suite of innovations 
that complement one another and work together to 
provide a novel or distinctive value proposition that 
underlies success.  The key is not necessarily the product 
or service itself – which could be highly innovative or even 
just acceptable – but something brought to market in an 
innovative way, supported in an innovative way, branded 
in an innovative way, and in the end always an approach 
that builds enduring relationships between the company 
and its customers.
Furthermore, the core of the innovation value proposition 
need not be built around a technology per se.  In the 
examples cited above – Toyota, Honda, Nike, Visa, Fedex, 
Home Depot, Southwest Airlines, and Ford (in the early 
days) – proprietary technologies do play a part in the 
company’s success, but there is always much more later. 
The key to success is a focus not only on technology 
itself, but technology applied in a business process to 
optimize the relationship between the company and its 
customers.  
In today’s environment nearly any technology can be, has 
been, and will be copied, so the important competitive 
advantage is knowing how to use the technology in a 
way that adds the greatest value for customers.  When 
enough people believe that a $45,000 Lexus performs 
as well as or better than a $65,000 Mercedes, it is then 
that the structure of the market undergoes a profound 
change.   
With all of this in mind, we now have a better way 
to characterize marketplace competition, creative 
destruction, and innovation.  We see that effective 
innovation is not a matter of exploiting individual 
technologies, nor of exceptional performance in any other 
individual element of a business, but rather a matter of 
harnessing the business model itself, which may but 
does not necessarily include technologies among its 
many possible dimensions.  
To state it more simply, what’s happening continuously in 
the marketplace is competition between business models 
themselves.  The Lexus business model is different than 
Ford’s business model, or that of Mercedes, etc.  
What this means is that the winners at business model 
warfare have generally applied innovation to create 
competitive advantages, building stronger relationships 
with customers by developing business models that 
fit closely with customer needs and preferences across 
multiple dimensions.
Winners who have figured out these principles then seek 
to sustain their advantages through further business 
model innovations that defend newly-won territory and 
extend into new domains.  It is therefore the business 
model itself that must be the focus of innovation, and 
innovation in any or all of the 38 possible dimensions 
must be undertaken in service to a larger framework that 
is defined by the business model itself.  
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Part III:  Mapping the Future
As I mentioned above, during the last ten years we’ve 
had ample opportunities to explore business model 
innovation in our work with organizations in a great 
many industries, and to develop tools and models that 
our clients have used to help them chart their future 
course.  One of those tools has proven particularly use-
ful, and I would like to introduce it to you here.  We like 
it because it is both an analytical and a predictive tool, 
and because it seems to explain a great deal of what’s 
actually happening.
In particular, we wish to address these questions:
Where are we today, where are our competitors, and in 
which direction lies our future?
What business models will be successful in the future? 
In which direction should we direct our innovation ef-
forts?
In response to these questions we have devised a mar-
ket map as a simple matrix.  We label the horizontal 
axis “market size,” and the vertical axis “customiza-
tion” (or “differentiation”). 
by accident, but a central element of the company’s 
value proposition.  Hence, the lower right hand corner 
of the matrix designates the largest mass market, the 
one with the lowest prices and the least customization. 
In the US we have a company called “the dollar store” 
that occupies that spot.  Everything in the store, pre-
dictably, costs $1.  
Moving from bottom to top, meanwhile, means in-
creasing customization and differentiation.  Therefore, 
the upper left corner is where you’ll find the exclusive 
products that only the richest people in the world can 
buy.  Private yachts and jets, Picasso and Van Gogh 
paintings, mountain-top estates and private islands.
The lower left corner of the matrix is a therefore a Dead 
Zone – if there were such a thing as high prices and no 
customization, this is where you would find it.  
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Figure 2
Moving from left to right means accessing more cus-
tomers, which in turn implies that the price decreases. 
Hence, the business model intent of both Wal-Mart 
and Ikea is to move progressively to the right.  “Lower 
prices every day” is not a Wal-Mart advertising slogan 
No business would consciously choose to occupy this 
spot.  
What this map enables us to do, therefore, is to 
determine our relative place in the market, to study the 
behavior of our competition, and then to help us plot 
our future course.  
As an example of how we can use the model, let’s take 
the hypothetical example of Sears, which as I noted, 
Journal of Business Models (2013), Vol. 1, No. 1 pp. 13-37
31
SEARS 
1980
CU
ST
O
M
IZ
A
TI
O
N
MARKET SIZE
M
O
R
E
BIGGER
LUXURIES;
DIFFERENTIATED 
MARKETS
COMMODOTIES;
MASS MARKET
SMALL
N
O
N
-C
U
ST
O
M
IZ
ED
DEAD ZONE
was at one time the dominant American retailer, an 
innovative company that grew to enormous size and 
influence.  Sears did this by offering great value, and it 
was very specifically targeted at the core of the market. 
IN
CR
EA
SI
NG
 
CU
ST
OM
ER
EX
PE
CT
AT
IO
NS
SEARS 
2000
CU
ST
O
M
IZ
A
TI
O
N
MARKET SIZE
M
O
R
E
BIGGER
LUXURIES;
DIFFERENTIATED 
MARKETS
SMALL
N
O
N
-C
U
ST
O
M
IZ
ED
DEAD ZONE
COMMODOTIES;
MASS MARKET
customer expectations put it squarely in the expanding 
Dead Zone.  
Both as a matter of its business design and its 
marketing, it strived to be the iconic American retailer. 
Headquartered in the center of the country, in Chicago, 
the company exuded confidence and reliably produced 
handsome profits for many years.  Figure 3 shows 
Sears happily at core in 1980.
However, Sears had a young rival at that time, and 
within 20 years the rival had far surpassed it.  Wal-
Mart out-innovated Sears, and while Sears suffered 
significant declines, Wal-Mart grew very fast, both in 
the US and throughout the world.
Our market map of 2000 shows that the overall size 
of the market has grown significantly, which reflects 
the normal process of economic growth.  The map 
also mentions a key factor, which is that overall 
customer expectations changed from 1980, and parts 
of the market that were quite viable in 1980 have 
been overtaken by the dead zone by 2000.  Sears, 
which stayed resolutely where it was, and therefore 
did not adequately innovate its business, was simply 
swallowed up by the staying the same.  Changing 
Wal-Mart, however, demonstrated the qualities 
necessary for continued success.  By developing new 
innovations in its supply chain, product designs, 
and in fact across the entire scope of its business 
model, it succeeded in moving its business model 
both upward, with higher quality products, and to 
the right, with progressively lower prices.  (figure 5) 
(It should be noted that Wal-mart’s employment 
policies remain controversial, and one can argue that 
its success is based in part on a practice of under-
paying its employees by manipulating the labor laws 
of the US. For the purposes of this paper we leave this 
issue aside, but we acknowledge the ethical problems 
associated with this practice, and the likelihood 
that future changes to its business model may be 
forthcoming as a result.)
Wal-Mart, and another successful business model 
innovator Ikea, both continue to aspire to move 
both up, toward more customization, and to the 
right, toward ever lower prices.  And so do all of their 
competitors.  Including, of course, Amazon.  
By 2020 we can easily imagine Sears totally buried in 
the Dead Zone, and indeed with a massive infusion 
of innovation it’s hard to imagine Sears surviving at 
all, while Wal-mart will probably continue to move up 
Figure 4
Figure 3
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and to the right, even as the Dead Zone chases it up 
and outward.  Hence, the Wal-mart of 2020 will be 
the same as the Wal-mart of 1980 in name only, as 
creative destruction chases it ever forward.
So they will ask themselves how else they can customize 
the experience of shopping with them?  Amazon does 
so through its delivery services, and its offer to get your 
purchase to you within two days, or a day, or even hours 
in some cases.  Amazon also offers recommendations 
customized to your interests, based on statistical 
analysis of the behavior of millions of its customers. 
How will Wal-mart do that?
Netflix does the same thing, and because viewer 
recommendations are so important to its business, in 
2009 the company Netflix sponsored a contest in which 
it paid a prize of $1 million to the programmers that best 
improved the accuracy of user recommendations.  It’s 
quite obvious that the goal of the prize is also to move 
Netflix up on the map, toward still better customization.
You might also be able to use this map to help you think 
about the future of your business, and to compare your 
own company’s performance to your competitors, as 
we have compared Sears and Wal-mart.   As another 
example, let’s look at Mercedes and Lexus.  Earlier I 
mentioned that a $45,000 Lexus competes successfully 
with a $65,000 Mercedes, which on the map looks 
something like this.  
The $20,000 Chevrolet, meanwhile, purposefully sits 
in the center of the market, similar in brand identity 
and corporate culture to Sears.  For a long time this 
was a profitable spot, but no more.  So like Sears it was 
swallowed up by growing customer expectations.  The 
failure of Chevrolet to innovate was indeed a big part of 
the problems  that Rick Wagoner was unable to fix, and a 
significant contributor to the drastic decline of GM.
The point of all this is obviously that you can also use this 
framework to think about the aspects or dimensions of 
your business where customization can be offered, and 
where it can be improved by lowering prices, thereby 
moving your entire business model continually upward 
and to the right.  This may not be optional, and indeed, 
when we look at the companies that have failed, we often 
see that their competitors offered either lower prices, or 
more customized solutions, or both.  
For example, you may remember that in its early days, 
Google had a lot of search engine competitors, but over 
time they have all fallen away simply because the search 
results that Google provided were simply better, i.e., more 
customized to the specific requirements of searchers. 
Remember, though, that this does not mean that Google 
will forever be entrenched as the exemplary occupant of 
the g-spot (in which case the name of that spot on the 
matrix may have to be changed), because there is no end 
to the business factors that could become important in a 
future market, and which some firm other than Google 
may master.  As I noted above, it is very often when the 
key drivers of competition change that old companies are 
pushed aside, and new ones take their places as leaders. 
And this happens precisely because it is the new firms 
that master then new competitive factors first.
To take the example of but one company, we may be 
looking at such a process right now with Microsoft.  The 
company is a tech colossus, dominant in many fields, but 
still struggling to adapt to change.  Sales of the PC are 
declining worldwide, down 10% from 2012 to 2013.  Sales 
of tablets, on the other hand, increase, but Microsoft 
is not benefitting significantly from this because it 
did not foresee that market, and came quite late with 
its Surface.  Microsoft Office and Microsoft Windows 
remain dominant software products for PCs, but if PC 
sales continue to fall, then the company will find itself 
fighting a rear guard action to preserve the past, rather 
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than a proactive one to create the future.  We could well 
foresee that when PC sales drop below some currently-
unknown threshold that Microsoft may follow in the 
footsteps of Nokia or Kodak, passing the threshold of 
non-sustainability below which the company implodes.
But the leaders of Microsoft are obviously very smart, 
and they see what’s happening as well or better than us 
outsiders.  So will they lead their company to create the 
next generations of products and services and business 
models to sustain Microsoft in the years ahead?  Will 
they be able to create better business model and new 
products and services that move up and to the right on 
the matrix, faster and better than their competitors? 
The hypothesis of this paper, and the logic of business 
model warfare, suggests that this should be one of 
their overriding objectives, and perhaps a convenient 
(although certainly quite simplified) way to assess any 
given decision or proposed initiative.
We will follow this closely, but no matter what happens, 
it seems that concepts and principles explored here may 
be useful as we seek to understand the patterns of 
change in the marketplace, and to predict the outcomes 
of decisions yet to be made.
The upper right corner, meanwhile, remains an interesting 
sort of business Nirvana.  Here you might find an entirely 
customized product, which is affordable by literally 
everyone, because it’s free.  But surely this could not be 
the location of any company, for how would it survive?
In fact, however, there are currently two companies 
occupying that corner, and their astounding success 
has been achieved precisely because their product (well, 
service really) is utterly free and yet totally customized to 
the uniqueness of your specific requirements.  
One of these companies is Google, which is happy to 
provide you with a fully customized web search at any 
time, day or night.  It takes only milliseconds, and it did 
this approximately 2 trillion times in 2013, or 6 billion 
times per day, 4 million per minute, and thus 70,000 per 
second.  (I found that out by doing a Google search, of 
course.15) 
It is in honor of Google that I have named the sweet 
spot in the upper right corner, somewhat tongue in 
cheek, the “g-spot.”  (I hope they don’t mind.)  Google’s 
business model has created a good number of billionaires 
precisely because it is so well and uniquely positioned, 
and also because they do seem to fully understand the 
extraordinary position they occupy, and because they are 
managing the firm to exploit and extend their significant 
advantage.  
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Microsoft’s Bing, meanwhile, plays fast follower.  (It 
is a position we are accustomed to seeing a Microsoft 
product occupy.)
The other company now occupying the g-spot, beside 
Google, is Facebook (the “f-spot”?), which is also free.
Interestingly, Facebook is also built entirely on the 
concept of total customization, but in Facebook’s case, 
the customization is provided by you, the user.  And 
nearly a billion of us are happy to oblige.  Facebook has 
also created billionaire owners, and they also seem to 
understand their unique situation.
Actually, Google also relies on us to customize, as we 
are the one who are creating the 180 million + web 
sites that Google then searches for us, for free.  This 
profound partnership between content creators (us), 
platform creators such as Facebook, and content 
locators such as Google and Bing, constitutes a hugely 
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significant phenomenon for future business model 
innovators to understand, exploit, and further develop. 
It is here that we can anticipate many surprises in the 
future, particularly as computers become faster, more 
powerful, and less expensive.  
Oh, wait… there’s another example where the model 
shows its validity.  The PC itself, as s device, has gotten 
considerably less expensive, massively more powerful, 
and exceptionally more customizable, over the last 30 
years.  The entire PC industry has moved significantly 
up and to the right, especially if you consider your 
smart phone to be a PC, which would be an accurate 
characterization.  Today’s iPhone, for example, 
is the rough equivalent in computing power of a 
supercomputer from three decades ago.  Now, if the 
folks at Nokia had been thinking about their product in 
these terms, rather than as  “cell phone,” then perhaps 
they would have been better prepared for what the 
iPhone did to their business model.
So you get the point.  For the majority of companies 
that operate in the physical world of products and 
services, for which they must charge money to survive, 
the g-spot is an enticing destination that they will 
never actually attain, but toward which they must 
always strive.  Although I have indeed tried, I have yet 
to identify any competitive advantage that cannot 
be represented on the map, which suggests that it 
may valid very broadly.   (If you can think of counter-
examples, I would be happy to learn about them from 
you.)
E-world companies, meanwhile, can and quite happily 
do occupy that coveted spot.
Summary of 
Business Model Warfare
There is of course a lot more that could be said, but we’ll 
leave that for another time.  For now, I’ll summarize 
the concept of Business Model Warfare in these 
propositions: 
One:  A “business model” defines a broad competitive 
approach to business, and articulates how a company 
applies processes and technologies to build and 
sustain effective relationships with customers.  The 
experiences that customers have, and the relationships 
that companies build with customers, are the most 
critical factors.  Creating them, understanding them, 
preserving them, enriching them, and extending them 
are the critical attributes of success.  Everything that is 
done must be in service to these relationships; they are 
the point.
Two:  Every successful business model earns some sort 
of competitive advantage to the extent that it serves 
successful relationships.  However, any advantage 
may disappear overnight should a competitor devise 
a superior model, thereby displacing the company in 
the relationship with the customer.   We can visualize 
that relationship by understand the market as a two-
dimensional map, on which we plot market size (i.e., 
price), and product//service customization.  These 
two dimensions tell us a great deal about the value 
proposition underlying any business model.
Due to competitive forces, the life span of every 
business model is therefore limited, and due to the 
general unpredictability of change, its time frame is 
indeterminate.  Leaders who have the good fortune to 
preside over a successful business model should never 
lose sight of the ephemeral nature of their advantages, 
and must focus not only on administering the (illusory) 
stability of today, but on preparing for or precipitating 
the inevitable change of tomorrow by understanding 
how costs can be lowered while customization is 
simultaneously increased.
Three:  Since business models themselves are a more 
comprehensive way of understanding the focus 
of competition, they must also become a focus of 
innovation itself.  Relentlessly changing conditions 
means that business models evolve rapidly, and 
business model innovation is therefore not optional. 
While innovations in any area within an organization 
may be important, innovations that pertain broadly and 
directly to the business model will be life-sustaining.
Four:  The model tells us that we must aspire to move 
upward and to the right, and that the dead zone is 
chasing us that way.  If we stop, the dead zone threatens 
to swallow us, as indeed it has done for so many failed 
business models.
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Five:  Based on what we have discussed here, the 
pattern of company mortality is a real and significant 
phenomenon, a result of the acceleration of change 
throughout the economy that operates on both demand 
and supply.  Demand is enormously influenced by 
innovation - new products and services coming into 
the market significantly affect the fate of all market 
participants.  
The perspective from the supply side is a bit more 
complicated, but the pattern is also evident.  Because 
the market is so transparent and the performance of 
every public company is subject to detailed scrutiny 
by investors and analysts, subtle changes in an 
organization’s performance can lead to broad swings in 
stock price.  
Improving performance and increasing stock price are 
both self-feeding cycles that create more favorable 
conditions for companies to develop and implement 
future innovations, both by improving stock currency for 
making acquisitions and by lowering the overall cost of 
capital.  Conversely, declining performance and a falling 
stock price can lead to a downward spiral that makes it 
progressively more difficult for companies to compete 
for attractive acquisition fodder, and which can also 
increase the cost of capital that could be invested in 
innovation-related activities such as R&D and product 
development.  Get ahead and push farther ahead; get 
behind and fall farther behind.
The data cited here show that over the medium term the 
majority of companies will get trapped in the downward 
spiral and one way or another most will disappear. 
The prevalence of this trap suggests that while leaders 
may be thinking and worrying about change and its 
impact on their companies, about competition and about 
competitive advantage, many have been doing so in a 
way that is simply not effective.  Hence, we suggest that 
thinking about and enacting business model innovation 
may be a productive exercise for established businesses.
And the need for good thinking about business models 
is as important for new businesses as it is for old ones, 
and among the many examples consider the spectacular 
rise and equally spectacular collapse of Webvan, in which 
more than a billion dollars of capital was invested … and 
lost.  Its management team – including a renowned CEO 
who had formerly been the head of Andersen Consulting 
– was so confident of what they were doing (i.e., their 
business model) that they invested hundreds of millions 
of dollars of capital in a distribution infrastructure, even 
though market demand that would generate a return 
was completely unproven.  They believed that they 
could make the business work, and apparently fooled 
themselves into thinking that their own belief was 
sufficient basis for betting massive capital on a business 
model that had never actually been fully tested.  In the 
end, hundred-million-dollar warehouses were built but 
never used, never generating even a cent of return.
Thus, in spite of abundant talk about change, the 
temptation to build a business according to a fixed 
structure that is expected to endure for the long term 
remains strong.  Never mind that the long term is 
completely unpredictable.  Another way to say this 
is that such a management approach that remains 
unrepentantly focused on stability and continuity, 
instead of on disruption and change, will be unpleasantly 
surprised in the end.
For these reasons it will remains imperative to discuss 
managing for change as an absolute requirement, but 
many (most?) business leaders nevertheless still aren’t 
very good at dealing with it.  Recognizing change in the 
marketplace, anticipating, and adapting to its turbulent 
evolution, these are the challenges that confront all 
executives, for although we remember periods that 
seemed stable, they are in fact long gone and never to 
return.
As markets continue to evolve and competition becomes 
ever more demanding, engaging in Business Model 
Warfare therefore becomes not just an interesting 
possibility, but perhaps a requirement. To survive, all 
organizations must develop comprehensive innovation 
frameworks, and perhaps the perspective offered by the 
Business Model Warfare framework can help leaders to 
be more effective. 
In the end, when we look at the business world it’s clear 
that the story of change is still the important story to 
tell, and the process of leading an organization in the 
face of change remains the critical skill.  
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Incorporating Enterprise Risk Management in the Business 
Model Innovation Process
Yariv Taran 1, Harry Boer2 & Peter Lindgren3
Abstract
Purpose: Relative to other types of innovations, little is known about business 
model innovation, let alone the process of managing the risks involved in that pro-
cess. Using the emerging (enterprise) risk management literature, an approach is 
proposed through which risk management can be embedded in the business model 
innovation process.
Design: The integrated business model innovation risk management model devel-
oped in this paper has been tested through an action research study in a Danish 
company.
Findings: The study supports our proposition that the implementation of risk man-
agement throughout the innovation process reduces the risks related to the uncer-
tainty and complexity of developing and implementing a new business model.
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Introduction
The demise of Lehman Brothers triggered a global chain 
reaction, the financial crisis of 2008 to 2011 – world 
stock markets collapsed, large financial institutions 
and industrial companies went bankrupt, were bought 
out, or are still (at the time of writing this paper) strug-
gling to recover (e.g. GM, Chrysler, AIG). Worldwide, 
millions of employees lost their jobs, and governments 
have had to come up with rescue packages to save their 
own financial systems. As if it was not hard enough to 
adapt to the effects of hypercompetition (e.g. D’Aveni, 
1994), many companies experienced the financial crisis 
as “the final straw that broke the camel’s back”.
In a business summit that took place at Harvard Univer-
sity in the early phases of the financial crisis (October 
14, 2008), Professor Robert S. Kaplan linked the finan-
cial crisis with firms’ behavior, and argued that “apart 
from the macro issues [such as] interest rates and regu-
latory problems, virtually all the failures at those firms 
were because of the failure of their risk management 
function”. That is, CEOs were fired and companies col-
lapsed because they took higher risks than they could 
afford, and were not prepared for, or failed to identify 
and respond adequately to, the magnitude of the crisis. 
Business today is more difficult to manage than ever 
– economic trends and market changes are hardly pre-
dictable, and globalization has created ever more com-
plex business environments. Innovation is a key ingre-
dient in the way companies (have to) react to external 
changes. While most innovation efforts have tradition-
ally been focused on developing new products and, al-
beit to a lesser extent, process technologies, compa-
nies are increasingly considering their entire business 
model as an object for innovation. The IBM global CEO 
study 2006 held among 765 top CEOs indicated that 
competitive pressures had pushed business model in-
novation much higher than expected on industrial pri-
ority lists. According to that study, approx. 30 percent 
of CEOs were pursuing business model innovation ini-
tiatives and quite rightly so. 
There is little theoretical understanding of how to man-
age that process adequately. The aim of this paper is 
to contribute to developing that understanding, with a 
specific focus on the role of risk and risk management. 
While product and process innovations are not without 
risk (e.g. Keizer and Halman, 2007), business model in-
novation is potentially much riskier. Accordingly, our 
research question is:
To what extent and, especially, how can 
risk management help a company handling 
various risks effectively throughout its 
business model innovation process?
Risk and Risk Management
In simple terms, the term risk refers to “uncertainty of 
outcome” (Chapman and Ward, 2004). Risk manage-
ment has been defined as “the systematic application 
of management policies, procedures and practices to 
the tasks of communicating, consulting, establishing 
the context, identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, 
monitoring and reviewing risk” (ISO/IEC Guide 73, 2002).
The evolution of risk management has come a long 
way in the past two decades.  However, although com-
panies have successfully adopted risk management in 
their internal audit, treasury, insurance, environmental 
health and safety, and legal functions, it has not yet 
been fully incorporated into core business processes re-
lated to future growth, such as strategic planning, cap-
ital allocation, and performance management (Deloitte 
& Touche, 2008). This seems to imply that unrewarded 
risks, in the sense that no premium is obtained from 
managing them – only the potential for loss is reduced, 
are the main driver in today’s risk management practic-
es, while managing rewarded risks, which are part and 
parcel of decision-making processes associated with 
future growth, is not yet fully embedded in organiza-
tional change and innovation processes.
Furthermore, even if companies attempt to manage 
rewarded risks systematically, for example in project 
management (e.g. Kendrick, 2003; Chapman and Ward, 
2004) or product innovation management (e.g. Keizer 
et al., 2002; Keizer and Halman, 2007), they essentially 
assume that those risks can be managed in isolation 
from the entire system. Recent surveys and studies 
(e.g. Taplin, 2005; Deloitte & Touche, 2008; O’Connor 
et al. 2008; Kalvet and Lember, 2010; Guo, 2012, 2013), 
however, have shown that a growing percentage of 
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managers worldwide are interested in applying risk 
management in a much more comprehensive (i.e. pro-
active and holistic) manner. 
A study by Accenture (2009) suggests that there are, 
roughly speaking, three risk management models that 
a company can adopt, namely: 
1. Risk management for compliance, which involves a 
regulatory set of requirements focused on keeping 
the company complying with regulations.
2. Risk management for value protection, which is 
aimed at managing expected risks as well as reduc-
ing the degree of unforeseen risks..
3. Risk management for value enhancement, which is 
aimed at covering all dimensions of the business as well 
as increasing the protection against unforeseen risks
According to Accenture (2009), “In choosing where to 
stand on the risk management spectrum, a company is 
deciding what kind of risk management culture it wants to 
embrace. Does it want to simply comply with regulations? 
Or does it want to be visionary and adjust risk manage-
ment for the evolved company it will become as the busi-
ness grows?”. This suggests that dynamic, i.e. innova-
tive, companies will, or perhaps even should, adopt a risk 
management model that is more focused on value en-
hancement and helps them proactively to manage risks, 
pitfalls and surprises along the way (e.g. COSO, 2004).
Enterprise risk management
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) attempts to cap-
ture and reduce the effects of today’s business com-
plexity and uncertainty by providing a broad framework 
for managing risks (e.g. Moeller, 2007; Monahan, 2008; 
Olson and Wu, 2010; Wu and Olsen, 2010; Hoyt and 
Liebenberg, 2011; Kraus and Lehner, 2012). According 
to the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), 
ERM deals with risks and opportunities affecting value 
creation, and helps an entity to get where it wants to 
go and avoid pitfalls and surprises along the way. Thus, 
they define ERM as “a process, effected by an entity’s 
board of directors, management and other personnel 
… designed to identify potential events that may af-
fect the entity, and manage risks to be within its risk 
appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives” (COSO, 2004). Table 
1 gives an example of an ERM framework (CAS, 2003).
Table 1: Enterprise Risk Management framework (adapted from CAS, 2003)
Process step Types of risks
Strategic Operational &  
Cultural
Financial Hazard
Establish Context
Identify Risks
Analyze / Quantify
Integrate Risks
Assess / Prioritize Risks
Treat / Exploit Risks
Monitor and Review
40
Journal of Business Models (2013), Vol. 1, No. 1
ERM benefits – Applying ERM helps companies (e.g. 
COSO, 2004; Graham, 2004; Ernst & Young, 2006; The 
National Affordable Homes Agency, 2008, Deloitte 
& Touche, 2008; Olson and Wu, 2010; Wu and Olsen, 
2010; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Kraus and Lehner, 
2012):
• Improve their contingency planning by taking a 
proactive approach, so that managers can avoid 
surprises, and anticipate and influence events be-
fore they are happening.
• Make better decisions by aligning a company’s risk 
appetite with its strategy.
• Enhance risk response decisions through risk avoid-
ance, reduction, sharing, and acceptance.
• Identify and manage multiple cross-enterprise 
risks, segmented mostly to four core risk groups: 
strategic, operational & cultural, financial and haz-
ard risks (CAS, 2003).
• Seize new opportunities based on identified risks.
• Achieve efficiencies – a structured and comprehen-
sive risk management process built into existing 
activities generates better managerial processes; 
e.g. facilitating resource allocation, improving de-
ployment of capital, avoiding unnecessary prob-
lems, or setting demanding performance targets.
• Improve their corporate governance – an efficient 
ERM process can assist with defining reporting and 
communication protocols, setting appropriate cor-
porate ethics as well as securing compliance with 
regulatory requirements.
• Strengthen accountability by demonstrating that 
levels of risk associated with policies, plans, pro-
grams and operations are explicitly understood, 
and that stakeholder interests are optimally bal-
anced.
ERM challenges – Despite the potential benefits sug-
gested above, it has also been implicitly argued (e.g. 
Ernst & Young, 2006; Deloitte & Touche, 2008; Kraus 
and Lehner, 2012) that the understanding of how to in-
corporate ERM into future-oriented business process-
es is currently lacking. Companies that do apply ERM 
embed it within their system, but tend to focus on 
risks related to existing assets. In so doing, they miss 
the connection to business processes aimed at future 
growth (e.g. Deloitte & Touche, 2008), including busi-
ness model innovation processes.
Demonstrating the benefits of the value of taking risk 
(and preventing their consequences) is one of the great 
challenges related to the adoption of ERM and using it 
in future-oriented activities. According to the Deloitte 
& Touche ERM survey (2008, p. 2), “management is de-
manding proof of the value proposition of ERM, just as 
they did when quality initiatives were first being intro-
duced. Unfortunately, such proof is usually most evident 
after a catastrophe”. The aim of the study presented 
here is to demonstrate the usability and usefulness of 
risk management in one such future-oriented and, as 
the next subsection will show, potentially quite risky 
activity, namely business model innovation.
Uncertainty and complexity management
Risk is a function of the uncertainty and complexity re-
lated to innovation. Boer (1991) addressed uncertainty 
and complexity as follows.
Uncertainty – Several terms have been used to refer to 
this aspect of organizational reality. Some authors use 
the term predictability (e.g. Mintzberg, 1979); others pre-
fer to call it uncertainty (e.g. Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 
1973; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979). Inevitably connected 
with innovation, uncertainty refers to the extent to which 
individuals, groups or organizations are informed about 
the future (Galbraith, 1973). The level of uncertainty may 
vary along a continuum of certainty, risk, uncertainty and 
unstructured uncertainty (De Leeuw, 1982), is generally 
assumed to be highest at the initial stages of the inno-
vation process, but should tend to decrease in the course 
of time. It may concern the objectives to be pursued, the 
activities to be performed in order to achieve desirable 
results, the people to perform the activities, the arrange-
ments regulating their cooperation, and the influence of 
the organization’s context (Simon, 1964; Galbraith, 1973; 
Mintzberg, 1979; Kickert, 1979; De Leeuw, 1982). Typi-
cal symptoms of uncertainty are failures being made, 
setbacks and surprises occurring, unforeseen barriers 
needing to be leveled, goals and objectives requiring re-
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definition during the process, formerly elaborated ideas 
and accepted solutions being rejected and exchanged for 
new ideas leading to alternative solutions, implemented 
solutions appearing to be less effective than anticipated, 
and/or schedule and budget overruns (Galbraith, 1973; 
Sayles, 1974; During, 1984; Schroeder et al., 1986). 
Complexity – This factor has been referred to using 
different terms, such as comprehensibility (Mintzberg, 
1979) and analyzability (Perrow, 1967). Still following Boer 
(1991), we use the term complexity to refer to the diffi-
culty with which a process can be understood (cf. Mint-
zberg, 1979). The extent to which an innovation process 
is complex or, contrarily, easy to understand, depends on 
features such as the newness and radicality of the in-
novation. Furthermore, not all activities in an innovation 
process are complex. The greater the gap between the 
knowledge and skills required from the people involved, 
and the competences these people actually have, the 
more the organization has to rely on unanalyzed experi-
ence, intuition, chance and guesswork, rather than well-
known, standard methods of designing, developing and 
implementing solutions to the innovation problem (cf. 
e.g. Perrow, 1967). In other words, competence gaps in-
crease uncertainty.
Uncertainty, complexity and risk – It is important to 
note that the success of a business model innovation 
depends on the company’s ability to recognize that it 
is about to perform activities that are more uncertain, 
complex and therefore also riskier than anything it has 
experienced in the past, and the ability to cope with 
these process characteristics. Figure 1 illustrates the 
relationships between uncertainty, complexity and risk 
and, implicitly, suggests that the higher the level of in-
novation uncertainty and complexity, the greater the 
need for risk management.
The question is: how? The next section will investigate 
that.
Figure 1: Complexity-uncertainty based risk scale
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MEDIUM-HIGH RISK
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LOW RISK
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Managing Risk in Business Model 
Innovation
Business model innovation
Many authors have attempted to define the business 
model concept. Some authors took a narrow, more 
technological or financial focus (e.g. Stewart and Zhao, 
2000; Chesbrough, 2007), others adopted a more gen-
eral perspective (e.g. Amit and Zott, 2001; Osterwalder 
et al., 2004). Some have incorporated corporate strat-
egy in their business model definition (e.g. Timmers, 
1998; Hamel, 2000), others have left it out (e.g. Selz, 
1999; Weill and Vitale, 2001). However, put simply, 
most (if not all) authors agree that a business model 
is a model that explains how a company does business. 
The number of building blocks of business model can-
vasses presented in the literature ranges from three to 
nine (Osterwalder et al., 2004; Morris et al., 2005).
There has been quite a debate in the literature on the 
question when a change can rightfully be called a busi-
ness model innovation. Two approaches seem to pre-
vail. The first approach defines business model inno-
vation as a radical change in the way a company does 
business (Chesbrough 2007; Linder and Cantrell 2000). 
The second approach regards any change in any of the 
building blocks of a business model, or the relation-
ships between them, as a form of business model in-
novation (Amit and Zott 2001, Osterwalder et al. 2004, 
Magretta 2002; Taran et al., 2014). We adopt the sec-
ond approach. 
Risk management in business model 
innovation
Risk management in the context of business model 
innovation is “terra incognita” – unexplored territory 
(Taran, 2011). We will therefore rely on the (limited) re-
search available on risk management in adjacent areas, 
namely project and product innovation management 
(e.g. Taplin, 2005; O’Connor et al. 2008; Kalvet and 
Lember, 2010; Guo, 2012, 2013), in particular the work 
of Keizer et al. (2002) and Chapman and Ward (2002), 
to develop a deeper understanding on how and when 
risk management could be incorporated into a compa-
ny’s business model innovation process.
Keizer et al. (2002) clarified how Unilever, a world-
leading company in fast-moving consumer goods, 
adopted the Risk Diagnosing Methodology (RDM) in 
its product innovation management. RDM was initi-
ated, developed and successfully tested first in a di-
vision of Philips Electronics Company. Its aims were 
to identify and evaluate technological, organizational 
and business risks in product innovation. Similar to the 
Philips results, RDM proved to be a very useful method 
for Unilever for diagnosing product innovation project 
risks, promoting creative solutions, strengthening 
team ownership and building a knowledge base of po-
tential risks in product innovation projects.
Keizer et al. (2002) argued that, in relation to Unilever’s 
innovation funnel (Figure 2), the RDM process should 
be applied at the end of the “feasibility” phase, i.e. at 
the “contract” gate. Since RDM was focused particu-
larly on one of the gates of the company’s innovation 
funnel, the main issues addressed at that stage were 
consumer and trade acceptance, commercial viability, 
competitive reactions, external influential responses, 
human resource implications, and manufacturability.
Chapman and Ward (2004) proposed a framework for 
incorporating risk management in project manage-
ment processes, called SHAMPU (Share, Harness, And 
Manage Project Uncertainty). In contrast to Keizer et 
al.’s (2002) study, which argues for applying the risk 
management process only once, at the end of the fea-
sibility phase, Chapman and Ward maintain that the 
nine phases of the SHAMPU risk management process 
(define, focus, identify, structure, ownership, estimate, 
evaluate, harness, manage), should be presented as an 
ongoing process activity, followed by an iterative loop 
back to the “estimate” phase or even to the (first) “de-
fine” phase, to refine or redefine the basis of analysis of 
sources of uncertainty revealed to be important. How-
ever, similar to Keizer et al. (2002), Chapman and Ward 
(2004) also argued that the risk management process 
should start at the early phases of the project and end 
at the planning phase, before allocating and executing 
the project. This “planning” phase in the Chapman and 
Ward model can, to a great extent, be compared to the 
“feasibility” phase in the Unilever innovation funnel 
(Figure 2).
In translating the suggestions put forward by Keizer et 
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al. (2002) and Chapman and Ward (2004) to business 
model innovation, we make one important amend-
ment, which follows from the question why risk man-
agement should only be applied early on in the innova-
tion process. Why is it that other gates can be left out 
and, more fundamentally, how can risks be managed 
adequately at other (more progressed) gates, if risk 
management is not applied there? We believe that risk 
management should play a role throughout the entire 
innovation process and therefore propose:
The implementation of risk management 
throughout the innovation process reduces 
the risks related to the uncertainty and 
complexity of developing and implementing 
a new business model.
In order to be able to research this proposition, we put 
forward a generic process that illustrates the possible 
integration of risk management within the overall busi-
ness model innovation process (Figure 3). The model 
adopts the widely used stage-gate model proposed by 
Cooper (1993). The rationale for adopting a stage-gate 
process is twofold. First, previous research (e.g. Taran, 
2011) indicated that many companies have adopted 
this model and incorporated it, in one way or another, 
in their innovation processes. This makes logical sense: 
the stage-gate model is essentially a project manage-
ment tool, which is meant to increase the manage-
ability of an innovation process by organizing it as a 
sequence of stages and gates. Second, adopting the 
stage-gate model allows us and, for that matter, com-
panies using the model, to allocate risk management 
activities where they belong, namely at the gates, as 
also suggested by both Keizer et al. (2002) and Chap-
man and Ward (2004). 
A business model innovation risk 
management model
We propose the model in depicted in Figure 3 to de-
scribe a practical, i.e. linear and systematic, implemen-
tation of risk management in the business model in-
novation process. Stage one focuses on visualizing the 
“as-is” business model of the company. Then, the pro-
cess will continue by following a stage-gate procedure 
ending with the implementation of the new business 
model. 
Each stage and gate provides an opportunity for a com-
plete risk management process. Based on an extensive 
literature review (e.g. COSO, 2004; Graham, 2004; 
Ernst & Young, 2006; The National Affordable Homes 
Agency, 2008, Deloitte & Touche, 2008; Olson and Wu, 
2010; Wu and Olsen, 2010; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; 
Kraus and Lehner, 2012), we narrowed that process 
down to four core activities, namely:
Figure 2: The Unilever innovation funnel (Keizer et al., 2002)
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1. Identify various risks – strategic, operational & cul-
tural, financial and hazard risks.
2. Analyze each of the risks identified.
3. Evaluate those risks – determine the level of risk 
that a company is willing to accept.
4. Treat the risks – the four possibilities are: avoiding, 
reducing, accepting and transferring/sharing the 
risks (e.g. De Loach, 2003).
The purpose of the gates is to relax constraints, un-
certainties and complexities throughout the business 
model innovation process, as well as to provide more 
certainty for managers regarding the path chosen. The 
first risk management phase is focused on the assess-
ment of the current (“as-is”) business model. Identify-
ing the risks at that stage can, for example, follow from 
a SWOT analysis, where the company is considering 
how to take advantage of opportunities and strengths 
and deal with weaknesses and threats. Then, through 
careful analysis and evaluation of each identified (stra-
tegic, operational & cultural, financial, hazard) risk, 
managers search for possibilities to treat those risks, 
which eventually results in three possibilities, namely: 
retrenchment (cost cutting), compliance with regula-
tions, or search for innovation solutions (e.g. a new 
product/service, process and/or market position).
The second risk management phase begins by identify-
ing the risks of each business model innovation pos-
sibility that was proposed in the design phase. Here, 
too, users follow a systematic process of analyzing, 
evaluating and then treating those risks, which results, 
during the prioritization phase, in rejecting some busi-
ness model innovation ideas, and selecting others for 
further processing. 
Finally, the third risk management phase facilitates 
the identification, analysis, evaluation and treatment 
of risks related to each downstream milestone. The 
purpose of this gate is to systematically organize the 
anticipation and sense of urgency needed to prevent 
sloppy implementation processes by dealing with a 
large variety of strategic, operational & cultural, finan-
cial and hazard risks.
Thus, unlike Keizer et al. (2002) and Chapman and Ward 
(2004), who suggested that the risk analysis should take 
place (only) at the gates of the innovation process, in our 
model we propose that the risk management process 
should be applied through the entire business model in-
novation process i.e. during all stages and at all gates.
Figure 3: Risk management integrated in the business model innovation process
Stage 1 Gate 1 Stage 2 Gate 2 Stage 3 Gate 3 Stage 4
                 Innovation
Risk  
management
As-is business 
model
New business 
model design
Prioritizing and 
milestones
Implementation
Identify risks I I I
Analyze risks A A A
Evaluate-prioritize E E E
Treat risks T T T
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It should also be noted that unlike Cooper’s (1993) 
stage-gate model, we chose not to include a testing 
and validation phase. Due to the nature of business 
model innovations, it would be quite impossible to test 
and validate a new business model prior to its imple-
mentation, as suggested for product innovations.
Research design
In the previous section we presented a business model 
innovation risk management model, which is based on 
the proposition that risk management should be im-
plemented throughout the innovation process. This 
section describes the design of the pilot study we con-
ducted to shed more light on the practical usability and 
usefulness of the model. 
According to Christensen (2006), theory is built in two 
major stages: 
1. A descriptive stage, which aims to inductively ob-
serve, classify and define various relationships to a 
specific phenomenon.
2. A normative stage, in which the researcher moves 
beyond statements of correlation to define what 
causes the outcome of interest. 
Given the “state-of-the-theory” of business model inno-
vation, it would be too early to pursue normative theory. 
For that reason, this paper focuses on the first phase, 
i.e. the descriptive ‘pyramid’. While the wide majority of 
business model innovation research has focused on the 
base (observe, describe, measure) of the pyramid, and 
some work has been conducted at the second level (cat-
egorization) (e.g. Koen et al., 2011; Taran et al., 2014), this 
paper moves business model innovation theory develop-
ment to the third level (models) (Figure 4). 
A business model innovation process conducted by a 
Danish company, Provital, provides the empirical basis 
for this paper. We decided to perform action research 
in order to:
Figure 4: The process of building a (descriptive) theory (Christensen, 2006)
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• Put the model developed (Figure 3) into a field test 
aimed at analyzing its usability and usefulness 
and, through that,
• Explore the extent to which and, especially, how 
risk management can help a company handling 
various risks throughout its business model inno-
vation process (cf. our research question formu-
lated in the introduction section).
The study began in early 2008 and ended in 2011. We 
were involved in the company’s attempt to develop an 
innovative business model from its inception, and par-
ticipated actively in the development and screening of 
new business model ideas, as well as in the strategic 
decision making and change processes implemented 
later on. 
Short case description
Provital was established in 2008 as a joint venture be-
tween two medium-sized Danish companies. Provital’s 
value proposition involved a new and revolutionary fil-
tration system, which can be assembled in various ways 
and applied in multiple industries (e.g. pools, car wash, 
marine boats, drinking water). One of the strengths of 
the products resided in the fact that they offered high-
er quality for a lower price and lower life-cycle cost to 
target customers, regardless of their industry. 
Taking the changing focus of customers and countries 
towards environmentally friendlier products, and given 
the fact that there were few competitors to their of-
fering in the global market, Provital expected that its 
cleansing system had the potential to revolutionize the 
market for water purification and would help the com-
pany become a large and global player in a relatively 
short period of time. 
However, due to the potentially wide array of applica-
tions of, and target markets for, their products, Pro-
vital had difficulties in understanding how to manage 
the development of a business model supporting the 
company’s ambitions and, particularly, how to mitigate 
the risks involved in that process. Each industrial focus 
required its own manufacturing methods and technol-
ogies, ways to organize the company’s core activities, 
and selection of key suppliers as well as target mar-
kets, including choices such as customer types (e.g. 
B2B versus B2C) and geographical areas.
Data collection and data analysis
The company gave us a lot of freedom in experimenting 
with the business model innovation risk management 
model. In order to keep track of our interventions, we 
developed a project definition report that systemati-
cally described each phase we went through. After we 
completed that report, the R&D manager was inter-
viewed in order to assess the risk management process 
in light of the criteria benefits, timing and functionality 
(see below).
Data collection – In order to develop that report we 
used participant observation and, in addition, con-
ducted ten semi-structured in-process interviews, an 
ex-post interview with the R&D manager, and seven 
meetings with the company managers. We designed 
the meetings as workshops, which systematically fol-
lowed the business model innovation process depicted 
in Figure 3. This helped us to test the risk management 
process while it was implemented, and explore its ef-
fects on the innovation process. All notes taken at the 
meetings and workshops were uploaded to the project 
extranet. The managers had free access to those files 
and were encouraged to comment, correct and/or sim-
ply accept our interpretations of these events.
Data analysis – Similar to the procedure reported by 
Keizer and Halman (2007), the data was analyzed in 
three successive steps: 
1. Risk management literature review – to develop a 
list of key risk factors.
2. Analysis of the interviews – to develop a better un-
derstanding of disparities between the expected 
and the actual contribution of applying risk man-
agement, and of the importance of applying risk 
management in the business model innovation 
process. 
3. Content analysis – to draw valid case conclusions 
and check the risks identified by Provital’s man-
agers during the workshops against the potential 
risks outlined on the basis of our previous litera-
ture review. 
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Through that process we developed a list of risks, 
separated into four categories (strategic, operational 
& cultural, financial and hazard) with 22 critical risk 
issues.   
Additionally, given that our intention with the action 
research was to put the model developed (Figure 3) 
into a field test to analyze its application and effects, 
we decided to select the following criteria for assessing 
whether the application of the model should be consid-
ered as successful, partly successful or a failure:
• Benefits – so that we could learn whether the 
application of risk management throughout the 
business model innovation process was, indeed, 
beneficial for the company, not only in terms of 
the “success” or “failure” of the innovation, but 
also as regards the extent to which uncertainties, 
complexities and consequent risks were reduced 
throughout the business model innovation pro-
cess.
• Timing – so that we could learn whether risk man-
agement activities should be applied only once 
(e.g. Keizer et al. 2002), several times, but still only 
at the early phases of an innovation process (e.g. 
Chapman and Ward, 2004) or, as our model sug-
gests, ongoing, throughout the entire process.
• Functionality – akin to the clinical test of a new 
medicine, we developed a new model (i.e. new 
medicine) but can only confirm whether the model 
actually functions as expected and if there are any 
“side-effects”, by trying it out in practice. 
The “benefits” criterion tests the usefulness of the 
model. The “timing” and “functionality” criteria test 
the model’s usefulness as well as its usability.
According to Popper (1963), every genuine test of a 
theory is an attempt to falsify or to refute it. Testabil-
ity, according to him, is falsifiability. Accordingly, a suc-
cessful case would only suggest that the model is not 
refuted – further research would be needed to develop 
arguments for its usefulness and usability in similar 
contexts and its transferability to different contexts. 
The second scenario (i.e. partly successful), would sug-
gest that the model has been partly disproven. Fur-
ther investigation would be needed in order to learn 
what went wrong in which stage(s) and/or gate(s) of 
the model, and which aspects of the model need to be 
revised before testing it again. The third scenario (i.e. 
failure) would indicate that the model has to be reject-
ed.
Validity and Reliability – as recommended by Field-
ing and Fielding (1986), Duffy (1987), Dick (1993), Lew-
is (1998), Greenwood and Levin (2000) and Maxwell 
(2005), we used the following tactics:
• Data triangulation – multiple sources of evidence 
were used, namely primary and secondary data, 
face-to-face interviews, mediated interviews, and 
group and third party interviews.
• Two action research cycles were performed – this 
increased our understanding, and facilitated us 
in refining the initial conceptual framework (e.g. 
Lewis, 1998).
• Data gathering process – as mentioned above, in-
process and ex-post interviews were conducted for 
understanding better the disparity between the 
expected and the actual contribution of applying 
risk management, as well as the importance and 
seriousness of applying risk management in the 
business model innovation process (e.g. Keizer and 
Halman, 2007).
• Iterative triangulation – is recommended in situ-
ations where the research topic is novel and un-
derdeveloped, but at the same time a body of rel-
evant literature exists (Lewis, 1998). Accordingly, 
the business model innovation risk management 
model, was developed based on existing studies, 
rather than on data collected directly from the 
company. 
Analysis and Discussion
The aim of this section is to analyze the results in view 
of the research question, give more concrete details on 
the process applied to identify, evaluate, analyze and 
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treat various risks, and present initial findings regard-
ing “how” and the “extent” to which risk management 
can help a company in the complex and uncertain pro-
cess of business model innovation.  
Process description
As shown in Table 2, the risk management process in-
volved four phases. First, for each risk criterion (strate-
gic, operational & cultural, financial and hazard), poten-
tial risks were identified. Then, each risk was analyzed 
qualitatively by assessing both the probability of the 
risk to occur and the relative impact that risk would 
have. For those risks that were rated as “medium” or 
“high”, i.e. misfit to the corporate risk appetite level 
of the firm, an “action needed to be taken” description 
was made, focused on a possible solution, i.e. avoid-
ing, reducing, accepting, transferring or sharing the risk 
(e.g. De Loach, 2003), along with appointing a person 
in charge and determining the expected target date 
of completion. Finally, residual risks were assessed 
against the risk appetite level of the firm.
Benefits
Our observations and experiences from the workshops 
and interviews suggest that Provital has gained valua-
ble benefits from experimenting with risk management. 
The company’s managers report that risk management 
assisted them in managing various risks across the en-
terprise efficiently and effectively, as well as in prior-
itizing their strategic, operational and financial choices 
throughout the business model innovation process.
According to Provital’s R&D manager, many of the risks 
identified were not new to them, but through the pro-
cess of analyzing these risks they realized that they 
had not really known how to manage them effectively 
but learned to do so. Furthermore, rating risks as low, 
medium or high helped them to better understand, 
systematically prioritize and organize what needed to 
be done in order to deal with the risks identified. By 
explicitly describing how to treat each risk expected in 
the course of the process, they were better prepared 
for and more aware of the risks they were willing to 
accept, which reduced the risk level (inherent versus re-
sidual risks) and, with that, also the overall uncertainty 
and complexity associated with the business model in-
novation process. 
Furthermore, according to Provital’s R&D manager, 
risk management also served as a compass that kept 
the company on track with its strategic goals and, for 
himself, to prioritize his work tasks. Running daily op-
erations is hard enough, and focusing on small issues 
can distract attention from the bigger and more urgent 
ones. Keeping an “action needed to be taken” table for 
the risks that were rated as “medium” or “high” kept 
him focused and certain that he would find the time to 
address them.
 
Additionally, he also found risk management to be 
a very efficient tool. Dividing the larger problem into 
different criteria and steps that are relatively easy to 
understand guided him through the business model in-
novation process. 
All in all, Provital’s managers were very satisfied with 
experimenting with the risk management process, and 
the R&D manager in particular stated that he intended 
to continue working with risk management in future 
innovation processes, as well as with prioritizing his 
daily, weekly and monthly activities.
These findings confirm previous publications (e.g. 
COSO, 2004; Graham, 2004; Ernst & Young, 2006; The 
National Affordable Homes Agency, 2008; Deloitte 
& Touche, 2008), which propose many benefits that 
company may gain from applying risk management in 
their innovation processes.
Timing
When the R&D manager was asked whether risk man-
agement should be applied once or, rather, as an ongo-
ing part of the innovation process, he argued for the 
latter. He felt it is particularly important to apply risk 
management at the early phases of the innovation 
process, but since competition today is so dynamic, 
today’s certainties can very easily become tomorrow’s 
new challenges – e.g. their bank crashed during the 
global financial crisis.
Thus, as strategies and innovation plans may need to 
be changed frequently and occasionally perhaps even 
radically, new risks may emerge, which need to be an-
alyzed all the time, both with respect to new innova-
tions and also in different phases of a single innovation 
process. According to the R&D manager, Provital will be 
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Table 2: Example of evaluation and treatment of risks at Provital
Qualitative risk analysis Action plan Post-hoc evaluation
Medium 
and high 
risks 
identified 
Likeli-
hood  
(1-5)
Impact
(1-5)
Inher-
ent 
risk 
Risk treatment Person in 
charge, and 
milestones
Re-
sidual 
risk
Fit to the 
compa-
ny’s risk 
appetite
Further 
action 
planned
Strategic risks
S1 – Pro-
vital’s lack 
of sales, 
leads to a 
shutdown 
of the joint 
venture.
5 5 High Primary focus is on 
insuring the com-
pany owners’ sat-
isfaction through 
improving web 
visualization, ag-
gressive market-
ing, achieving im-
mediate sales and 
revenues, and se-
curing IPR on the 
system.
Top manager 
and R&D man-
ager are respon-
sible, already 
working on solv-
ing the problem. 
They continue 
more rigorously 
after receiving 
funding.
Low Fit No further 
action need-
ed. But keep 
monitoring 
closely the 
owners’ ex-
pectations. 
S2 - New 
competitor 
enters the 
industry 
with a 
competitive 
solution. 
4 3 Me-
dium 
Monitoring the 
industry for po-
tential competi-
tors.
R&D manager Medium No fit Keep moni-
toring the 
industry for 
p o t e n t i a l 
competitors 
on a month-
ly basis.
Operational & cultural risks
O1 - No 
profes-
sional 
sales peo-
ple. Low 
marketing 
skills and 
practice.
1 5 Me-
dium 
Need to get fund-
ing for employing 
high quality sales 
and marketing 
people. Also, con-
sidering outsourc-
ing the marketing 
function and sell-
ing to a third (ex-
pert) company.
All company 
managers. Partly 
already in pro-
gress, and to be 
applied more rig-
orously after re-
ceiving funding.
Low Fit No further 
action is 
needed.
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Table 2: Example of evaluation and treatment of risks at Provital
Qualitative risk analysis Action plan Post-hoc evaluation
Medium 
and high 
risks 
identified 
Likeli-
hood  
(1-5)
Impact
(1-5)
Inher-
ent 
risk 
Risk treatment Person in 
charge, and 
milestones
Re-
sidual 
risk
Fit to the 
compa-
ny’s risk 
appetite
Further 
action 
planned
O2 - Tests 
fail to 
show 
that the 
system is 
success-
ful also 
in other 
industrial 
settings.
2 3 Me-
dium
Insure that the 
system operates 
successfully be-
fore sales. The 
system will not 
sell if the pre-
stress tests 
show that the 
system fails to 
operate success-
fully.
R&D manager. 
Already working 
on the problem.
Low to 
me-
dium
Poor fit No further 
action need-
ed.
O3 - One 
of Pro-
vital’s 
suppliers 
choose 
to stop 
working 
with the 
company.
1 1 Low 
(many 
sup-
pliers 
avail-
able)
- - - - No further 
action need-
ed
Financial risks
F1 - Lack 
of invest-
ment 
money.
3 4 Me-
dium 
Looking for po-
tential investor.
All managers 
(and owners). Al-
ready working it.
Low to 
me-
dium
Poor fit No further 
action need-
ed.
F2 - One 
of the 
mother 
compa-
nies goes 
bankrupt.
1 5 Me-
dium 
Cannot be con-
trolled by the 
company.
- Medium No fit Tolerate.
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Table 2: Example of evaluation and treatment of risks at Provital
Qualitative risk analysis Action plan Post-hoc evaluation
Medium 
and high 
risks 
identified 
Likeli-
hood  
(1-5)
Impact
(1-5)
Inher-
ent 
risk 
Risk treatment Person in 
charge, and 
milestones
Re-
sidual 
risk
Fit to the 
compa-
ny’s risk 
appetite
Further 
action 
planned
Hazard risks
H2 - Glob-
al financial 
crisis af-
fects the 
company’s 
perfor-
mance 
and sales.
5 3 High Each financial 
investment will 
be carefully ana-
lyzed and decid-
ed on jointly with 
financial experts.
Top manager 
and R&D man-
ager are respon-
sible. Already in 
progress. 
Low to 
me-
dium
Poor fit No further 
action need-
ed.
able to stay ahead of its competitors, be more flexible 
and cope better with changing conditions that are both 
internal and external to the organization, by continu-
ally analyzing various risks systematically. 
Thus, contrary to Keizer et al. (2002), but partly in line 
with Chapman and Ward (2004), the Provital case sug-
gests that risk management cannot only be beneficially 
applied in the early stages but actually during all stages 
and at all gates of an innovation process.
Functionality
The study shows that risk treatment choices need to 
be considered in a comprehensive manner when look-
ing for appropriate and holistic solutions. Every change 
may create new problems, challenges and risks. If each 
risk is handled individually, treating one strategic risk 
may very well result in a new operational challenge. For 
example, sales volumes in the local markets Provital 
served so far were low and in order to grow the com-
pany was eager to enter the US market. However, the 
entire supply chain was comprised of local players only. 
The high operational and (particularly) logistical costs 
involved in setting up a global supply system forced 
the company to consider alternative, more cost effec-
tive, operational solutions such as licensing and a joint 
venture. 
Thus, in addition to managing strategic, operational & 
cultural, financial and hazard risks individually, keeping 
a bird’s eye (i.e. systemic) view on the entire business 
model innovation process is also recommendable. 
However, Provital’s R&D manager also observed that 
an over-abundance of risk management can be prob-
lematic, too, as this overloads the organization with 
too many activities, which are not only time consuming 
but can also be confusing for staff members to cope 
with. For example, when Provital’s managers were 
asked to list what they thought would be significant 
risk factors (Table 2), they realized that their list was 
getting longer and longer, to a point that it simply be-
came impossible to manage it effectively, and decided 
to reduce the list to the 22 most critical risk factors. 
This observation touches on previous research, which 
has reported the negative impact of bureaucracy on 
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innovation (e.g. Burns and Stalker 1961), especially 
during the early phases of an innovation process (e.g. 
Zaltman et al., 1973; Kelly and Kranzberg, 1975; Pierce 
and Delbecq, 1977; Boer and During, 2001). Thus, al-
though managing risks throughout the business 
model innovation process is important, finding the 
right balance so as not to suffocate the process is a 
serious challenge.
Additionally, we also identified that by incorporating 
risk management in business model innovation pro-
cesses, starting at the stage prior to a gate, followed 
by risk analysis at the gate, and treatment choices 
that take place in the stage following that gate, Pro-
vital could significantly reduce many of the uncertain-
ties and complexities they were facing in the course 
of the business model innovation process. They were 
much more clear about the treatment initiatives in 
terms of “what to do”, “how to do it” and “when to do 
it”, and address the most urgent ones first with full 
commitment from the management team.
These findings correspond with Courtney et al. (1997), 
who argued that if a company underestimates or fails 
to manage uncertainties adequately, it will lead the 
company to develop strategies and operational pro-
cesses that:
• Neither defend against threats nor take advan-
tage of opportunities.
• Assume that the world is entirely unpredictable, 
which will then lead them to either abandon plan-
ning processes (i.e. too uncertain – too risky), or 
simply follow their gut instinct (i.e. “just do it”). 
In the latter case, the innovation process will be 
perceived as nothing less than a gamble..
Finally, we observed that the company did not always 
implement initial treatment choices made at the 
gates in full. If new problems emerged (e.g. financial 
constraints), the CEO occasionally decided to re-prior-
itize. This raises the question whether risk treatment 
decisions made at the gates should always be carried 
out “as planned”, or, alternatively, that they should 
be regarded as suggestions for action during the next 
stage(s). 
Evaluation and Propositions
The application of the model in the Provital case 
should be considered a success:
• Benefits: Provital gained multiple benefits from 
applying the model. It has reduced the risk level 
(inherent versus residual risks), and with that 
also the overall uncertainty and complexity of 
the entire business model innovation process. 
Consequently, they could proceed with the inno-
vation process with more certainty. Additionally, 
by mitigating (mostly) known risks, they became 
more actively aware of their risk appetite and the 
volume and types of risks they were willing to ac-
cept.
• Timing: it appears to be important to apply risk 
management through the entire innovation pro-
cess i.e. during all stages and at all gates. By con-
tinually analyzing potential risks, the company 
was able to act more flexibly and cope better with 
changing conditions both internal and external to 
the organization.
• Functionality: the approach proposed in Figure 3 
works (for Provital). One issue remains: too little 
risk management creates unforeseen risks and 
effects; too much risk management creates bu-
reaucracy and reduces flexibility and creativity. 
Finding the right balance is crucial, but how to 
achieve that is an open question.
Thus, the business model innovation risk manage-
ment model proposed in this paper was not rejected. 
However, it is too soon to conclude that the model is 
generally valid – more research in similar and differ-
ent contexts is needed. Table 3 translates the find-
ings reported above into testable propositions.
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Table 3: Generalization of action research findings into propositions
Category Action research case analysis - related text Proposition
Benefits
“By explicitly describing how to treat each risk 
expected in the course of the process, they 
were better prepared for and more aware of the 
risks they were willing to accept, which reduced 
the risk level (inherent versus residual risks) 
and, with that, also the overall uncertainty and 
complexity associated with the business model 
innovation process.”.
Proposition 1: The implementation of risk man-
agement into a business model innovation process 
reduces the level of risk related to the uncertainty 
and complexity of, or associated with, developing 
the new business model.
Proposition 2: Managing risks throughout the en-
tire business model innovation process will assist a 
company in aligning risk-treatment processes with 
the risk appetite level of the firm.
Timing
“When the R&D manager was asked whether risk 
management should be applied once or, rather, as 
an ongoing part of the innovation process, he ar-
gued for the latter. He felt it is particularly impor-
tant to apply risk management at the early phases 
of the innovation process, but since competition 
today is so dynamic, today’s certainties can very 
easily become tomorrow’s new challenges …”.
Proposition 3: The likelihood of launching a suc-
cessful new business model is increased if risk man-
agement is applied throughout the entire business 
model innovation process, i.e. in all stages and at all 
gates.
“Provital will be able to stay ahead of its competi-
tors, be more flexible and cope better with chang-
ing conditions that are both internal and external 
to the organization, by continually analyzing vari-
ous risks systematically”.
Proposition 4: Embedding risk management pro-
cess in business model innovation process promotes 
organizational learning and flexibility, and creates 
more focus on strategic choices made at the gates.
Functionality
“…in addition to managing strategic, operational 
& cultural, financial and hazard risks individually, 
keeping a bird’s eye (i.e. systemic) view on the en-
tire business model innovation process”. 
“…an over-abundance of risk management can be 
problematic, too, as this overloads the organiza-
tion with too many activities, which are not only 
time consuming but can also be confusing for staff 
members to cope with”.
Proposition 5: The likelihood of launching a suc-
cessful new business model increases by securing:1) An adequate alignment of various (stra-
tegic, operational & cultural, financial and 
hazard) risks treatments choices with one 
another.2) A sufficient and effective volume of risk 
management activities overall.
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Conclusion
Contribution
In this paper we investigated the application and suc-
cess potential of risk management in business model 
innovation processes, and formulated the following 
research question: To what extent and, especially, how 
can risk management help a company handling various 
risks effectively throughout its business model innova-
tion process? Accordingly, we integrated findings re-
ported in the risk management literature and Cooper’s 
stage-gate process in the business model innovation 
risk management model depicted in Figure 3, and tried 
that model in a business model innovation process un-
dertaken by the Danish company Provital. 
Given the limited research available on business mod-
els and risk management (associated with innovation 
processes), and the lack of research on understanding 
how to incorporate risk management within the overall 
business model innovation process, this research was 
largely explorative study – entering “terra incognita”. In 
addition, the research is based on the study of a single 
case. Yet, some valuable lessons can be formulated.
First, the study supports our proposition that the imple-
mentation of risk management throughout the innova-
tion process reduces the risks related to the uncertainty 
and complexity of developing and implementing a new 
business model. The operational use of the business 
model risk management model suggests that it makes 
managers much more focused on identifying problem-
atic issues (“know what to do”), and on putting explicit 
plans and timetables into place for resolving/reducing 
identified high and medium rated risks (“know how and 
when to do it”).  Furthermore, the study indicates that 
risk management assists a company in aligning the risk 
treatment choices made during the innovation process 
with the company’s corporate strategy and risk appe-
tite. In effect, managers are more confident about the 
strategic choices made during the innovation process, 
and it is also relatively easier for them to share their vi-
sion and future plans with their staff members, and to 
prioritize their operational plans. 
So, risk management is “good”, but the case study also 
suggests that too much risk management is not. An 
overload of risk management leads to time-consuming 
bureaucracy and reduces flexibility and creativity. How 
to find the optimal “volume” of risk management in a 
business model innovation process remains a question 
for further research.
Further Research
Carlile and Christensen (2005) suggest that the descrip-
tive part of theory building (Figure 4) is a preliminary 
stage, which researchers generally must pass through in 
order to develop more advanced normative theory. Ac-
cording to them, “the ability to know what actions will 
lead to desired results for a specific company in a spe-
cific situation awaits the development of normative 
theory in this field” (Carlile and Christensen 2005, p. 4). 
The action research reported in this paper should be 
considered as a pilot study (e.g. Lancaster et al., 2004; 
Ruxton and Colegrave, 2006), aimed at pre-testing or 
“trying out” (Baker, 1994) the approach proposed in 
Figure 3. Thus, although the action research failed to 
falsify the proposed generic business model innovation 
process (Figure 3), the results drawn from this research 
should be considered as tentative theory. Consequent-
ly, further research is needed in order to validate and 
test the generalizability of the model. In order to even-
tually arrive at normative theory, further research will 
involve the following consecutive steps:
• Test the approach in different situations, through a 
multiple action research study aimed at testing the 
approach through business model innovation initi-
atives of various companies, preferably SMEs and 
larger firms, representing different industries. In 
that respect, it should also be recognized that prac-
titioners should not only measure the operational 
use of the approach by the “success” or “failure” 
of a business model innovation, but also in terms 
of the extent to which uncertainties, complexities 
and consequent risks are reduced throughout the 
innovation process. The reason for doing so is the 
understanding that innovation is a “risky business” 
– risk will never be eliminated completely. The ap-
plication of the model in various circumstances 
may also validate, or alternatively falsify, the sug-
gested linear nature of the model and, particularly, 
the risk management activities applied throughout 
that process. 
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• Measure long-term effects of applying the model – 
once the application of the model has been tested 
in various industrial settings, and still assuming 
that it has yet to be falsified, we propose to pro-
ceed with a questionnaire-based survey to analyze, 
retrospectively, not only the short term effects of 
applying the model, but also the long term effects 
of its application in terms of, for example, avoiding 
cannibalization and securing sustainable growth.
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ABSTRACT
Purpose: Different applications and conceptualizations of the business model concept have created discussions on 
what it actually is. The purpose of this paper is twofold: 1) to establish an overview of current usages of the business 
model construct, its nature and role in theory building, and – building on this - 2) to derive guiding principles appli-
cable for achieving better clarity of the business model construct in future research.
Design/methodology: Variances in roles, nature and forms of current and diverse applications of the business mod-
el concept are discussed from a vertical and a horizontal dimension. Based on the analysis, key issues for achieving 
construct clarity are proposed. 
Findings: This paper 1) demonstrates that there are at least three levels of understanding business models (gen-
eral, conceptual and as a research construct), 2) that the business model construct is heavily influenced by the 
research view, 3) that the establishment of specific constructs can be informed by the existing literature, and 4) 
discusses how the emergent business model concept can be strengthened.
Implications
Different and complementary business model perspectives may provide a better understanding and reflection of 
reality than a single, general and detailed definition. For specific applications, definitions need to explicitly clarify 
the particular role, nature and boundaries of the business model.  
Originality/value
The paper provides a methodological contribution in the discussion on business model definitions by adding clarity 
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Introduction
What is a business model? This question is of relevance 
for anyone considering applying the business model 
construct or just reading the diverse contributions in 
the field. 
Although the business model idea addresses general, 
fundamental and familiar challenges of strategic na-
ture (Sandberg, 2002; Verstraete and Jouison-Lafitte, 
2011), there is still discussion about what business 
models are, and, consequently, their usefulness 
(most recently Arend, 2013; and a direct response, 
Zott and Amit, 2013). The business model concept 
was initially important for understanding e-business 
(Amit and Zott, 2001; Zott et al., 2011; Wirtz et al., 
2010) and commercialization of technology and inno-
vation (Chesbrough, 2006, Chesbrough and Rosen-
bloom, 2002, Johnson, 2010). However, Porter (2001) 
described the unclear nature of the business model as 
an “invitation for faulty thinking and delusion” as he 
analyzed unhealthy business practices rated to the in-
ternet. On the other hand, Pohle and Chapman (2006) 
found that business model innovation, i.e. defined 
as innovation incorporating both product and service 
generated comparatively better returns than isolated 
initiatives, which has been partly supported by Aspara 
et al. (2010). 
By tracking the application of the business model 
term in the literature (Ghaziani and Ventresca, 2005), 
it has been possible to see how it has been diffusing 
into new communities during the internet expansion 
in the 90ties with new meanings related to value cre-
ation (and delivery). At the same time, however, older 
meanings of the business model co-existed in old en-
vironments, albeit often in tacit versions. In this way 
the term business model has become a keyword, with 
a global meaning as well as local meanings. Business 
models appear to be a complex and multifaceted phe-
nomena which “integrates a variety of academic and 
functional disciplines, gaining prominence in none” 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002), and Shafer et al. 
(2005) talked about an identity crisis for the business 
model. Others claimed that the confusion resulted in 
the lack of progress of business model research. This 
wave of criticism apparently culminated around 2010-
11. In a review, Schneider and Spieth (2012) summa-
rized the situation as: “academic research on the topic 
is blamed to lag behind practice and in particular to lack 
formalization and structure (Zott et al.; 2011, Casade-
sus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; Plé et al., 2010). Further-
more, the concept is argued to miss sufficient theoretical 
grounding (Sahu and Marko, 2007; Morris et al., 2005; 
Teece, 2010; George and Bock, 2011; Nenonen and Stor-
backa, 2010) and to be based on a multitude of differing 
and inconsistent theoretical approaches (Camisón and 
Villar-López, 2010; Zott et al., 2011; Casadesus-Masanell 
and Ricart, 2010)”. It has recently been questioned if 
some of the energy going into this definition discus-
sion may have been applied for more useful purposes 
(Baden-Fuller and Haefliger, 2013).
Some of the above and other academics have explored 
the background and implications of the differenc-
es in business model understandings. This approach 
seems to be in line with the multidisciplinary presence 
and the inclusive nature of the business model field, 
pointing in the direction of seeing business models as 
a boundary object playing an important sense-making 
and sense-creating role for various stakeholders, de-
spite their individual approaches and understandings 
of the term. Empirically, this has been addressed by 
Verstraete and Jouison-Lafitte (2011) and Doganova 
and Eyquem-Renault (2009) seeing business model 
as important in the mobilization of resources in the 
entrepreneurial process. Further, Verstraete and Jou-
ison-Lafitte (2011) propose a conventionalist approach 
arguing that business model definitions – despite the 
variety in terms and language - addresses the same 
type of problems which is why there is some homoge-
neity of the concept. On a broader scale, while address-
ing the criticism in their review, Zott et al. (2011) also 
found emergent common ground in the business mod-
el literature. It has also been suggested that business 
model research exhibits the features of “progressive 
science” by Lakatos (Lecocq et al., 2010) in which sci-
ence develops as a series of progressive research pro-
grammes. But this raises the general critical questions 
about how we identify what the research programmes 
are and in particular when and how we identify “pro-
gressive shifts” in problems. This perspective, howev-
er, emphasize that - putting frustrations aside – these 
discussions are related to how science learns and build 
knowledge in the business model field.
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A central thesis of this paper is that much of the dis-
cussion and confusion is due to lack of clarity of more 
fundamental aspects in the different applications of 
the concept. In general definitions assist us in under-
standing the topic of interest – i.e. for classification and 
guidance of activities. But definitions (the content) and 
how we arrive at them (the process of defining) is com-
plex. First of all, there is the actual content and what 
we accept as a general definition. Several reviews have 
addressed this in different ways, but the result is often 
consolidating the findings, restating the problem, and 
providing no real solution. Secondly, the actual process 
of defining depends on the audience and how defini-
tions make sense and contribute to learning. There are 
substantial, traditional issues of different scientific and 
methodological approaches between different areas of 
business research, which is often neglected and not dis-
cussed in the calls for definitions. In addition it is rarely 
discussed if it is necessary, useful and possible to have 
a general definition accommodating and transcending 
different disciplines, their paradigms and traditions.  
Understanding the nature of the business model con-
cept has important implications for researchers and 
practitioners in 
1. establishing and maintaining an overview of its 
meaning and 
2. for dialogues about and positioning of their re-
search, both within and between different commu-
nities and disciplines, and
3. in theory building, as this depends on constructs 
and the ability to establish ties between these con-
structs. 
As already stated, there have been many attempts to 
define business models. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to add new dimensions to actual definitions. 
However, there have only been few – if any – contri-
butions on how we can arrive at definitions which si-
multaneously capture the broad meaning as well as the 
focus for specific applications which may indicate that 
the role, the process and context of definitions, may 
deserve more attention than what has been the case in 
the current literature, especially as the business model 
field is cross-disciplinary. 
The purpose of this paper is therefore twofold: 
1. to establish an overview of current usages of the 
business model construct, and in particular its nature 
and role in theory building, and – building on this – 
2. to derive guiding principles applicable for achieving 
better clarity of the business model construct in 
future research.  
Some of the fundamental questions we explore are: 
How can we apprehend, measure and discuss a con-
struct with multiple understandings? How precise defi-
nitions do we need - and when? 
The paper proceeds as follows: First part presents the 
methodology and key terms. Second part explores the 
central understanding of the business model from dif-
ferent levels and views, trying to understand its role, 
nature and format. Finally, this understanding is being 
discussed in relation to the need for a definition in spe-
cific contexts. 
Methodology and Key Terms
This paper suggests that business model understand-
ings can and must be explicated for specific purposes 
of knowledge creation, including the communication 
with different audiences. The paper takes an eclectic 
and pragmatic approach as it builds on existing contri-
butions, and it does not, in general, claim that one view 
or definition is superior compared to another.  To sup-
port this view and to provide some pragmatic guidance 
as to determine what type of definition is needed in 
different situations, it is proposed that business model 
definitions can be seen as a semantic field which can be 
described in a vertical as well as a horizontal dimension: 
First part examines the vertical, hierarchical level of 
understandings with different degrees of abstraction 
which may be relevant for different purposes and audi-
ences, by “unpacking” the literal meaning of business 
models. This is followed by a (brief) review of the liter-
ature and the apparent common ground which paves 
the way for a conceptual definition. This part also pro-
poses the existence of three levels of understandings 
(as a general reference, as a conceptual definition and 
as a specific construct). 
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Part two provides a horizontal dimension, i.e. different 
views, of business model understandings and their role 
in theory building. The analysis is based on contrast-
ing business model understandings, sometimes in a 
stylized way, according to dimensions of classic char-
acterization of scientific work, such as inductive versus 
deductive, nomothetic versus ideographic etc. Contri-
butions were selected from databases, conferences, 
consulting reports, and books based on the key word 
“business models”. For the contrasting analysis, diver-
sity of the contributions was important. The number 
of papers analyzed was determined by the saturation 
principle, i.e. the process was stopped when no further 
insights appeared (some, but not all, of the contribu-
tions are referred to in the text). Two brief examples 
can serve as an illustration of the analysis: A deduc-
tive approach (from the general to the applied) would 
require a predefined understanding (construct) in the 
research design, whereas a more inductive approach al-
low a more open construct. A nomothetic understand-
ing would indicate some kind of broader, normative 
(objective) generalization, whereas a more ideographic 
approach would indicate a more local understanding 
of business models. This process generated insights 
with implications for the construct in terms of e.g. con-
tent, scope, ability to deal with dynamics etc.. In addi-
tion, the insights were also evaluated in various par-
adigmatic views (Lincoln et al., 2011; Scott and Davis, 
2007; Arbnor and Bjerke, 2009; Skyttner, 2006; Ted-
dlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Gioia and Pitre, 1990), but 
for presentation purposes in this journal, the insights 
are organized according to four views identified in the 
business model literature:  The representational, the 
functionalist, the pragmatic and the systemic view. 
The findings are applied in the discussion and implica-
tions section to address the “do we need one business 
model definition” question in contexts of designing 
constructs in research projects, when communicat-
ing with practice and when communicating with col-
leagues. As definitions, concepts and constructs are 
not used consistently in the literature we initially focus 
on the role of definitions and how we arrive at them. 
Key terms: Definitions, concepts and constructs
Understanding the “essence” of things (Aristotle) has 
been a major question debated in philosophy and sci-
ence since ancient Greece. Without being entangled in 
a philosophical debate this is not without problems. A 
definition is the outcome of an activity which explains 
to an audience the meaning of an expression (Long-
worth, 2006). This sentence is in itself a definition 
consisting of a definiendum (what we define, i.e. defi-
nition) and definiens (how we do it – in this case by ac-
tivity). Defining imply the usage of definiens i.e. other 
constructs which may be more or less precise. This may 
be especially challenging in new areas and in social sci-
ence as definiens may be ambiguous and vague. 
The process of gaining acceptance and usage of a defi-
nition, i.e. “the activity of explaining”, can take several 
forms, depending on the context. In academia we rely 
to a heavy extent on writing. In practice oriented set-
tings other senses may be involved. As such, the ac-
tivity and validation of definitions may differ in form 
and process, including formal techniques emphasizing 
logic and rigor; convention logics; peer reviews; coercive 
power; opinion leaders; study of literature; empirical 
evidence; exemplary cases etc.. Central to this, howev-
er, is the definition’s capacity to provide meaning (in 
some cases classification) and eventually guide the 
behavior of its audience. Audiences, however, may dif-
fer and their preconception and knowledge of the area 
may also be heterogeneous. Therefore, the context – 
the audience – is central, as the audience validates and 
eventually applies a successful definition, i.e. what is a 
“necessary and sufficient” description in a classic sense 
of definitions. 
As shown by Ghaziani & Ventresca (2005) the business 
model has achieved both global as well as local mean-
ings in different communities. As the business model 
concept reflects a complex reality and has a large and 
diversified audience, it is no surprise that we find dif-
ferent perceptions and applications of the term. The 
calls for definitions are often rooted in the particu-
lar disciplines of the specific researcher(s). These are 
deeply rooted in different scientific traditions and ap-
proaches (ontologically, epistemologically and meth-
odologically). For the same reason we see different 
uses of the terms definitions, construct and concepts 
in different fields. For the sake of clarity we establish 
the following definitions to be applied for the remain-
der of the paper: A lexical definition is used to describe 
a general understanding of a term to a wide audience. 
A theoretical definition uses explanations which have 
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(potential) theoretical and/or empirical underpinnings. 
It is often used in science as part of theory, which – in 
this paper – is seen rather broadly as a coherent de-
scription or explanation of observed or experienced 
phenomena (Gioia and Pitre, 1990). To describe and in-
vestigate phenomena of interest we use concepts and 
constructs. Concepts are used to describe ideas, in their 
own existence, without necessarily being connected to 
specific measures or facts, although we specify them 
through conceptualization or conceptual definitions 
which have the potential to become theoretical defi-
nitions whether these are based on empirical research, 
reasoning, disciplined imagination (Weick, 1989) or yet 
more flexible terms  (Astley, 1985). Concepts may have 
looser or tighter structural characteristics i.e. embrac-
ing different features and/or some kind of hierarchical 
structure (Laurence and Margolis, 1999). Constructs, 
albeit embracing both objective and subjective dimen-
sions, are more explicitly (defined and understood) re-
lated to facts and measures of inquiry. A major part 
of theory building and verification is the linkage of 
constructs as theory can be seen as a “system of con-
structs in which the constructs are related to each other 
by propositions” (Bacharach, 1989). Achieving clarity on 
constructs is therefore essential for achieving validity 
(traceability) and reliability (replication) (Van Maanen 
et al., 2007). Lack of construct clarity is a typical cause 
of rejection (Suddaby, 2010) why we return to charac-
teristics of high quality constructs and concepts later. 
A Vertical Dimension: Levels of 
Business Model Understandings
This section argues that business model understand-
ing has a vertical dimension, with different degrees of 
abstraction which may be useful for different purpos-
es. This is demonstrated by the literal meaning of the 
business model term as well as some major trends in 
the current literature. 
Business model = “business” + “model”
The “business model” is from its inception a two-di-
mensional construct. The “business model” (definien-
dum) – what we try to define – is dependent on the 
definiens – the terms “business” and “model”. Both 
terms can be used as nouns and verbs and have 
been discussed extensively in the literature. For this 
reason we will constrain ourselves to summarize 
some of the major points indicating the challenges. 
 
 “Business1” – and doing business
To do business is to perform activities (such as transac-
tions) to exchange valuables. Traditionally, a business 
is related to an entity labeled as “organization”, “firm” 
or “company”. More recently, however, a major claim in 
the literature is that business is based on opportunities 
and activities across organizational entities, thereby 
partly disconnecting it with the organizational entity. 
+ “Models” - and modeling 
Literally a “model” is a representation of reality2 or an 
example (role model) to follow. A model can be ex-
pressed more or less accurately, with different levels 
of details, as a pattern, image, physical 3-dimensional 
model of some fabric, descriptions, mathematical for-
mulas or the like. 
Similar to other concepts in social sciences, business 
models are not physical objects, but social constructs 
which may be communicated in words or pictures. As 
business models are embedded in the organization 
“The actual business model is a highly complex entity 
that can only be represented through abstraction – so 
when we talk about a real, objective business model, 
we are really working with its abstraction” (Casades-
us-Masanell and Ricart, 2010). In order to understand 
a model we apply words, frameworks and tools view 
grounded in specific disciplines or contexts and we use 
different levels of aggregation and decomposition de-
pending on the purpose and the audience. At the high-
est level and without the possibilities to see the details 
and specification this model may only make sense to a 
few. On the other hand, a very detailed level may result 
in a very precise and exhaustive model at the risk of los-
ing the overview of the model. For a cross-disciplinary 
concept, there may be good reasons to reflect on what 
influences our perception of models as this may range 
from ideographic understandings to general and pre-
scriptive (nomothetic) formats of “what constitute a 
business model”. Further, the different perspectives of 
models are likely to be present simultaneously thereby 
posing a potential source of discourse.
Models are the outcome of the activity of modeling. 
This particular aspect is important as modeling begins 
with an idea or object which is articulated in the mod-
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eling process. Modeling, especially in unknown areas, 
may also contain an element of learning – some parts 
may not be possible to realize, linkages or causal re-
lations may be different from what was first antici-
pated. These processes may actually feedback into the 
original idea of the model, and as a result the model 
changes during under the process. Business models 
can therefore be seen as both static and dynamic enti-
ties in addition to being viewed by biased (subjective) 
individuals. 
This literal unpacking of the terms gives us a lexical 
level of understanding, which make sense and appeals 
to a broad range of audiences in academia and prac-
tice, but it is still a polysemous construct, which mean-
ing can differ – even within communities.  Additional 
definiens in the construct can provide the basis for a 
more exact positioning. 
A brief review of the development of the 
business model field
This brief review focuses on the major tendencies as 
well as adding further definiens to establish a defini-
tion for the discussion to follow.  
Business model definitions grew out of new develop-
ments in businesses such as the commercial application 
of the internet. These new ways of doing businesses 
seriously challenged the established literature e.g. as a 
result of challenging organizational borders, transpar-
ency in markets, connection of markets (complementary 
and multi-sided) etc.. Early definitions, however, were 
heavily influenced by idiosyncratic perceptions of busi-
ness models (ostensive type of definitions) or stereo-
typed (archetypical) ways of doing business. However, 
simple definitions such as a “statement of how a firm 
will make money” (Stewart and Qin, 2000) have proved 
to be incomplete, focus only on partial components and 
ignoring the depth of the business model concept. It also 
neglects the social impact - or even promise - of busi-
ness models (Yunus et al., 2010; Thompson and MacMil-
lan, 2010; Seelos and Mair, 2007) and the emphasis on a 
broad range of stakeholders which has been a theme in 
the some parts of the literature. 
In a few years perception of business models expanded 
to emphasize its systemic, boundary spanning nature, 
reflecting that competition was not just about posi-
tion, resources or technology (Chesbrough, 2007). It 
was everything in a dynamic blend. The business model 
became both a vehicle of change and subject to change 
it self, thereby raising the question of how it could be 
understood. Afuah (2004) focused on the value dimen-
sions of business models and provided a framework 
linking it to established methods in strategic manage-
ment. The change related aspects of business models 
led Linder and Cantrell (2000) to suggest avenues of 
change between existing and latent business models. 
In addition, it was proposed that business models were 
also narratives tied together with numbers in  “stories 
that explain how enterprises work” (Magretta, 2002). 
The systemic properties of the business model became 
focus of attention. The original definition of Osterwal-
der and Pigneur (2005) stresses the systemic nature 
of business models: “A business model is a conceptual 
tool containing a set of objects, concepts, and their re-
lationships with the objective to express the business 
logic of a specific firm. Therefore we must consider 
which concepts and relationships allow a simplified de-
scription and representation of what value is provided 
to customers, how this is done and with which financial 
consequences”. 
In this variety of definitions, Zott et al. (2011) found 
similarities and emerging common ground: 
1. The business model is emerging as a new unit 
of analysis, 
2. business models emphasize a system-level, 
holistic approach towards explaining how firms 
do business, 
3. organizational activities play an important 
role in business model conceptualizations, 
4. business models explains both value creation and 
value capture. 
As they mainly addressed peer reviewed publications it 
is a bit surprising that  37% of the reviewed contribu-
tions (n=103) had no definition of the business model 
at all (19 % used that of others, and the remaining 44% 
had its own definition (Zott et al., 2011)). 
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Some of the common ground identified by Zott and 
colleagues is also present in a series of comparative 
studies around 2005 aiming to identify common char-
acteristics of existing definitions  (Osterwalder, 2004, 
Scheer et al., 2003). Often cited is Shafer et al. (2005) 
who examined 12 definitions by assigning 42 different 
and unique attributes. They concluded that definitions 
embrace 4 general categories: 
1. strategic choices, 
2. value creation, 
3. value capture and  
4. value network.  
They propose to “define a business model as a repre-
sentation of a firm’s underlying core logic and strategic 
choices for creating and capturing value within a value 
network” (Shafer et al., 2005). They explicitly stated 
that the “core logic” element is to emphasize the stra-
tegic choices on cause-effect relationships. 
Since 2005 there seems to be a convergence around 
this core understanding of business model. The la-
belling, however, differs and this is not without sig-
nificance due to the semantic change of meaning. In 
particular, the “logic” dimension appears ambiguous. 
Teece (2010) suggests that business models are a 
“design or architecture of the value creation, delivery, 
and capture mechanisms”. Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ricart (2010), sees business models as a result of “a 
set of committed choices that lays the groundwork for 
competitive interactions”, and Zott and Amit (2010) 
maintain a transaction and activity view. Despite these 
differences it seems plausible to conclude that there 
are not an infinite number of possible meanings at the 
conceptual level. 
For the following discussion we apply a conceptual 
definition of business models as “a focal firm’s core 
logic for creating, delivering and capturing value with-
in a stakeholder network”.  The different conceptions 
of value remain key in this definition. To maintain a 
firm perspective, the “focal firm” is included. Similar-
ly, the boundary spanning nature of business models 
is included in the “network” aspect, which is further 
emphasized by the “stakeholder” term rather than the 
narrower “value network”. “Strategic choices” is left 
out to apply business models “as unit of analysis” and 
manipulation, e.g. strategy. “Core logic” is maintained 
in order to emphasize the systemic nature, related to 
governance, strategic decision, activities or something 
different. This conceptual definition is not exhaustive, 
but it represents the general features in the literature 
as well it has an underlying cognitive coherence provid-
ing us with an understanding of what a business model 
is (the criteria of necessary and sufficient). It also pro-
vides a starting point for more operational definitions 
as we will see. 
Three vertical levels of business model 
understanding
The analysis moved us from a highly abstract two-di-
mensional to a more specific multi-dimensional con-
struct which can be summarized in three levels (see 
also table 1): 
Level 1: The literal meaning of business models are 
about describing ways, realities – current or to be, of 
how to do business. The level of abstraction is high and 
so is the range of potential meanings and audiences. 
At the best, this first, two-dimensional construct can 
point to the domain of the business model field and in-
voke already present associations and knowledge. Fur-
ther explication is needed in order to provide a clearer 
understanding. 
Level 2: A conceptual definition is achieved by assigning 
more dimensions to the above definition. This brings 
us a step further toward a theoretical definition. It is 
suggested to apply the convergent understanding of 
business models as “a focal firm’s core logic for creat-
ing, delivering and capturing value within a stakeholder 
network”. This core understanding is apparently able 
to embrace the many variants of definitions. It is also 
a conceptual understanding which refers to theoretical 
constructs, indicating a potential of increasingly estab-
lishing itself as a theoretical definition. This conceptual 
definition requires much more of its audience than the 
level 1 definition. 
Level 3: Consists of an operational explicit, construct 
with a domain of defined observable dimensions and 
measures for a specific undertaking, such as a research 
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Table 1: The vertical levels and properties of the business model concept
Definition Application, nature 
and scope
Definition type Coherence and seman-
tic relations
(Level 1) 
“Business model”
General understanding 
Pointing to domain 
Two dimensional construct 
Linking with practice - simple
Literal, polysemous Not explicated 
Ambiguous – key word with 
global as well as local mean-
ings
(Level 2)
“a focal firm’s core 
logic for creating, de-
livering and capturing 
value within a stake-
holder network”
Template for operationaliz-
ing 
Multi-dimensional construct 
indicating domain such as 
content/features, systemic 
structure and linkages
Advanced linking with prac-
tice
Lexical, wide audience appeal
Conceptual definition and/
or theoretical definition with 
scientific underpinnings
Intuitively connected, indica-
tion of specifics 
Bridging options with estab-
lished literature, discourses
Bridging with practice
(Level 3)
Compliant with level 2 
and/or dependent on 
research objective
Operational construct for 
specific research
Multidimensional construct – 
with explicit focus and delim-
itation of domain
Theoretical
Stipulative 
Explicated 
Bridging with established lit-
erature, discourses (research 
gaps)
project in academia or a managerial model in practice 
related situations. A major part of the remaining paper 
is dedicated to how this can be created and informed 
by the existing literature. 
A Horisontal Dimension: Four Views 
in Business Model Understanding
This section presents four different views which may be 
perceived as a horizontal dimension of business model 
understanding. The four views represent different per-
spectives on business models identified in the literature. 
The four views are; the representational view (as depict-
ing what they are); the functionalist view (how they 
work); the pragmatic view (as a result of practice); the 
systemic view (how they are linked internally and exter-
nally). For each view the aim is to understand the role, 
perception and nature of the business model construct. 
The representational view
The representational view reflects an ideal of business 
models as a perfect, general, objective (and ultimately 
true) representation of reality. The business model 
concept is given denotative meaning by adding dimen-
sions and characteristic attributes. Removing attrib-
utes will lead to corresponding loss of meaning. 
The representational view provides a core understand-
ing incorporating important features such as the com-
ponents, configurations and boundaries. It emphasizes 
a business model understanding as the core unit of 
analysis, applicable both at macro and micro level. At the 
macro level this view can provide a general and often de-
contextualized understanding of platforms of current 
and potential/latent dimensions and configurations 
which may be theoretically underpinned and/or opera-
tionalized for more specific applications, for instance to 
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develop typologies of business models (Zook and Allen, 
2011; Malone et al.; 2011, Gassmann et al., 2012). At the 
micro level, a business model may be viewed as the re-
sult of past behavior (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 
2010; Tikkanen et al., 2005) as well as a platform, or 
“template” of initiatives (Zott and Amit, 2010)
The brief introduction clearly shows that a representa-
tional view – to the extent that it claims a global and 
stable view - is challenged by the complexity of the real 
world, such as connotative understandings (e.g. related 
to industry contexts), as well as threats to the stability 
of the construct in periods of change in which unknown 
or latent dimensions of the construct may become vis-
ible and critical. For instance, in the early entrepreneur-
ial phases it is evident, that the emergent business 
model changes significantly as a result of learning, new 
customers, changes in power balances etc. The current 
debate in the financial community on the use of narra-
tives and business models in reporting can also be seen 
as an attempt to “repair” on the shortcomings of a sin-
gle perspective providing a “true and fair view” of a firm 
(Beattie and Smith, 2013). 
Although an objective representational view is more 
of an ambition than a reality, it has a strong history 
and roots in hard (nature) sciences, which still influence 
our thinking - often implicitly without reflection. As it 
always strives for perfection, a “better way”, it tends 
to be elitist - driven by theory and historically with a 
tendency to deny other perspectives (Deetz, 1996). New 
knowledge is created on top of existing in a cumulative 
way, and builds on an advanced, consistent and stable 
system of language and methods which emphasize 
generalizations / de-contextualization, validity, rigor, 
causality, validity and replication. The research process 
is linear and constructs are determined before data col-
lection. In general, it is silent on actors and the sense-
making and narrative character of business models.
The functional view
The functional view focuses on the role of the busi-
ness model in an institutionalized context. It is a clas-
sic foundation for organization and management lit-
erature. We briefly explore 3 business model themes 
within this view: The commercialization of technology, 
the role in strategy, and an expansion of this with more 
dynamic perspectives. 
The first view is that business models act as means of 
commercializing technology and ideas into new busi-
nesses (Chesbrough, 2006; Chesbrough and Rosen-
bloom, 2002; Morris et al., 2005; Yunus et al., 2010). As 
a demonstrative example, Chesbrough (2007) specifi-
cally assign the following roles to business models: 
1. Articulate the value proposition, that is, the value 
created for users by the offering.
2. Identify a market segment, that is, the users to 
whom the offering is useful and for what purpose.  
3. Define the structure of the value chain required by 
the firm to create and distribute the offering, and 
determine the complementary assets needed to sup-
port the firm’s position in this chain. This includes 
the firm’s suppliers and customers, and should 
extend from raw materials to the final customer. 
4. Specify the revenue generation mechanism(s) for 
the firm, and estimate the cost structure and profit 
potential of producing the offering, given the val-
ue proposition and value chain structure chosen. 
5. Specify the revenue generation mechanism(s) for 
the firm, and estimate the cost structure and profit 
potential of producing the offering, given the value 
proposition and value chain structure chosen. 
6. Formulate the competitive strategy by which the 
innovating firm will gain and hold advantage over 
rivals. 
Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007) also provide a frame-
work for assessing the business model awareness of 
companies, ranging from the unarticulated to sophis-
ticated situations of establishing and nurturing own 
ecosystems, thereby covering both planned as well as 
emergent approaches to business model dynamics.
A second functionalist view addresses business mod-
els fit with strategy processes. Examples of this is the 
“design” and instrumentalist type of literature such as 
Osterwalder and Pigneur’s (2010) business model can-
vass, Wirtz’s (2011) discussion on organizational roles 
of business models and Chatterjee’s (2013) “simple 
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rules of business model design”. These contributions 
address the questions of “who has the responsibility 
for the business model” and the “how and when” it can 
be applied. 
An extension of this adds dynamics to the discussion, 
incorporating process, cognitive, and structural ele-
ments, position, resources, and knowledge dimensions. 
As already stated business models can be seen as out-
comes of strategic decisions (Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ricart, 2010; Tikkanen et al., 2005), which still leave 
many manifestations at the tactical and operational 
level open. In particular, some of these options may 
create mutually reinforcing virtuous circles of actions 
and processes (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2011), 
thereby opening an discussion on the balance between 
replication and innovation of business models (Dunford 
et al., 2010; Aspara et al.) and evolution of business 
models (Demil and Lecocq, 2010; Morris et al., 2005). 
Common for these is an ambition to look for patterns 
in the development. The underlying consistency view 
also becomes apparent in potential synergies and con-
flicts when multiple business models are present (Zott 
and Amit, 2008; Velu and Stiles, 2013; Casadesus-
Masanell and Tarziján, 2012; Markides and Charitou, 
2004). The functionalist view does not necessarily 
require a very precise ex ante definition of a business 
model but it does assign an, ex ante, often determin-
istic role to business models and what type of ques-
tions they address. This classic functionalist view con-
tributes more to theory refinement and improvements 
of (instrumental) knowledge than in more radical types 
of change with less predictability and un-linear nature. 
Further, the classic functionalist view emphasizes the 
institutional context and it is silent on the role of ac-
tors as they act within the institutional frames.
The pragmatic view
As the research community failed to identify a gen-
erally accepted definition, it was suggested to “trust 
the practitioners” and their use of business models 
(Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 2009; Lecocq et al., 
2010). The pragmatic view assigns value to concepts 
by their successful practical application, i.e. it assigns 
greater value to the connotative than the denotative 
meaning of business models, and tends to avoid the 
definition challenge. In this view the business model 
is the solution to a problem and a result of entrepre-
neurial activity. The view is supported by observing the 
activities of entrepreneurs in the process of taking an 
idea and turning it into a new business. The emergent 
business model circulates in various and shifting mani-
festations (business plans, elevator pitches, budgets 
etc.) among actors in different worlds. In doing so it 
exhibits the capacity as a boundary object being simul-
taneously robust enough to maintain meaning while 
adapting in a process which answers questions related 
to the balance of resource contributions and rewards 
(Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 2009; Verstraete and 
Jouison-Lafitte, 2011). Similarly, Ahokangas and Myl-
lykoski (2013) show us that business models change in 
content and risk, and Lund and Nielsen (2013) that the 
role, contribution and value capture dimensions may 
change significantly during the process, following the 
“effectuation” behavior of entrepreneurs (Sarasvathy, 
2001) and pointing to the limits of the functionalist 
and essentialist view. 
The business model works both as a narrative and 
calculative device (Magretta, 2002), thereby linking 
sense-making literature and actors (e.g. entrepre-
neurs, managers) in what Perkman and Spicer (2010) 
describe as elements of a theory of performative rep-
resentation, providing three core roles of convincing, 
legitimizing, and guiding social action. This is also an 
important aspect in periods of significant change in es-
tablished organizations and this could link the business 
model field and “strategy-as-a-practice” field (Johnson 
et al., 2007). The pragmatic view is not limited to new 
businesses or organizations in isolation. Lindgren et 
al. (2010) examines innovation of business models in 
networks, and Wikström et al. (2010) demonstrate how 
business models in project based firms are influenced 
by actors, and Heikkilä and Heikkilä (2010) discuss 
alignments and conflicts in establishing joint business 
models. 
In the pragmatic view the business model is a result 
of problem solution. There are possible, but no exact 
pre-defined formats, roles or functions assigned to the 
model. The business model serves as a boundary object 
but it has no ex ante predefined format as this is creat-
ed and changed in the process between the actors. The 
business model has a fundamentally subjective nature, 
due the linkages with the surrounding actors. Existing 
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theory and reviews are therefore playing a less domi-
nant role than in the other views but may provide first 
input (e.g. frameworks) for initiating a process. The re-
search process is likely to be shifting between practice 
and theory (abduction) and is often very close to the 
field. Although research in this view is basically local 
and emergent of nature, the final model and findings 
can still be mirrored against more general definitions or 
used for analytical generalization (Yin, 2014). 
The systemic view
The development of systems theory – although dat-
ing further back – accelerated after 2WW. It is worth 
noting that especially biologist Bertalanffy saw sys-
tems thinking as an important way to link different 
disciplines and avoid compartmentalization of science 
(Scott and Davis, 2007). There have been many appli-
cations of a systems perspective in business research, 
including operations, it and organizational learning 
(Skyttner, 2006; Scott and Davis, 2007) and the sys-
tems perspective is also clearly present in various man-
agement methodologies and representational models 
of business activity, including the previous views. 
Although the systemic nature of business models has 
been stressed consistently, it is rarely addressed more 
explicit. Amit and Zott (2012) apply a systems view by 
elaborating on their original business model definition 
Amit and Zott (2001) as “content, structure and gov-
ernance of transactions designed so as to create value 
through the exploitation of business opportunities”. 
Business model innovation can therefore be seen as ei-
ther directed inwards or adjusting to the environment. 
They also draw on their previous empirical research to 
show how business models can generate competitive 
advantage from novelty, lock-in, complementarity or 
efficiency effects. Also applying a systems view Ber-
glund and Sandström (2013) focus on the relation be-
tween a focal firm and its environment and develop hy-
pothesis of development on the interaction. In a larger 
perspective this connect the business model to the 
relative importance of the firm based business model 
vs. multisided markets, complementarity of business 
models, networks or eco-systems in competition and 
development dynamics (Hamel, 2002; Chesbrough, 
2006). Sánchez and Ricart (2010) specifically address 
the openness/closedness dimension of business mod-
els and the relation to low income markets. These per-
spectives may be important in understanding whether 
business models can “create” new markets by turning 
latent demand into actual demand. 
The systems perspective and the business model con-
cept can be seen as compatible concepts as they both 
deal with purpose oriented input-output relations di-
rected at stakeholders and with transformative mech-
anisms in-between. Since a system is more than the 
sum of its parts, removing one or more dimensions will 
make it incomplete and incoherent. Other characteris-
tics are shared with the business model concept: 
1. the specific content / conceptualization is not pre-
defined and potentially rich in aspects,
2. the level of abstraction is not pre-defined, 
3. an open system is in principle without boundaries, 
4. systems are rich on relations (logic, architecture 
…), and 
5. they can both be manipulated by agents.
Both systems and models can be broken down in sub-
systems which can be analyzed in further depth (e.g. 
ecosystem, industry, stakeholders). For instance each 
of the possible dimensions of the business model con-
struct may be perceived as a system on its own (e.g. 
value creation system, value delivery system etc.). Also 
complexities such as system dynamics, system “fits” 
i.e. interactions (alignment and misalignment) of sys-
tems applies equally well for both models and systems. 
It should be noted, however, that the systems perspec-
tive has received critique similar to the business model 
concept. At the general level, systems are not eas-
ily defined and too open for some audiences (see e.g. 
(Skyttner, 2006)). It is also evident that the systemic 
nature is present in the background of the other views 
(e.g. organizations as rational systems to attain spe-
cific goals in the functional view). 
Applying an explicit system view provides a more gen-
eral approach to business models – it applies equally 
well to entrepreneurial as well as more “established” 
settings, although still bounded by the context of the 
defined systems. By linking business models, the sys-
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tems perspectives and connecting to the disciplines 
and nomological worlds of business research and man-
agement it becomes less abstract and offers new op-
portunities for bridging across disciplines. Addition-
ally, in the academic environment a systems view may 
provide a potential platform for mapping, coordinating 
and operationalizing research projects which may also 
include new methods and fields (e.g. complex systems 
theory). 
Business models - the horizontal views
As we have shown there are several ways to under-
stand business models, but the call for definition may 
- intended or not - be rooted in the representational 
and influenced by a functionalist view. The definitions 
and constructs generated by these views may not be 
equally relevant or appropriate in all cases. Some com-
mon themes across the views are:  
First of all, the purpose, the origin of the research 
question, and the type of data needed, has impor-
tant implications for establishing a proper business 
model construct and when this can take place. This 
may sound obvious, but reflections on the deeper sci-
entific aspects and the current practice so far, reveal 
that the cross-disciplinary and multi-view nature has 
been a source of confusion when researchers try to un-
derstand contributions from other views. This aspect 
is also related to issues of general validity and gener-
alization, i.e. whether these apply at a local level, rela-
tivist level, within particularities of the specific study, 
within the related disciplines, or a general (universal) 
level of claims. 
Secondly, a large part of the discussion is centered on 
how business models relate to actors, processes, and 
outcomes, i.e. whether they are part of or “external” to 
the model. For purposes of understanding, analysis and 
theory building it will be useful if this is explicated. For 
instance, business model dynamics may change from 
being dependent on a visionary entrepreneurial leader 
to being embedded and institutionalized in organiza-
tional structures and processes. This has clear implica-
tions for how actors should be included or related to 
the business model definition. In fact, business models 
are not always the main subject of analysis, but a vehi-
cle to understand other phenomena. 
Thirdly, the stability and format of business models 
and constructs are not given. Businesses change both 
in terms of resources, relations and “logic”. This chal-
lenges the possibility of having an accurate depiction 
of reality. A too narrow construct may not be able to 
capture empirical observations and therefore not be 
able to explain causality, especially in longitudinal re-
search. A broad construct will generally be able to cap-
ture a broader scale of change. A possibility is to define 
latent dimensions of business model change. 
Fourthly, it should also be noted that the views are of-
ten mixed in practice: For instance, research conducted 
in the pragmatic view may have conclusions delivered 
as “tools” which may have the character of functional-
ist determinism. The views can be seen as competing, 
but probably a better way is to see them as comple-
mentary, especially when dynamics are present (see 
also discussion and implications).
Fifthly: Although the systemic point of view is embed-
ded in the other views, it is worthwhile to separate it 
out, to understand its potential benefit for both single 
research purposes but also as a perspective on busi-
ness model research at a more general level. 
The findings are summarized in table 2 and 3. Table 2 
provides a general overview, and table 3 provides de-
tails of the business model constructs. These are ideal 
representations of the views for the purpose of estab-
lishing completeness, pointing to meaningful differ-
ences rather than exclusive classification, and with a 
note that they may not be without internal challenges. 
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Table 2: Business model views, their purposes and examples of presence
View Business models as 
representations of re-
ality
Business models 
serves specific func-
tions
Business models as 
outcomes of relations 
between actors
Business models as 
(open) systems
Purpose Objective representa-
tions, “snap shots”
Search for general and 
causal relations – grand 
theory
Theory refinement - fit 
with role, hierarchies 
and consensus
Insights and/or norma-
tive
Understand practice of 
problem solution 
Challenging established 
theories, new insights 
Understand interplay 
between actors
Holistic understanding 
of different systems, 
their components, inter-
actions and dynamics at 
macro and micro level
Integrative platform
Examples 
of pres-
ence and 
usage
Theoretically driven re-
search, business model 
frameworks, business 
model typologies
Theoretically based 
research on existing, 
renewed and new busi-
ness models in estab-
lished companies 
Grounded research in 
entrepreneurial and 
change oriented situa-
tions Exemplary cases 
for inspiration
Understanding of inter-
play between business-
es and their environ-
ment, e.g. ecosystems, 
clusters, complementar-
ity, multisided markets
Table 3: Variations in the business model constructs in the 4 views
View Business models as 
representations of re-
ality
Business models 
serve specific func-
tions
Business models as 
outcomes of relations 
between actors
Business models as 
(open) systems
Role of the-
ory Theory driven / testing Linear, planned,  de-
ductive, causality
Theory testing / driv-
en, causality, deduc-
tive, linear
Theory creation /ap-
plication / challenging 
- Looking for the unfa-
miliar Abduction
Integrative views / de-
pendencies
Integrative platform for 
research programmes
Context De-contextualized Contextualized by dis-
ciplines and institu-
tional frames
Contextualizing within 
stakeholder environ-
ment
Contextualizing and 
contextualized within 
focal system(s)
Nature of 
b u s i n e s s 
model con-
struct
Unit of analysis - ob-
jective, measurable, 
depicting (actual and 
possibly latent) com-
ponents and configu-
rations 
Exact, stable construct 
and identifiable causal 
linkages
Construct fulfills ob-
jective (real), general 
functions 
Flexible construct 
within boundaries of 
generic purposes
Boundary object 
Frameworks and facili-
tation may guide busi-
ness model conceptu-
alization 
Dynamic construct un-
der transformation
Emphasis on part-sys-
tems, components, 
linkages, and feedback
Boundaries / open-
closed / levels / Static 
-dynamic
Multiple business models
Continues on next page
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Table 3: Variations in the business model constructs in the 4 views
T i m i n g : 
Availability 
of construct
Construct ready before 
research – desk
Predefined assump-
tions on function – 
desk Business model 
becomes  conceptual-
ized in process
Business model be-
comes  conceptualized 
and/or modified in in-
teractive processes in 
field
Ex ante perception or 
creation through ex-
plorative investigation
Actor role External (silent) Silent - adapting to in-
stitutional regime
Actors as creators Self-regulating or actor 
influenced systems
Risks Too narrow - lack in 
comprehensiveness 
and practical applica-
bility
Too constrained by ex-
isting knowledge
Reinvention of existing 
knowledge
Too general, losing rel-
evance and meaning
Continued from previous page
Discussion and Implications
To discuss the implications we initially discuss the is-
sue of not having a definition at all, the benefits and 
challenges of multiple views, and then proceeds with a 
discussion of different situations where we need defini-
tions: when establishing research projects, communicat-
ing with practice, and finally, when communicating with 
colleagues. 
Advantages of not having a definition? 
In general it can be argued that a grounded – or feyera-
bendish – approach with no or limited prior concepts 
and methodology is appropriate in contexts with no or 
limited prior knowledge or if a fresh approach is needed. 
The business model field is not virgin territory as there 
is currently a wide range of perceptions of business 
models, ranging from more systematic approaches to 
more intuitive approaches. Typically, all kind of actors 
will have some kind of prior bias, assumptions and pre-
defined ideas about business models which cannot be 
ignored. Consequently, it can be argued that having no 
definition imply the risks of 
1. being misunderstood as readers base their judg-
ment on their own business model perceptions, 
2. insufficient positioning of – and weak constructs in 
the research, and
3. bad “research economics” by not building in exist-
ing knowledge. 
 
All risks are latent in the 4 different views, but highest 
when ex ante designs are needed. It generally seems 
appropriate to apply a reflexive approach to the exist-
ing body of knowledge and explicate the definition. 
Business models understandings as 
a semantic field embracing a core 
understanding with multi-levels and 
multiple-views 
The business model field can be seen as a large seman-
tic web of multi-levels and multi-views with a com-
mon, core understanding. Based on Astley (1985) this 
situation may be ascribed to three causes: 
1. the business model field is immature and the core 
definition will develop as our knowledge accumulate, 
2. the business model field is a multi-view field and 
cannot be embraced from a single view,
3. the popularity of the business model field is due 
to publication driven need for “newness” and inter-
esting stories.
A call for a single, all-embracing definition rooted in 
the essentialist tradition mirrors a specific view on sci-
ence as progressing linearly by building cumulatively 
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on prior knowledge. Although valuable as a platform of 
potential dimensions of more operational definitions, 
the underlying “consistency view” of such a position is 
not without problems as reality is difficult to embrace 
in one view. Further, it may lead to incremental and 
insignificant findings with limited application (Astley, 
1985). Instead of trying to force-fitting other perspec-
tives into one view, with potential side effects of re-
jecting other perspectives, it seems more productive 
to allow multiple perspectives to co-exist and inform 
each other: Multiple perspectives generate more com-
plete knowledge for a complex construct phenomena 
as business models, just as it is characteristic that a 
multidimensional construct is more than the sum of its 
parts (Suddaby, 2010). In addition to this, the interest 
in the business model as well as the different perspec-
tives may be seen as a result of necessary additions 
to the established knowledge. As it will be noted, the 
above arguments are based on complementarity and 
does not suggest that the views are necessarily (fully) 
comparable or compatible (the debate of the para-
digms and compatibility – incompatibility theses).  
In specific projects, a combination of views could be 
seen as a way of triangulating. This may provide fur-
ther insights of inspiration (in case of variance in find-
ings), strengthening findings (parallel findings), or – 
especially in dynamic settings - tracking changes and 
shifts in relevance across the views. 
Another part of the critique is related to the theoretical 
underpinning and the theoretical maturity of the busi-
ness model. Rather than trying to connect it exclusively 
to one specific theory, it may be possible to connect it 
to more theories due to its cross-disciplinary nature. It 
may be argued that the relevance of the business mod-
el concept is related to its holistic nature and embrace-
ment of multiple views. All research carries limitations 
and we always view business models with only a par-
tial view. However, the limitations and focus of a spe-
cific research project may reduce the relevance of the 
business model concept to a point where the project 
may be approached in a traditional “silo”-way by estab-
lished disciplines. This touches on a related question of 
“what is business model research?” Key elements of an 
answer may include elements of its systemic nature, 
involving multiple levels, components and perspectives 
across disciplines. Allowing multiple perspectives on 
business models to co-develop may be the best way to 
inform the understanding of the core definition.   
Definitions for research projects: Need 
for construct clarity (level 3 definition)
Construct development in the business model field is 
challenging due the scope of the concept. 
In general it is recommended that academics should 
define their purpose and usage of the business model 
concept and avoid implicit definitions which have been 
the case in the past (Zott et al., 2011; Zott and Amit, 
2013).  To facilitate knowledge accumulation, it is sug-
gested - for the lack of better – that academics join the 
emerging core understanding (level 2 conceptual defi-
nition) or at least explain plausible deviations (such as 
challenging it) from this. This level of understanding 
may be sufficient for cases of general references and 
discussions when the business model is not the main 
unit of analysis. For other purposes it needs operation-
alization, by clarifying what aspects of the business 
model concepts are investigated as well as clarifying 
the relation to the conceptual definition.
Suddaby (2010) argues that clarity of a construct can 
be assessed by four characteristics which mutually re-
inforce each other:  
1. clear definition, 
2. a clear sense of the scope,  
3. semantic relation to other constructs,  
4. coherence. 
Specifically, our analysis point to the importance of 
the origin of the research question in combination with 
a view, or mix of these, with implications in relation 
to the research design and the research process, the 
static/dynamic aspect, the focal area of the business 
model, the components and their linkages, and the lev-
el of operationalization. Finally, the semantic relations 
to the involved disciplines and the business model field 
must be explained to ensure relevance and theoretical 
underpinning. Building on the previous analysis and 
discussion – this can be integrated in five steps as sug-
gested in table 4. 
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Table 4: Five steps to achieve clarity of business model construct for specific research project
Key questions To consider
1. What is the origin 
of the research 
question?
Theoretical or empirical origin of research question
Timing of conceptualization of business model
2. Which perspec-
tive(s) are rele-
vant?  
The role of the business model: 
Depicting reality, general causality – a representational view
Understanding role – managerial and organizational – a functional view
Understanding motivation, actors and outcome – a pragmatic view
Understand feedback, regulation and dynamics – a systems view
A mix of above – fit with research design
3. What content is 
needed? Required breadth/focus of business model component/functionsRequired level / depth of each component / function
Static / dynamic, stable or flexible – prior, current and latent components
Boundaries (to other systems, levels, actors etc.)
4. Which ties are 
important? Ties between content elementsStatic / dynamic, stable / flexible - e.g. new prior, current, latent ties
5. What are the 
semantic relations 
and position of the 
research? 
Semantic relation to high level business model concept
Semantic relations and potential discourses with established management research 
and practice areas
Position and relation to business model research
Definitions when dealing with practice
One reason for the popularity of the business model 
is quite simple: Business models may be good sto-
ries, providing cases for inspiration. They constitute 
good bridging options between academia and practice, 
whether this is at the more general level on the role 
and utility of science, general communication or in spe-
cific engagements (Clegg and Starbuck, 2009). In both 
cases, however, academics face two audiences: Their 
academic peers and practitioners. These may have dif-
ferent prior knowledge on business models, why it may 
be necessary with simultaneous and dual constructs. A 
practice oriented audience cannot be expected, at least 
initially, to have the same in-depth knowledge of state 
of the art definitions and perspectives as academics. 
Therefore simpler (lexical), abbreviated definitions or 
exemplary (ostensive) definitions may be useful for 
such audiences to convey the meaning of the concept. 
Depending on the circumstances, the initial under-
standing can be enhanced / deepened over time, pos-
sibly by the application of various frameworks. In such 
situations the researcher uses a level 2 definition in the 
communication with practice and a level 3 definition in 
the actual project. In practice this may require consid-
erable attention in the communication and analysis in 
order to achieve precision and avoid confusion (e.g. by 
mixing definiens and definiendum).   
Definitions when communicating with 
colleagues; improving business model 
understanding
The business model literature has been able to capture 
many of the recent ways of doing business related to 
new opportunities, new technologies and the increas-
ing awareness of other stakeholders than sharehold-
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ers. In this way, the business model literature has chal-
lenged established theories. This is still reflected in 
special journal issues where it is common to see very 
broad research agendas covering customer responses, 
eco-systems, scalability, internal processes, competi-
tion, and organizational linkages with business models 
(Björkdahl and Holmen, 2013; LaPlaca, 2013; Robins, 
2013). Responses, however, are often – and naturally – 
unorganized and fragmented. 
The holistic characteristics of business models create 
a potential to bridge management research across 
disciplines. The business model concept has differ-
ent theoretical status and maturity in different fields. 
The semantic and nomological relations of the busi-
ness model construct are critical for bridging the busi-
ness model field and these disciplines, across deeply 
institutionalized meanings of the terms. For instance, 
“value” has different meaning in marketing and fi-
nance. This sort of linguistic ambiguity is not unusual 
in administrative science, it can be a source of fruitful 
insights, and often theory development actually de-
pends on it (Astley, 1985). A second aspect of bridg-
ing is the motivation, ability and potential conflicts 
of joining a more holistically based perspective rather 
than pursuing a strong disciplinary and narrow path. 
This may require adaption of research practices and 
terms in the disciplines involved. For instance, the 
perceived importance of empirical evidence and more 
conceptual thinking (disciplined imagination) may 
differ between disciplines. Therefore, such initiatives 
as reviews seen from special disciplines, such as In-
dustrial Marketing (Coombes and Nicholson, 2013), 
or suggestions for positioning the business model in 
an extended strategic research domain (Priem et al., 
2013), or open research agendas (e.g.Zott and Amit, 
2013, Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013) must be 
welcomed. Bridging would probably create a win-win 
situation: Our understanding of the business model 
concept may be improved, theoretically underpinned 
and individual disciplines may achieve a better under-
standing of their contributions to the holistic idea of 
a business. This may facilitate both inspiration, bet-
ter positioning and focus of research and maybe even 
provide a kind of more elaborate Lakatonian style 
research programmes. Systematically organized pro-
grams with a portfolio consisting of multiple views 
may be one practical way of doing this. Other ways 
could be to include researchers from different disci-
plines in specific project teams. 
It may be a relevant to ask if anyone – and in that case, 
who – should take responsibility of the concept and its 
development? Should the concept be reserved for the 
strategy field? Or should it have its own domain or be 
incorporated / diffused into specific fields. Where will 
it have its greatest value and impact? Is there a need 
for “middle layers” of business model definitions be-
tween the general definition and specific disciplines 
reflecting the strategic dimensions of these (strategic 
marketing, strategic IT, etc.)? 
Concluding Remarks – Do We Need 
One Business Model Definition?
Definitions – to some extent – share purposes and 
characteristics with models. They help us understand 
and classify constructs, and they guide us in situations 
where we have to orientate our behavior. Neither defi-
nitions nor models are necessarily exhaustive, precise 
and static and heavily dependent on the audience. 
The relevance of the business model concept must be 
judged on its ability to reflect the real world of busi-
ness in a better way than alternative approaches, i.e. 
whether we better understand the reality of 5, as 5 it-
self or by seeing it as the sum of 3+2=5 or I+I+III = V. 
Reflecting this, the business model literature is wide 
spanning, cross-disciplinary, cross-organizational, 
boundary spanning and systemic by nature. At the 
higher level we find the broad understanding point-
ing to the domain of the business model. We also find 
a multi-dimensional concept indicating the business 
model components and their potential linkages, shar-
ing an understanding of business models as embracing 
critical elements of the “logic” of value creation, value 
delivery and value capture and the ways these are or-
ganized in a stakeholder network. This concept main-
tains its meaning but takes different forms depend-
ing on perspectives such as depicting reality, element 
of process, its outcome or as a part a system. Rather 
than trying to achieve one single, generally applicable 
and exhaustive definition, these complementary and 
different views may be applied to build and elaborate 
on this core business model understanding. In sum, 
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the views provide an understanding on the “what, why, 
how and when” of business models as a holistic and 
dynamic concept.
In conclusion: We need – not one – but more - defi-
nitions building on a shared understanding. The cur-
rent and shared convention may be sufficient for the 
general understanding; in many cases a more explicit 
definition is needed, important determinants being the 
audience and the purpose. As such, it may be argued 
that the real value of the business model construct lies 
not in the precision of its definition, but in its role as 
a boundary object between different disciplines and 
between academia and practice. At least for a period, 
a more systematic approach to coordinating business 
model research around the emerging core understand-
ing may be more fruitful than trying to develop new 
definitions. 
Endnotes
1    Websters dictionary (1989) offers more than 17 definitions on business and 21 on models. Only the relevant and central ideas 
     are provided here. 
2   Many more aspects of models in the introduction to Long Range Planning, April 2010 issue, Baden-Fuller & Morgan
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Abstract
The business model concept is gaining traction in different disciplines but is still 
criticized for being fuzzy and vague and lacking consensus on its definition and 
compositional elements. In this paper we set out to advance our understand-
ing of the business model concept by addressing three areas of foundational 
research: business model definitions, business model elements, and business 
model archetypes. We define a business model as a representation of the value 
logic of an organization in terms of how it creates and captures customer value. 
This abstract and generic definition is made more specific and operational by the 
compositional elements that need to address the customer, value proposition, 
organizational architecture (firm and network level) and economics dimensions. 
Business model archetypes complement the definition and elements by provid-
ing a more concrete and empirical understanding of the business model con-
cept. The main contributions of this paper are (1) explicitly including the customer 
value concept in the business model definition and focussing on value creation, 
(2) presenting four core dimensions that business model elements need to cover, 
(3) arguing for flexibility by adapting and extending business model elements to 
cater for different purposes and contexts (e.g. technology, innovation, strategy) 
(4) stressing a more systematic approach to business model archetypes by using 
business model elements for their description, and (5) suggesting to use busi-
ness model archetype research for the empirical exploration and testing of busi-
ness model elements and their relationships. 
Keywords: business model, business model classification, business model concept, business model definition, business model ele-
ment, business model framework, customer value, value creation.
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Introduction
Every company has a business model, whether that 
model is explicitly articulated or not (Chesbrough, 2006; 
Teece, 2010). Examples of companies with well-known 
business models are SouthWest Airlines’ low-cost car-
rier model, Rolls Royce’s ‘power-by-the-hour’ model 
and Threadless’ ‘customer is the company’ model. Busi-
ness models matter; the same idea or technology taken 
to market through two different business models will 
yield two different economic outcomes (Chesbrough, 
2010). Business models are required because of the 
features of market economies where there is consumer 
choice, transaction costs, heterogeneity amongst con-
sumers and producers, and competition (Teece, 2010). 
According to Ghaziani and Ventresca (2005) the public 
talk about ‘business models’ commenced in the early 
1970s and rose to prominence halfway the 1990s, at the 
same time as the digital economy.
Academic research on business models started ap-
pearing late 1990s with early work from, for example, 
Timmers (1998), Weill and Vitale (2001) and Afuah and 
Tucci (2001). However, related concepts have appeared 
earlier such as Drucker’s ‘theory of business’ (Drucker, 
1994). The business model concept has been applied 
in studies as a basis for enterprise classification, as a 
factor for enterprise performance and as a focal point 
for innovation (Lambert & Davidson, 2013). Business 
models have received attention from different disci-
plines, such as e-business, information systems, man-
agement, entrepreneurship, innovation, strategy and 
economics (Amit & Zott, 2001; Bouwman & Fielt, 2008; 
Hedman & Kalling, 2003; Morris, Schindehutte, & Allen, 
2005; Pateli & Giaglis, 2004; Teece, 2010; Zott & Amit, 
2013). However, while many researchers stress the im-
portance of business models, the concept is still fuzzy 
and vague and there is little consensus on its definition 
and compositional elements (Al-Debei & Avison, 2010; 
Morris et al., 2005; Shafer, Smith, & Linder, 2005). 
While defining the business model concept has been 
among the first tasks of early researchers in the area 
(Osterwalder, Pigneur, & Tucci, 2005), the definitions 
themselves have been subject to much debate (Pateli 
& Giaglis, 2004) and a general accepted definition has 
not yet emerged (Morris et al., 2005; Zott, Amit, & 
Massa, 2011). 
The objective of this paper is to increase our founda-
tional understanding of the business model concept 
by addressing three areas of research: business model 
definitions, business model frameworks and elements, 
and business model classifications and archetypes. 
These three areas are important for the conceptuali-
sation of business models and have been a core focus 
of research (Osterwalder et al., 2005; Pateli & Giaglis, 
2004). We conclude that a business model can be de-
fined as the value logic of an organization in terms of 
how it creates and captures customer value and can 
be concisely represented by an interrelated set of el-
ements that address the customer, value proposition, 
organizational architecture and economics dimensions. 
Moreover, we argue that the three areas of business 
model research complement each other in advancing 
our understanding of the business model concept. The 
business model definition can provide us with a generic 
and abstract conceptualization. Specifying the compo-
sitional elements of a business model can make the 
business model concept more specific and concrete and 
makes it suitable for different purposes and contexts 
(e.g. e-business, strategy, or innovation). Business 
model classifications and archetypes provide a more 
empirical and practical perspective and can provide in-
sights into the relationships between business model 
elements. A better understanding of the business 
model concept can improve the quality of business 
model research and enable a more cumulative research 
tradition in this relatively young field of research. 
While we will intensively relate to business model lit-
erature, this paper does not use a systematic literature 
review as main approach as we think that the further 
advancement of the business model concept benefits 
more from the underlying reasoning than from the 
systematic canvassing of a still developing and murky 
field. Moreover, when relevant we will make use of 
existing literature reviews on business models (e.g., 
Al-Debei & Avison, 2010; Morris et al., 2005; Shafer et 
al., 2005; Zott et al., 2011). The remainder of this paper 
is organized as follows. Firstly we discuss the business 
model definitions in more details. Thereafter, we ad-
dress business model frameworks and elements. Next, 
we discuss business model classifications and arche-
types. Finally, we present some concluding remarks 
and identify opportunities for future research.
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Business Model Definitions
While defining the business model concept has been 
among the first tasks of early researchers (Osterwalder 
et al., 2005), the definitions have been subject to much 
debate (Pateli & Giaglis, 2004) and a general accepted 
definition has not yet emerged (Al-Debei & Avison, 
2010; Morris et al., 2005; Shafer et al., 2005; Zott et 
al., 2011). Table 1 provides an overview of some of the 
prominent definitions over time. We will first explore 
these definitions and highlight some of the similarities 
and differences to increase our understanding of the 
business model concept. Thereafter, we will specific 
zoom into the notion of value creation. We will end this 
section with a working definition explicitly targeting 
customer value and some specific considerations that 
need to be taken into account when developing or us-
ing business model definitions.
Researchers have come up with different definitions in 
an attempt to explain what the essence and purpose 
of a business model is (Pateli & Giaglis, 2004). Defini-
tions have had different foci and have been more and 
less inclusive. Timmers (1998, p. 4) provides one of the 
first business model definitions. This definition influ-
enced the definition of Weill and Vitale (2001) and is 
quite similar to the definitions of Mahadevan (2000) 
and Tapscott (2001). These definitions see the busi-
ness model as an architecture and address the busi-
Table 1: A selective overview of business model definitions (ordered by year and author name).
Author(s) Definition
Timmers (1998) Definition of a business model: (a) an architecture for the product, service and information 
flows, including a description of the various business actors and their roles; and (b) a de-
scription of the potential benefits for the various business actors; and (c) a description of the 
sources of revenues. (p.4)
Mahadevan 
(2000)
A business model is a unique blend of three streams that are critical to the business. These 
include the value stream for the business partners and the buyers, the revenue stream, and 
the logistical stream. (p. 59)
Rappa (2000) In the most basic sense, a business model is the method of doing business by which a com-
pany can sustain itself -- that is, generate revenue. The business model spells-out how a 
company makes money by specifying where it is positioned in the value chain.
Afuah and Tucci 
(2001)
A business model is the method by which a firm builds and uses its resources to offer its 
customers better value than its competitors and make money doing so. It details how a firm 
makes money now and how it plans to do so in the long-term. The model is what enables a 
firm to have a sustainable competitive advantage, to perform better than its rivals in the long 
term. (p. 3-4)
Amit and Zott 
(2001)
A business model depicts the content, structure, and governance of transactions designed so 
as to create value through the exploitation of business opportunities. (p. 511)
Tapscott (2001) A business model refers to the core architecture of a firm, specifically how it deploys all rele-
vant resources (not just those within its corporate boundaries) to create differentiated value 
for customers. (p. 5)
Continues on next page
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Table 1: A selective overview of business model definitions (ordered by year and author name).
Author(s) Definition
Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom 
(2002)
The business model provides a coherent framework that takes technological characteristics 
and potentials as inputs, and converts them through customers and markets into economic 
inputs. The business model is thus conceived as a focusing device that mediates between 
technology development and economic value creation. (p. 532) It “spells out how a company 
makes money by specifying where it is positioned in the value chain” (p. 533)
Morris et al. 
(2005)
A business model is a concise representation of how an interrelated set of decision variables 
in the areas of venture strategy, architecture, and economics are addressed to create sustain-
able competitive advantage in defined markets. (p. 727)
Shafer et al. 
(2005)
We define a business model as a representation of a firm’s underlying core logic and strategic 
choices for creating and capturing value within a value network. (p. 202)
Chesbrough 
(2006)
At its heart, a business model performs two important functions: value creation and value 
capture. First, it defines a series of activities that will yield a new product or service in such 
a way that there is net value created throughout the various activities. Second, it captures 
value from a portion of those activities for the firm developing the model. (p. 108)
Johnson, 
Christensen, 
and Kagermann 
(2008)
A business model, from our point of view, consists of four interlocking elements that, taken 
together, create and deliver value. The most important to get right, by far, is the customer 
value proposition.  The other elements are the profit formula, the key resources and the key 
processes. (p. 52-53)
Demil and Le-
cocq (2010)
Generally speaking, the concept refers to the description of the articulation between differ-
ent BM components or ‘building blocks’ to produce a proposition that can generate value for 
consumers and thus for the organization. (p. 227)
Osterwalder 
and Pigneur 
(2010)
A business model describes the rationale of how an organization creates, delivers, and cap-
tures value. (p. 14)
Teece (2010) In short, a business model defines how the enterprise creates and delivers value to custom-
ers, and then converts payments received to profits. (p. 173)
Zott and Amit 
(2010)
A business model can be viewed as a template of how a firm conducts business, how it de-
livers value to stakeholders (e.g., the focal firms, customers, partners, etc.), and how it links 
factor and product markets. The activity systems perspective addresses all these vital issues 
[...]. (p. 222)
George and 
Bock (2011)
[...] a business model is the design of organizational structures to enact a commercial oppor-
tunity. (p.99) [...] three dimensions to the organizational structures noted in our definition: 
resource structure, transactive structure, and value structure. (p.99)
Continued from previous page
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ness network with a focus on the different roles of the 
actors and their interactions and relationships. An-
other early definition comes from Rappa (2000) who 
emphasises the monetary aspects, which is also is 
also prominent in some other definitions (e.g., Afuah 
& Tucci, 2001; Mullins & Komisar, 2009; Teece, 2010). 
This often comes with a stronger emphasis on the or-
ganization and strategic aspects (e.g., Afuah & Tucci, 
2001; Morris et al., 2005). Most authors do stress that 
a business model does not cover the full strategy (e.g., 
Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). Others quite explic-
itly differentiate between business models and strat-
egy (e.g., Magretta, 2002; Mansfield & Fourie, 2004). 
More comprehensive definitions combine the ideas of 
an architectural representation of the business net-
work and the generation of revenues for the focal or-
ganization (Dubosson-Torbay, Osterwalder, & Pigneur, 
2002; Morris et al., 2005). However, others are less in-
clusive in their business model definition and explicitly 
differentiate it from other concepts (e.g. strategy) or 
exclude some specific elements. For example, Timmers 
(1998) differentiates the business model from the mar-
keting model, which addresses the commercial viability 
via the competitive advantage, positioning, market-
ing mix, and product-market strategy. Amit and Zott 
(2001) see the revenue model as a distinct, yet comple-
mentary concept to the business model.
There is quite some confusion about the organizational 
entity as business model definitions refer to the firm 
level (e.g., Afuah & Tucci, 2001; Osterwalder et al., 
2005; Rappa, 2000) as well as the network level (e.g., 
Mahadevan, 2000; Tapscott, 2001; Timmers, 1998; 
Weill & Vitale, 2001). While some position it as a new 
level of analysis nested between the firm and the net-
work level (e.g., Amit & Zott, 2001). Some definitions 
do not include an explicit reference to the organization-
al entity (e.g., Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Mor-
ris et al., 2005). Most authors do include both levels in 
their conceptualization based on their further discus-
sion, operationalization and application of the business 
model concept (see also the discussion below on busi-
ness frameworks and elements). Most firm level defini-
tions do not differentiate between the corporate entity 
and the business unit although most seem to imply the 
business unit. A notable exception is Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom (2002), who explicitly relate the business 
model to the business unit strategy. 
Some definitions follow from, or are influenced by, the 
specific context in which the business model concept is 
used. For example, Amit and Zott (2001) focus on value 
creation in e-business and see the business model as 
depicting the design of transaction content, structure, 
and governance transactions. Chesbrough and Rosen-
bloom (2002) focus on technological innovation and 
position the business model as mediating between 
technology development and economic value creation. 
The business model concept is also applied for organi-
zations that have less of a profit focus such as socially-
oriented organizations (e.g., Yunus, Moingeon, & Leh-
mann-Ortega, 2010) and government organizations 
(e.g., Janssen, Kuk, & Wagenaar, 2008). This use of 
business models for different purposes and in differ-
ent contexts, such as start-ups and established com-
panies, different types of innovation, different kinds 
and varying importance of technology, for-profit and 
not-for-profit, etc. may also explain why there is no 
widely agreed upon definition.
Some researchers have tried to address the problem 
of different business model definitions by identifying 
categories or themes reflecting the different origins 
or meanings of the concept (Table 2). Osterwalder et 
al. (2005) distinguish between an activity/role-related 
approach, which is more inward looking and a value/
customer-oriented approach, which is more outward 
looking. The categories of Morris et al. (2005) repre-
sent a hierarchy where the perspective increases in 
comprehensiveness as one progressively moves from 
the economic to the operational to the strategic levels. 
Wirtz (2011) suggests that definitions developed from 
a technology orientation to an organization orientation 
to a strategic orientation. Given this wide variety of 
origins and meanings of the business model concept, 
it is not surprising that a general accepted definition 
has not yet emerged. Therefore, it will be important for 
the definition to provide a generic and abstract concep-
tualization that can be applied for different purposes 
and in different contexts (e.g. technology, innovation, 
strategy).
Many (earlier) definitions summarize what a business 
model is made off (e.g., Bouwman, De Vos, & Haaker, 
2008; Osterwalder et al., 2005; Timmers, 1998); these 
definitions are very close to the frameworks and ele-
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Table 2: Categorizations or themes for business model definitions (ordered by year and author name).
Authors Categories/themes
Morris et al. (2005) % Strategic level 
% Operational level 
% Economical level
Osterwalder et al. 
(2005)
% Activity/role-related approach (inward looking)
% Value/customer-oriented approach (outward looking)
George and Bock 
(2011)
% Organizational design
% The resource-based view of the firm
% Narrative and sense-making
% The nature of innovation
% The nature of opportunity
% Transactive structures
Wirtz (2011) % Strategy-oriented approaches
% Organization-oriented approaches
% Technology-oriented approaches
Zott et al. (2011) % E-business and IT
% Strategy
% Technology and innovation management
ments discussed below and are less useful for deriving 
a generic and abstract definition. Other (later) defini-
tions are more formulated around the value logic in 
terms of creating, delivering and/or capturing value 
(e.g., Chesbrough, 2006; Johnson, 2010; Osterwalder & 
Pigneur, 2010; Teece, 2010). For example, Chesbrough 
(2006, p. 108) states that a business model performs 
two important functions: value creation and value cap-
ture. ‘First, it defines a series of activities that will yield 
a new product or service in such a way that there is net 
value created throughout the various activities. Sec-
ond, it captures value from a portion of those activi-
ties for the firm developing the model.’ Ghaziani and 
Ventresca (2005) concluded that the business model 
discourse is mostly framed around value creation. Even 
if the meaning is framed differently, these frames still 
embody the same idea, namely, ‘the question of how 
to create value in the face of a changing business en-
vironment’ (p. 545). ‘The different frames emphasize 
different aspects of the same problem. Generating 
revenues and managing relationships, although os-
tensibly different, both have something to say about 
the challenge of creating value in the unsettled Digital 
Economy’ (p. 545).
While most authors are not very explicit about what 
they mean with value, most definitions seem to refer 
to customer value (i.e. value for the customer) (e.g., 
Afuah, 2004; Dubosson-Torbay et al., 2002; Oster-
walder & Pigneur, 2010; Tapscott, 2001; Teece, 2010). 
Because most authors do not discuss what they mean 
with ‘value’ and ‘customer value,’ it is hard to compre-
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hend a definition of business model without a better 
understanding of the value concept. The concept of 
value has a long history in axiology or ‘the theory of val-
ue’ (Holbrook, 1999) and has been of interest to many 
different fields in the social sciences, including eco-
nomics, strategic management and marketing (Khali-
fa, 2004; Sanchez-Fernandez & Iniesta-Bonillo, 2006). 
We will take a closer look at the value concept in mar-
keting literature (and related management literature) 
as this is the most obvious source for customer value. 
In addition, we will briefly discuss the ideas on value 
creation in strategic management as this is the field 
where most business model authors rely on for their 
theoretical foundation. However, as will follow from 
the brief overview below, there are no straight answers 
to be found here either as customer value is a complex 
and multi-dimensional concept and value creation is 
still ill understood from a strategic perspective.
Conceptualizations of customer value range from more 
simplified, uni-dimensional to more complex and holis-
tic, multi-dimensional approaches (Sánchez-Fernández 
& Iniesta-Bonillo, 2007). Woodruff (1997) defines it as 
‘a customer’s perceived preference for and evaluation 
of those product attributes, attribute performances, 
and consequences arising from use that facilitate (or 
block) achieving the customer’s goals and purposes in 
use situations’ (p. 142). Woodruff’s definition reflects 
the richness and complexity of the concept, but may 
not be readily translated into an effective operational 
definition (Parasuraman, 1997). Holbrook (1999) em-
phasizes that consumer value is an ‘interactive rela-
tivistic preference experience’ (p. 5). An ‘interactive’ 
approach entails that ‘value depends on the charac-
teristics of some physical or mental object but cannot 
occur without the involvement of some subject who 
appreciates these characteristics’ (p. 6). It is ‘relativis-
tic’ because it depends on relevant comparisons, it var-
ies between people and it changes among situations. 
And ‘experience’ means that consumer value resides in 
the consumption experience rather than in the prod-
uct purchased. Customer value in the use context is 
also described as use value (or value-in-use), which is 
value created with and determined by the user during 
the consumption process (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; 
Dixon, 1990). This is differentiated from exchange val-
ue (or value-in-exchange), which is value embedded in 
the product itself (i.e. added during the production pro-
cess) and determined at the point of exchange process 
(Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Dixon, 1990). Bowman 
and Ambrosini (2000) see use value as being defined 
by customers, based on their perceptions of the use-
fulness of the product on offer. In monetary terms it 
is the amount the customer is prepared to pay for the 
product. They explicitly refer to perceived use value to 
stress that it is subjectively assessed by the customer. 
Exchange value is realized when the product is sold and 
it is the amount paid by the buyer to the producer.
In general, (strategic) management literature has not 
paid a lot of attention to consumers (Brief & Bazerman, 
2003). The emphasis has traditionally been on the sup-
ply side where the producers (solely) create value as 
reflected in the common term ‘added value’ (Priem, 
2007). So far there is little consensus on what value cre-
ation is and how it can be achieved in the management 
literature (Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007). A notable ex-
ception is Priem (2007), who introduces an orientation 
on consumers and value creation – the ‘consumer ben-
efit experienced’ viewpoint – as an alternative for the 
dominant orientation on producers and value capture 
in strategic management approaches based on firm 
positioning, transaction cost, and resource-based view. 
One of the fundamental ideas behind this perspective 
is that consumers experience value during their con-
sumption activities. So products and services are not 
‘value laden’ as they are without value when they are 
unconsumed. In subsequent work, Priem, Li, and Carr 
(2012) refer to ‘demand-side’ research that looks at 
explaining and predicting managerial decisions that in-
crease value creation within a value system based on 
product markets and consumers (downstream from 
the focal firm) instead of factor markets and producers 
(upstream of the focal firm). A demand-side approach 
recognizes that consumer’s heterogeneity of demand 
contributes to firm heterogeneity and emphasizes that 
firms first must compete to create more consumer 
value (to join the value system) and only then compete 
to capture that value. Adner and Zemsky (2006) also 
argue that value creation presents a distinct set of 
challenges and stress the role of demand-side factors 
in sustainable competitive advantage. 
Following the discussion of the business model defi-
nition and the value concept, we conclude that from 
a generic and abstract perspective a business model 
provides an integral view on the value logic of an or-
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ganization by bringing together customer (use) value 
and value creation with business (exchange) value and 
value capture. We propose the following definition: a 
business model describes the value logic of an orga-
nization in terms of how it creates and captures cus-
tomer value. This definition is similar to most of the 
more recent definitions of other authors, in particular 
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), Chesbrough (2006), 
and Johnson (2010), except our explicit reference to 
customer value. Moreover, we excluded ‘delivering’ 
value from our definition as we see the separation of 
creating value and delivering value as a supply-side 
perspective focussing on producers adding value. Cus-
tomer (use) value cannot be created without involving 
the user and considering the use context.
Our business definition is abstract and generic enough 
to cover the use of the business model concept for dif-
ferent purposes and in different contexts and to cater 
for the evolution of the business model concept over 
time within this relatively young and emerging field. 
This is facilitated by not including a comprehensive 
list of elements but leaving that to more specific and 
operational frameworks (as discussed below). Our defi-
nition reflects the current business model discourse, 
which is mostly framed around value creation (Ghaziani 
& Ventresca, 2005).The core reasoning of the business 
model is about the creation of customer value and 
linking this to the capture of customer value (for the 
creation of business/exchange value). This aligns well 
with the ideas of Peter Drucker who states that ‘There 
is only one valid definition of business purpose: to cre-
ate a customer’ and ‘It is the customer who determines 
what a business is’ (Drucker, 2007, p. 31). While most 
business model authors nowadays emphasise value 
creation this does, however, not mean that value cap-
ture is ignored (Zott, Amit, & Massa, 2010). But while 
there is some attention to capturing the customer val-
ue created, business value and sustainable competi-
tive advantage are stressed in strategy (Chesbrough 
& Rosenbloom, 2002). Our definition model focuses 
on the firm level, but this does not exclude taking the 
network level into account. The specific firm can be the 
focal organization of a business network that plays a 
prominent role in creating and capturing customer val-
ue. In this way the business model can become a new 
level of analysis positioned between the firm and the 
network level (Zott et al., 2011). 
Based on the discussion of the business model defini-
tion, we also see opportunities for further developing 
the definition. Because most authors do only limitedly 
address what is meant with customer value and value 
creation, we suggest that business model research 
pays more attention to other literature in this area, in 
particular from marketing and strategic management. 
However, the current literature on customer value and 
value creation will not provide any straight answers ei-
ther as customer value is a complex and multi-dimen-
sional concept and value creation is still ill-understood, 
in particular from a strategic perspective. Moreover, 
there is an opportunity for business model research to 
contribute to the strategy literature as the business 
model can contribute to an expanded boundary model 
that includes value creation and integrates a demand 
side perspective (Priem, Butler, & Li, 2013)
Business Model Frameworks and 
Elements
Closely related to the business model definitions are 
the compositional elements describing what a busi-
ness model is made-off. The elements are also referred 
to as, for example, building blocks (e.g., Osterwalder 
& Pigneur, 2010), components (e.g., Pateli & Giag-
lis, 2004), (key) questions (e.g., Morris et al., 2005), 
or functions (e.g., Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). 
Business model elements are sometimes presented 
as part of the definitions and other times described in 
separate lists, frameworks or ontologies. Gordijn, Os-
terwalder, and Pigneur (2005) state that this kind of 
research has evolved from ‘shopping lists’ of compo-
nents, to components as building blocks, to reference 
models and ontologies. This means the description 
of elements has become more explicitly conceptual-
ized, shared and formal. Business model frameworks 
and ontologies do not only define the elements, they 
also define the relationships between the elements 
(e.g., Gordijn et al., 2005). They often also introduce 
some hierarchal structure, in particular a two-layered 
model with higher-level and lower level elements (e.g., 
Johnson et al., 2008; Morris et al., 2005; Osterwalder, 
2004). Table 3 presents a selective overview of busi-
ness model frameworks to briefly introduce the topic 
by describing a few prominent examples and highlight 
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some communalities and differences. Note that it 
is not our intention to be comprehensive here but to 
mainly focus on a representative set of well-known 
frameworks from different origins (in particular e-busi-
ness, innovation, and entrepreneurship). See for more 
complete overviews, for example, Shafer et al. (2005) 
and Zott et al. (2011).
The most well-known and widely used framework is 
the Business Model Canvas (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 
2010). The Business Model Canvas is presented as a 
shared language for describing, visualizing, assessing 
and changing business models. It is focussed on design 
and innovation, in particular by using visual thinking 
which stimulates a holistic approach and storytelling. 
The Canvas is a follow up of the Business Model On-
tology (Osterwalder, 2004). In this ontology the ele-
ments are grouped into four pillars: customer interface 
(segments, relationships and channels), product (value 
proposition), infrastructure management (activities, 
resources, and partners) and financial aspects (rev-
enues and costs). Osterwalder (2004) shows how the 
ontology synthesize most of the other business model 
frameworks and elements at that time (e.g., Afuah & 
Tucci, 2001; Hamel, 2000; Magretta, 2002). 
The Four-Box Business Model (Johnson, 2010; Johnson 
et al., 2008) has many similarities with the Business 
Model Canvas. Johnson stresses the interdependencies 
between the boxes in terms of consistency and com-
plementarily and sees this as the way in which a simple 
framework can become quite complex. However, there 
is not much further discussion of these interdepend-
encies or support for dealing with them. The main dif-
ference between the Business Model Canvas and the 
Four-Box Business Model is that the former has a cus-
tomer pillar while the latter does not have a separate 
customer box but covers customer aspects to some 
extent in the value proposition box. Moreover, while 
the Business Model Canvas has key partnerships as a 
separate element, the Four-Box Business Model puts 
it under key resources. The Four-Box Business Model 
includes more detailed operational (business rules, 
behavioural norms and success metrics) and financial 
(target unit margin and resource velocity) aspects than 
the Business Model Canvas.
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) discuss business 
models in relation to technological innovation. They 
position the business model as a heuristic logic and 
focusing device that mediates between technology de-
velopment and economic value creation. Chesbrough 
and Rosenbloom state that ‘the business model pro-
vides a coherent framework that takes technological 
characteristics and potentials as inputs, and converts 
them through customers and markets into economic 
inputs’ (p. 532). The elements of Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom are quite similar to the Business Model 
Canvas and the Four-Box Business Model. They do ex-
plicitly mention the value network as one of the ele-
ments, which includes customers, suppliers, comple-
mentors, and competitors. Moreover, Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom also see the competitive strategy as an 
element in the business model, which is not the case 
for the Business Model Canvas and the Four-Box Busi-
ness Model. However they do stress that this does not 
cover the full strategy and that there are differences 
between the business model and strategy, such as the 
fact that the business model emphasizes value crea-
tion while the strategy emphasizes value capture.
Morris et al. (2005) approach the business model from 
an entrepreneurship perspective. Similar to the Four-
Box Business Model, they also include more details on 
the financial aspects (operating leverage, volumes, and 
margins). In line with Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
Morris et al. also include competitive strategy as an el-
ement in the business model. Moreover, one of their 
elements addresses the personal factors of the entre-
preneur or investor in relation to their time, scope, and 
size ambitions, which they also refer to as ‘the invest-
ment model.’ This takes into account that there are 
different venture types possible such as the subsist-
ence, income, growth and speculative models. In addi-
tion, Morris et al. also stress the importance of internal 
and external fit with respect to the six elements. While 
internal fit (consistency and reinforcement between 
the components) is required for a working model, a 
strong internal fit can undermine adaptability and re-
sult in a poor external fit when the environment is tur-
bulent. Morris et al. also note that the components in-
teract with each other and that the investment model 
(component 6) effectively delimits decisions made in 
all other areas.
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Table 3: A selective overview of business model frameworks and elements (ordered by year and author name).
Author(s) List/Framework and Elements
Weill and Vitale 
(2001)
Business Model Schematics Atomic E-business Model
% roles and relationships (electronic and pri-
mary – including the firm of interest, its 
customers, suppliers and allies)
% major flows of product, information, and 
money
% revenues and other benefits each partici-
pant receives
% Strategic objectives & value proposition
% Sources of revenue
% Critical success factors
% Core competencies
 
E-business Initiative
% Combination of atomic models
% Targeted customer segments
% Channels to the customer
% IT infrastructure capability
Osterwalder 
(2004);
Osterwalder and 
Pigneur (2010)
Business Model Canvas
% Customer Segments
% Customer Relationships
% Communication, Distribution & Sales Channels
% Value Propositions
% Key Resources 
% Key Activities
% Key Partnerships
% Revenue Streams
% Cost Structure
Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom 
(2002)
Technology-market mediation
% Value proposition
% Market segment
% Value chain
% cost structure & profit potential
% value network
% competitive strategy
Morris et al. 
(2005)
Entrepreneur’s business model
% How do we create value? (factors related to 
the offering)
% Who do we create value for? (market factors)
% What is our source of competence? (internal 
capability factors)
% How do we competitively position ourselves? 
(strategy factors)
% How we make money? (economic factors)
% What are our time, scope, and size ambitions? 
(personal/investor factors)
Continues on next page
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Weill and Vitale (2001) introduce E-business Model 
Schematics for describing e-business models. This 
Framework uses the elements in Timmers’ definition 
(Timmers, 1998) as starting-point and adds a visual 
representation to it. Moreover, Weill and Vitale dif-
ferentiate between atomic e-business model and e-
business initiatives that are based on combinations of 
atomic models and identify specific elements for both. 
What is notable about the approach of Weill and Vitale 
is its focus on e-business, which comes with special 
attention for information flows, electronic relation-
ships, and IT infrastructure. Some other frameworks 
even have a separate, higher-order element address-
ing technology (e.g., Bouwman et al., 2008; Mason & 
Spring, 2011). Moreover, the network perspective on 
the organizational architecture is very prominent in E-
business Model Schematics with a description of roles, 
relationships and flows.
Business model frameworks address what a business 
model is made-off. As the framework overview above 
shows, there are significant similarities in terms of the 
elements that can be used to represent how an or-
ganization (in a network setting) creates and captures 
customer value. From a comparison of 18 frameworks 
and lists, Morris et al. (2005) state that the num-
ber of elements mentioned varies from four to eight 
and that a total of 24 different items are mentioned 
as possible elements, with 15 receiving multiple men-
tions. They conclude ‘that the most frequently cited 
are the firm’s value offering (11), economic model (10), 
customer interface/relationship (8), partner network/
roles (7), internal infrastructure/connected activities 
(6), and target markets (5). Some items overlap, such 
as customer relationships and the firm’s partner net-
work or the firm’s revenue sources, products, and value 
offering’ (p. 727). Al-Debei and Avison (2010) suggest 
a unified business model conceptual framework with 
the dimensions value proposition, value architecture, 
value network, and value finance. Based on our descrip-
tion and discussion of business model frameworks, the 
findings of Morris et al. (2005) and the unified model of 
Al-Debei and Avison (2010), we suggest that the core 
elements of a business model should address the cus-
tomer, value proposition, organizational architecture 
and economics dimensions.
The customer dimension identifies the target cus-
tomers and articulates their problem (a difference be-
tween the current and desired situation). This problem 
(or opportunity) is sometimes also described as the 
job-to-be-done (Johnson et al., 2008; Ulwick, 2005). 
The value proposition dimension presents the or-
ganization’s solution to deal with the customer prob-
lem often in terms of an offering and its potential 
benefits. The value proposition is the first amongst 
equals and can be seen as the central dimension of 
the business model, as also argued by, for example, 
Zott et al. (2011). The organizational architecture di-
mension addresses how the value proposition can be 
effectuated by the capabilities and resources of the 
focal organization and the other actors in the busi-
Table 3: A selective overview of business model frameworks and elements (ordered by year and author name).
Johnson et al. 
(2008);
Johnson (2010)
Four-Box Business Model
% Customer Value Proposition
• Job-to-be-done
• Offering
% Profit Formula
• Revenue Model
• Cost Structure
• Target Unit Margin
• Resource Velocity
% Key Resources
% Key Processes
• Processes
• Business Rules & Success Metrics
• Behavioural Norms
Continued from previous page
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ness network. There can be differences between the 
representation of the organizational architecture at 
the organizational and network level, for example the 
value chain and the value system (Porter, 1985). The 
economics dimension focuses on financial considera-
tions (how to make money) in terms of the revenues 
and costs and their drivers (e.g. margin, economies 
of scale). Economics can also include non-financial 
considerations related to social and environmental 
considerations (e.g. the triple bottom line). Together 
these business model dimensions cover the core ques-
tions about creating and capturing customer value in 
terms of who, what, why and how. The identification 
of four dimensions advances our understanding of the 
business model concept from the earlier discussion 
on definitions and moves the conceptualisation from 
abstract and generic to more concrete and specific. A 
business model describes the value logic of an orga-
nization in terms of how it creates and captures cus-
tomer value and can be concisely represented by an 
interrelated set of elements that address the custom-
er, value proposition, organizational architecture and 
economics dimensions.
We suggest to include the business model dimensions 
as high-level core elements and to make use of busi-
ness model frameworks as multi-level structures spec-
ifying a (limited) number of higher-order elements (or 
pillars, boxes, questions, etc.) and elaborating these in 
more detail as lower-level elements (or building blocks, 
components, factors, etc.). This means that depend-
ing on the specific purpose, context and/or theoretical 
foundations of a business model study, a more special-
ised framework can be used that may have additional 
higher-order elements and/or more specific lower-
order elements. In this way business model research 
can, on the one hand, build on a cumulative body of 
knowledge and, on the other hand, be flexible enough 
to adapt to specific purposes and circumstances. For 
example, some frameworks may have additional high-
er-order elements addressing strategy or technology. 
Or some frameworks may cover the economics dimen-
sion by a financial higher-order element and revenues 
and costs as lower-order elements while others add 
volume, growth and resource velocity as additional 
lower-order elements. This flexibility does mean that 
when developing or using a business model framework, 
it is required to address the origin and foundation of 
the framework and elements and discuss assumptions 
and limitations. 
A business model framework should not only define 
the elements, but also define the relationships be-
tween the elements. According to Morris, Minet, Rich-
ardson, and Allen (2006, p. 47) ‘a useable business 
model framework captures the ways in which key de-
cision variables are integrated, including the need for 
unique combinations that are internally consistent.’ 
It is important to recognize that a business model 
framework ‘more than the sum of its parts, the model 
captures the essence of how the business system will 
be focused’ (Morris et al., 2005, p. 727). This is in line 
with suggestions that the business model is a system 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2001) with complex interdependencies 
between its elements (Johnson, 2010). Moreover, there 
should be a blend (Mahadevan, 2000) or balance (Bou-
wman et al., 2008) between the different dimensions. 
We suggest to take this one step further, more than 
a consistency or fit between the business model ele-
ments, the strongest business models create synergies 
between them going beyond tensions and trade-offs 
between customer and business perspectives and be-
tween value creation and capture. However, while the 
importance of the relationships and consistency be-
tween the elements in a business model framework is 
recognized, this topic is hardly addressed by literature 
so far except at the even more concrete level of busi-
ness model archetypes. Moreover, there is also a lack 
of empirical testing of the business model frameworks 
and elements. Here also research on business model 
archetypes can be of great value as this research is of-
ten based on empirical studies.
Business Model Classifications and 
Archetypes
Business model research has been addressing the iden-
tification and description of different types of business 
models. These archetypes are discussed individually 
or collectively as part of a classification (Hedman & 
Kalling, 2003; Osterwalder et al., 2005; Pateli & Giaglis, 
2004).An archetype can refer to  a full business model, 
often an exemplar based on a specific company such as 
the ‘low-cost carrier model’ of SouthWest Airlines, or 
a simplified, basic model, such as the ‘full service pro-
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vider’ atomic business model (Weill & Vitale, 2001), or a 
specific aspect or element of a business model, for ex-
ample, the ‘free’ business model pattern (Osterwalder 
& Pigneur, 2010) for the revenue model. In this section 
we will discuss a number of these archetypes and clas-
sifications to get an impression of this area of research 
and link it to the business model conceptualization. It 
is not intended as being comprehensive with respect 
to the full range of archetypes or classifications but is 
representative and in particular covers e-business re-
search, which has been most prolific in this area.
Authors in academic literature as well as popular press 
identify and discuss generic representations of specific 
types of business models and/or specific instantiations 
of these specific types. Common examples are the ‘ra-
zor-and-blades model’ of Gillette, the ‘power-by-the-
hour model’ of Rolls Royce, the ‘low-cost carrier model’ 
of SouthWest Airlines, the ‘direct sales with build-to-
order model’ of Dell, and the ‘the customer is the com-
pany model’ of Threadless. The in-depth descriptions 
of business model archetypes often address interest-
ing business models of well-known firms or innovative 
business models of upcoming firms based on empiri-
cal studies. For example, With the rise of the Internet, 
there was a lot of attention for e-business models, 
which later on got refined to pure-play and clicks-and-
mortars models (e.g., Afuah & Tucci, 2003). Another 
example, Anderson (2009) discusses how companies 
can be successful by giving away things for free and us-
ing more indirect revenue sources like cross-subsidies 
or freemium. The in-depth descriptions of business 
model archetypes are often presented as engaging 
stories of real world examples or in-depth case studies. 
This makes the business model concept very concrete 
and practical.
While some authors focussed on individual business 
model archetypes, others started producing classifi-
cations of multiple business model archetypes in the 
form of lists or typologies (Table 3). The rise of the In-
ternet resulted in an increase in business model choic-
es (Pateli & Giaglis, 2004) with new e-business models 
and adapted versions of traditional ‘bricks-and-mortar’ 
models. There were many authors trying to describe 
and understand different e-business models, for exam-
ple Timmers (1998), Rappa (2000) and Weill and Vitale 
(2001). Later the specific focus on e-business models 
lessened, although many of the newer models are still 
associated with technology as driver or enabler. Oster-
walder and Pigneur (2010) and Johnson (2010) are ex-
amples of newer lists that are not e-business focussed. 
Sometimes classifications make use of business model 
frameworks to systematically describe each business 
model archetype, as abstract presentation or exem-
plary instantiation, with the help of a business model 
framework. This is, for example, done by Weill and Vi-
tale (2001), Afuah and Tucci (2003), and Osterwalder 
and Pigneur (2010).
While most business model classifications are lists 
that present an unordered set of business model ar-
chetypes, some provide business model typologies 
that position archetypes relative to each other based 
on underlying criteria. For example, Timmers (1998) 
uses 2 criteria for classifying his Internet business 
models: (1) functional integration (form single func-
tion to multiple functions/integrated) and (2) degree 
of innovation (from lower to higher). While the typolo-
gies provide insights into different types of business 
models and their relative positioning, there is little in-
tegration or consolidation of the different criteria and 
model types presented by different authors. Moreover, 
the criteria used to classify business models overlap to 
some extent with the elements in the business model 
frameworks, for example, Weill and Vitale (2001) and 
Afuah and Tucci (2003). It is unclear what the relation 
between the criteria and elements is. Moreover, there 
is no holistic and exhaustive business model taxonomy 
available yet (Lambert, 2006; Pateli & Giaglis, 2004). 
Whereas a typology is an arbitrary/artificial classifica-
tion that suits a specific need with categories that are 
conceptually derived and based on a limited number of 
variables, a taxonomy is a general/natural classifica-
tion providing a basis for generalisation with catego-
ries that are empirically derived and based on a large 
number of variables (Lambert, 2006).
The classifications and archetypes can be applied for 
the design and management of business models, for 
example, business model composition (Weill & Vitale, 
2001), business model decision-making (Morris et 
al., 2005) and business model maturity (Chesbrough, 
2006). Moreover, this kind of research is also impor-
tant for business model innovation as it can help as-
sessing the novelty of a business model. Weill and Vi-
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 Table 4: A selective overview of business model classifications (ordered by year and author name).
Author(s) Classification Comments
Timmers (1998) Internet business models Classified by 2 criteria: 
(1) functional integration; 
(2) degree of innovation
% e-shop
% e-procurement
% e-auction
% 3rd party marketplace
% e-mall
% Virtual communities
% Value chain integrator
% Information brokers
% Value chain service provider
% Collaboration platforms
Rappa (2000) Business models on the web
% Brokerage model
% Advertising Model
% Infomediary Model
% Merchant Model
% Manufacturer Model
% Affiliate Model
% Community Model
% Subscription Model
% Utility Model
Weill and Vitale 
(2001)
Atomic e-business models
Described by 4 elements (see 
atomic e-business model in 
Table 3)% Content Provider % Direct to Consumer 
% Full Service Provider 
% Intermediary
% Shared Infrastructure 
% Value net integrator
% Virtual Community 
% Whole of Enterprise/ 
Government
Afuah and Tucci 
(2003)
(Internet) Business models (based on dominant revenue 
models) Described by 4 elements: (1) 
profit site (role in value network), 
(2) revenue model, (3) commerce 
strategy and (4) pricing model% Commission% Advertising
% Mark-up
% Production
% Referral
% Subscription
% Fee-for-service
Johnson (2010) Business model analogies
% Affinity club
% Brokerage
% Bundling
% Cell phone
% Crowdsourcing
% Disintermediation
% Fractionalization
% Freemium
% Leasing 
% Low touch
% Negative operating cycle
% Pay-as-you-go
% Razors-and-blades
% Reverse auction
% Reverse razors-and-
blades
% Product-to-service
% Standardization
% Subscription club
% User community
Osterwalder 
and Pigneur 
(2010)
% Unbundling
% Long tail
% Multi-sided platforms
% Free (Freemium, Bait & 
Hook)
% Open
Described by 9 elements (see 
Business model Canvas in Table 
3)
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tale (2001) discuss how atomic e-business models can 
be seen as pure types or as building blocks for more 
complex compositions in business model design and 
innovation. They also address how compositions need 
to take the synergies and conflicts between atomic 
e-business models into account, for example, while 
direct-to-customer and virtual community go well to-
gether, direct-to-customer should not be combined 
with content provider.  The business model framework 
of Morris et al. (2005) includes 3 levels: foundation, 
proprietary and rules levels. The business models ar-
chetypes can be used at the foundation level to help 
making generic decisions regarding what the business 
is and is to ensure that such decisions are internally 
consistent. Chesbrough (2006) presents different busi-
ness models archetypes as part of a maturity model for 
open innovation. It moves from very basic models with 
little advantages for the company to highly sophisti-
cated models that drive the innovation activities of a 
company and form a platform for leading its industry.
Business model classifications and archetypes are im-
portant for the conceptualisation of business mod-
els, as they are more concrete and empirical than the 
definitions and frameworks. However, research into 
classifications and archetypes is very fragmented and 
not yet well developed, often lacking a systematic ap-
proach. Business model archetypes can benefit from 
more rigorously applying business model frameworks 
to systematically describe an archetype and specify its 
scope (i.e. does it cover the complete business model 
or only certain elements). An archetypical description 
of a complete business model should at least address 
the customer, value proposition, organizational archi-
tecture, and economics dimensions to provide a holistic 
understanding of how a certain way of doing business 
creates and captures customer value. Research into 
classifications and archetypes can also be used to vali-
date and enrich our understanding of business model 
definitions and frameworks; in particular it can help to 
empirically test the business model frameworks and 
explore the relationships and consistency between 
business model elements. This also means that re-
search into business model archetypes can make con-
tributions that go beyond identifying and describing a 
particular archetype.
Concluding remarks
The business model concept is still criticized for being 
fuzzy and vague and lacking consensus on its defini-
tion and compositional elements. In this paper we 
set out to advance our understanding of the business 
model concept by addressing three areas of research: 
business model definitions, business model elements, 
and business model archetypes. We conclude that a 
business model describes the value logic of an orga-
nization in terms of how it creates and captures cus-
tomer value and can be concisely represented by an 
interrelated set of elements that address the custom-
er, value proposition, organizational architecture and 
economics dimensions.
Business model definitions are converging around de-
scribing how organizations can create and capture cus-
tomer value. These kinds of definitions are abstract 
and generic enough to cover the use of the business 
model concept for different purposes and in different 
contexts (e.g. technology, innovation, strategy). We ex-
plicitly include the customer value (or use value) where 
other definitions are less clear by referring to value in 
general or include business value (or exchange value). 
The focus is on the value creation from the customer 
perspective and linking value creation to value cap-
ture. However, a more strategic perspective is required 
to fully understand value capture and business value. 
Moreover, while the focus is on the organization, the 
business network needs to be included as well when it 
plays a critical role in creating and capturing customer 
value. Advancing the business model definition will re-
quire further research into customer value and value 
creation and needs to address related research in mar-
keting and strategic management. Moreover, there is 
an opportunity for a unique contribution of business 
model theory focussing on the integration of customer 
(use) value and value creation with business (exchange) 
value and value capture. 
While the business model definition is abstract and 
generic, business model frameworks and elements can 
make the business model concept more specific and 
operational. We suggest that a business model frame-
work needs to include four dimensions that address the 
customer, value proposition, organizational architec-
ture and economics. The value proposition can be seen 
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as the central dimension. Organizational architecture 
can be both at the firm and network level. Economics 
can also include non-financial considerations. Together 
these dimensions cover the basic who, what, why, and 
how questions about creating and capturing customer 
value. We suggest using a multi-level structure, which 
is used by many business model frameworks, and in-
clude the business model dimensions as high-level core 
elements. Additional high-level elements (e.g. technol-
ogy, competitive strategy) can be included depending 
on the purpose and context. Also the elaboration into 
low-level elements can provide additional flexibility. 
However, there should be a minimal agreed upon set 
of low-level elements for each high-level (core) ele-
ment (e.g. revenues and costs for economics). Future 
research should empirically test the business model 
framework and elements. Moreover, the development 
of theory or guidelines about when and how to extent 
or adapt a framework could greatly contribute to the 
quality and consistency of the development and ap-
plication of business model frameworks. In addition, 
research into the relationship between the business 
model elements is needed to further advance the 
frameworks.
Business model classifications and archetypes describe 
different types of business models more fully or par-
tially (i.e. covering only certain elements or aspects). 
While some authors have focussed on specific arche-
types, others have developed lists or typologies. This 
research is of great value for better understanding the 
business model concept due to its empirical nature and 
practical approach. The classifications and archetypes 
can be applied for the innovation, design and manage-
ment of business models. However, research on busi-
ness model classifications and archetypes has so far 
been not very systematic and is quite fragmented. This 
research can benefit from the systematic use of busi-
ness model frameworks for describing business model 
archetypes and determining their scope. Moreover, a 
better understanding of the use of typologies and their 
underlying criteria is also required. The development of 
a more holistic and exhaustive business model taxono-
my is also seen as an important area of future research. 
Research into business model archetypes can also help 
to empirically test the business model frameworks and 
to further explore the relationships and consistency be-
tween business model elements.
Our understanding of the business model concept ad-
vanced greatly from the foundational research into 
business model definitions, business model frame-
works and elements, and business model classifica-
tions and archetypes. Moreover, we argue that these 
three areas complement each other in advancing our 
understanding of the business model concept and cre-
ating consensus on its definition and compositional el-
ements. The business model definition can provide us 
with a generic and abstract conceptualization. Speci-
fying the compositional elements of a business model 
can make the business model concept more specific 
and operational and can offer the flexibility to cater for 
different purposes and contexts. Business model clas-
sifications and archetypes can benefit greatly from the 
use of business model frameworks. Business model 
definitions and frameworks can be validated and en-
riched by the empirical research into classifications and 
archetypes.
As we did not use a comprehensive, systematic litera-
ture review, there are limitations to the paper in terms 
of it covering all business model definitions, business 
model frameworks and elements, and business model 
classifications and archetypes in academic literature. 
However, we did make use of the insights from sys-
tematic literature review by others (e.g., Zott & Amit, 
2013) to complement the papers that we included in 
our selective overviews. Moreover, we left a discussion 
of the theoretical foundation of the business model 
concept out of this paper. For a full understanding of 
the concept this should also be addressed. Different 
theoretical perspectives are indirectly included by their 
influence on the business model definitions and the 
business model frameworks and elements.
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